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The Revd. C. Williams

a remembrance of
Gresford Parsonage
from his old friend
E. Newcome

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A. C. & M. Newcome
Shenley. 1803

DISCOURSES

ON THE

MALEVOLENT

SENTIMENTS.

By JOHN HEY, D. D.

NEWPORT-PAGNEL.

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Malevolent Sentiments.

PART I.

HATRED.

1 *John ii.* 9.

HE THAT SAYS HE IS IN THE LIGHT, AND HATETH HIS BROTHER, IS IN DARKNESS EVEN UNTIL NOW.

1. THE Gospel dispensation is compared to the light, in many places of holy writ; and with great reason: "whatever doth make manifest is light." Suppose men to hold any sort of intercourse with each other in a light which is faint and imperfect, and it is natural to conceive them interfering with each other, and doing each other harm; but suppose the light to shine fully upon them, they must not only see how to avoid any hurtful interference, but they must discern that in each other which is adapted to excite mutual regard and affection. So when men are involved in the spiritual or moral darkness of ignorance and barbarism, they find it difficult to avoid incroaching on each others rights; they become insensibly engaged in a course of injuries, begun perhaps through inadvertence, but carried on through passion, till the light of true wisdom illumines the scene, then they are enabled to perceive the ways of avoiding offences, and to discover qualities, which incline them to mutual friendship and beneficence.

2. There is no evil into which men are more apt to fall, whilst grossly ignorant of religion and morality, than an excessive indulgence of the *malignant passions:* there is perhaps no one thing which would better mark out degrees of barbarism than the degrees in which

such passions habitually prevail: with regard to these, Christianity hath a peculiar title to be compared to the light: for it not only enjoins the practice of benevolent virtues, but puts us upon various methods of softening our dispositions and rendering ourselves kindly affectioned towards each other in brotherly love. And yet we find from St. John, that some persons could profess themselves Christians, though they indulged themselves in hating their brethren. "He that saith he is in the light, and hateth his brother, is in darkness even until now."

3. Some remarks heretofore offered by me to a respectable audience, *(a)* and afterwards to the public, have been thought to fall, in some measure, under the censure of the Apostle; as being in some sort favourable to hatred and other unkind passions; but surely it is one thing to justify our Creator in giving us our malevolent affections, as far as they are his work, and another to justify man in indulging them to the hurt of his species. A thing may be given to a man with a kind intention, and judiciously, to be used on a particular occasion, though it cannot be used without doing some harm; and though the unrestrained and unlimited use of it, on all occasions, would be pernicious. He who puts a *sword* into your hand when you are attacked by an assassin, is your benefactor, and acts a reasonable part; but it does not follow, that you can make use of what is given you, without some present partial evil; or that the use of destructive weapons always promotes the general good. It seems, however, expedient, for the purpose of preventing wrong notions on this matter, to treat the subject of the malevolent affections somewhat more fully than I did in the work alluded to; so as to comprehend not only a justification of the Deity, but the part which man ought to take in the discipline and regulation of such affections; in both which things it would be a very material assistance if I might be permitted to go so far as to examine the declarations and precepts of the holy scriptures.

4. Although our sentiments are very various and diversified, yet it is found commodious to treat them as if each class were only a single sentiment or passion. We have accordingly divided malevolent sentiments

into four classes, or passions; *Hatred*, *Envy*, *Malice*, and *Resentment*. And the method, with regard to each, might be,

In the first place to consider its *Nature*.

In the second place to enumerate some of its good and bad *effects*.

And in the third place, to offer some hints of a practical sort, which might contribute towards the due management and *regulation* of it.

We begin with the passion of *Hatred*: a passion the Nature of which it is more difficult to define, than that of any other now before us. Still let us not give up the attempt; as every degree of explanation or investigation will be useful in practice. We will first view it experimentally, and then notice expressions of Scripture which relate to it.

5. On any occasion whatever, when we want to convey a precise idea of any feeling, we must consider first, whether he to whom we would convey it, already uses the *name* of it familiarly, or not: for it may happen, that the name may be commonly used by one whose idea affixed to the name is by no means precise and determinate. And it is also worthy to be remarked, that we generally use words by our feelings long before we think of defining: and that we are able to do this with such steadiness and uniformity as to answer the ends of conversation.

If the name is already in use, the regular way to ascertain the precise idea annexed to it, would be, to enumerate the instances in which it is used, and to class those instances, perhaps over and over again, until the peculiar circumstances appeared, in which that word could be used, and no other. But if the name were unknown to any man, though as a man he must sometimes feel the sentiment, then the proper or only way to describe the sentiment would be, to present the *object* which naturally excited it. In discourses of this nature we cannot perfectly attain to either of these modes of describing the sentiment of hatred; but we may approach to both. We may approach to the

former, to the description of a sentiment commonly spoken of, by distinguishing it from others with which it is apt to be confounded, and by contrasting it with its opposites. We may approach to the latter mode, by describing the object, instead of actually presenting it to the senses.

6. Thus it will tend to clear up our idea of hatred if we conceive it as the *opposite* to Love. And perhaps it might not be useless if we were to conceive Love to be gradually diminished by certain objects, till it vanished, or settled into indifference; then the continued application of the same objects would generate hatred. A person who could form such conceptions to himself, would at the same time acquire some idea of the origin of that sentiment; or of the manner in which it is generated in the human mind.

7. But our idea of hatred will be more definite if we *distinguish* that term from others, with which it is apt to be confounded. As aversion, envy, jealousy, enmity, malevolence, contempt, and disapprobation, or detestation.

Aversion is the opposite to desire; and desire being a tendency to some object, with a view to some particular gratification, aversion must be an opposite tendency. Hatred may be a cause of aversion, but it is distinct from aversion. We may feel some sentiments of hatred without avoiding the objects of it. And we may avoid without hating; as from some species of fear. Besides, we have aversion on the sight of some *things*, inanimate and irrational; whereas we only hate *persons*, properly speaking; or those beings which have intentions. If at any time we seem to hate things inanimate, it is only when they are viewed by our Imaginations in the light of Persons.* *Envy* presupposes a competition, which hatred does not. *Jealousy* is only a species of Envy. *Enmity* is a fixed and habitual inclination to do ill offices; composed chiefly of resentment, arising from a supposed violation of rights: whereas hatred may be only a momentary feeling, not concerned with rights of justice; it may be softened, or wholly remov-

* See Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments, Part II. Sect. 3. Chap. I. p. 211. Octavo.

ed, by a look, a word, a gesture. Nor is it impossible for a man to feel the effect of odious qualities without any settled purpose of doing harm. Which last remark shews the difference between hatred and *malevolence*, as malevolence is nothing but a desire to do harm. Hatred is apt to generate malevolence; but the offspring is not to be confounded with the parent. Little needs be said to distinguish *contempt* from hatred, if we listen to the notion of a philosophical Historian,* who affirms, that we never hate those whom we despise. Indeed Love and Hatred seem to have those persons for their objects, who are considered as our *equals: (b)* and contempt always estimates its object as in some sense an inferior. Disapprobation, or *detestation*, arises from a view of conduct; or if we in some sort disapprove of persons, it is because they violate some rules of conduct. Hatred does not necessarily imply any reference of actions to rules.

8. But though hatred may easily be distinguished from disapprobation, yet their connexion and their mutual influence is important enough to demand great attention. Under their connexion must be included the connexion and mutual influence of their opposites, love and approbation. The right notion of Love or Hatred seems to be, that sentiment which is generated in the mind by a person's having so frequently occasioned you pleasant or unpleasant feelings, that the idea of him is become habitually associated with such feelings; and his appearance, real or imaginary, instantly produces them. Now generally, nothing makes a person so lovely as virtue, to any one who has moral feeling, or so odious as vice; but it may happen, that virtue, by occasioning you some disappointment, or shock, may excite in you unpleasant feelings; as when a good man is more reserved, frugal, temperate, than you had looked for; when you had hoped for sympathy, but find the contrary; when he checks your desires, mortifies your vanity, by reproof or otherwise, makes you feel uneasy to yourself; pronounces sentence against you, levies contributions on your property, and so forth. And the unpleasantness of your feelings may be increased by his

* Hume's Hist. A. D. 1194. War with France.

being ungraceful, deformed, indigent; or by his having some bodily disorder: other circumstances might be mentioned. In like manner, though generally speaking vice makes a person more odious than any thing else, yet a person vicious in some respects may have qualities which may lessen the odiousness arising from his vice; as wit, eloquence, politeness, carelessness about money, beauty of person, or dress or other ornaments, external accomplishments, taste for the fine arts, or a graceful manner of glossing over his vicious conduct. In such cases, approbation is in a state of contention with Love, and disapprobation with hatred. The disgust which arises when we find good men reserved, poor, sick, deformed, reprovers, adverse judges, and so forth, is to be opposed by approbation of their moral characters: and our fancy for a pleasing person who is wicked or unprincipled, by our moral disapprobation. To be aware of such contentions as are here described is of very great importance; we may be in duty bound to maintain an affectionate regard and love for a person who has many faults, or vices; or we may suffer greatly, when a person is vicious and unprincipled, from his appearing too lovely in our eyes.

9. The second-mentioned method of giving an idea of the nature of any feeling is presenting the *object* of it, so that the feeling may be excited. The mere term hatred would no more convey the idea of the sentiment by any power of its own, than it would the idea of the Palsy, or of the shock of Electricity. In discourse, however, we cannot present the object itself, we can only refresh men's feelings by some faint description.

Think then what it is that you feel when you see a person of a rude, haughty character, coarse manner and ungraceful appearance; despising the rules of decency and decorum; hard, insensible, uncivilized; inattentive to the feelings of those with whom he converses; overbearing the delicacy of modest sense, and making meek virtue and unassuming worth shrink in silent confusion. Or think what you feel when you meet with one who is mean, sordid, effeminate, cowardly; without love of order, neatness, cleanliness; void of elegance and taste, of narrow mind and con-

fused intellect, yet busy, officious, curious, impertinent; deficient in wisdom, yet full of low artifice and hidden duplicity. All these qualities heightened by an ill-contrived exterior, and expressed in an illiberal countenance. Think what you feel on the sight of a person who has been frequently the occasion of making you yourself in particular dissatisfied; or appear unfortunate or despicable. Whether by his unmerited and ill-applied prosperity, or his insolence in boasting of it, or by his baseness in attaining it, or in any other way. Think what has been the effect when you have been eager to indulge your finer feelings; to expand yourself, as it were; to communicate your love of truth or virtue; or your relish for some liberal art; to expatiate on whatever has struck you as lovely, noble, ingenious; as likely to enlarge your sphere of beneficence; and all these efforts have been checked by want of sympathetic spirit; have been blighted by the chilling coldness of your companion. Or think, lastly, what has been the state of your mind when all the expectations were disappointed, which you had formed on the character, age, profession of those with whom you have conversed. When from men in years you have expected sound sense and unembarrassed argument, the result of practice and experience; or moderation and serene cheerfulness, with settled habits of easy virtue, the effects of having nearly finished their earthly labours, and of looking forward to a better world:—And you have been struck with the prevalence of some animal propensity, some cunning craftiness, eager ambition, sordid avarice, or perhaps vain affectation of youthful vivacity and licentiousness. Or when from a robust form and habit of body you have expected fortitude and magnanimity; and have been surprised and disgusted with childish cowardly apprehensions, and effeminate terrors. *(c)*

10. A due attention to our conceptions and feelings in such circumstances as these would make our idea of hatred much less vague than it appears to be at present. And possibly something of the following sort might *result;* agreeably to what has been already intimated; possibly we might determine, in general, that we feel the sentiment of hatred towards any person who

has frequently occasioned us painful inward sensations; so that the idea of him has become connected, or associated, as it is called, with unpleasing ideas; which are therefore always introduced into our minds by his personal appearance, or by a strong and lively conception of him in his absence.

If this conjectural language seems imperfect, it may be worth recollecting, that we can use a sentiment for the purposes of life when we have not attained to a satisfactory metaphysical account of its nature. Artists follow rules depending on the nature of Beauty; and with great success; though the nature of Beauty hath never been metaphysically settled and ascertained: in like manner, we may trust, that what we do know of our moral feelings, if rightly applied, may be highly useful, though much may remain to be determined. Nevertheless, the more clear and distinct our ideas are, the better shall we be prepared for action.

11. I would now proceed to examine the language of Scripture with respect to hatred, were it not expedient to prevent difficulties by mentioning a few *objections* which are likely to occur.

Obj. 1. It may be objected to what has been advanced, that not only those whom we hate, but those whom we *love*, bring unpleasing ideas to our minds, and sometimes make us feel weak or unfortunate. But this is only saying, that things which of themselves would excite hatred, may be counteracted by others of an opposite tendency; or that a person may have some odious qualities, and yet be amiable upon the whole. This is true; sweetness of disposition, and intelligent mildness, beaming from a countenance, is found to take off the natural effect of irregularity in the formation of person or features. Our gratitude towards any one will make him appear less odious, or more amiable, than he otherwise would appear; supposing him to make a generous use of our attachment. Hence the same person may seem odious and amiable to different men, who differ in their relation to him, though they may be of the same taste and discernment in respect of others, to whom they stand in the same relation. As a child may be loved by its parents, though it has qualities which would excite disgust in indifferent spectators.

Obj. 2. Something might be objected with regard to *fear*, as he whom we habitually fear, does excite unpleasing sensations by his appearance. But it is obvious to reply, that sentiments which differ from each other, may be rightly described, though they are said to agree in one particular. Our fearing a person may be one cause of our hating him; his exciting fear may be the way in which he raises those feelings which in the end form the passion or sentiment of hatred: but fear, being the sentiment arising on a probable expectation of impending evil, whether that evil seems likely to come from persons or things, is so distinct from hatred, which has no immediate concern with evil, and is directed to persons only, that our practice does not seem likely to suffer from any confusion to be apprehended between them. As therefore we enter into these disquisitions merely as foundations of practical rules, this objection needs not to draw us into any length of discussion.

Obj. 3. It may, however, be objected, in the third place, that sometimes we feel the sentiment of hatred towards a person *at first sight;* which seems inconsistent with the notion, that hatred depends on what are called associations of ideas, since such associations are formed after the manner of habits, by frequent repetition: ideas before they become associated must have appeared frequently to the mind united or connected. But we say in answer, that the reason why we feel any degree of hatred to a person at first sight, is, because there are certain looks, gestures, manners generally agreed upon as signs or marks of odious qualities. The first sight of a particular man who is proud or mean, is not the first sight of a behaviour expressive of pride or meanness. The acknowledged marks of an odious character may excite the usual feelings in us, though they be exemplified in persons hitherto unknown. And it should seem, that if there were a people whose characters were denoted by looks, gestures, manners different from those to which we have been accustomed, we could not, at first sight, feel, towards one of that people, either love or hatred.

12. Having then endeavoured to ascertain or determine, in some measure, the nature of Hatred, by considering some cases in which the term is used, and describing some of the objects by which the passion is excited, we may proceed to take a view of the language of *Scripture* relative to it. Here we find the term used in a variety of senses, but these may admit of some systematical arrangement, arising out of the different occasions on which scriptural expressions were used, and the different kinds of composition of which the sacred volume consists. It is never to be forgotten, that the sacred authors express themselves easily, artlessly, naturally; in a manner suited to the customs and feelings of men of ordinary attainments in literature; and therefore allow themselves in all those idioms and phrases, which would appear most natural and familiar to men unused to scientifical niceties.

Where a word is used in a variety of senses the chief business is, to find that sense which may be considered as the *stem* from which all the others have branched out. This sense when found out, may be called the *literal* sense, and when we have connected the other senses with it, and with each other, they all together form a system, the parts of which may be contemplated with satisfaction: their symmetry prevents all embarrassment and perplexity in the mind, and we can with ease take any one which is suited to our purpose.

I see no reason to think, that what we have laid down as the proper sense of hatred may not be taken as the literal sense of hatred in scripture. And this sense occurs more frequently than any other. Hatred is most usually spoken of as that sentiment which is excited by the appearance, real or imaginary, of a person, who by custom or habit, always brings to our minds a train of unpleasing ideas.

But though it be in strictness a *person* who is the object of hatred, yet it must again be observed, that our imaginations can personify; can give forms and characters and manners to things inanimate. Hence we are said in Scripture, in some few instances, to hate *things*, as well as persons. *(d)*.

The matter principally to be observed is this; it

seldom happens that we feel the sentiment of hatred pure and *unmixed:* being more apt to hate those who injure us, or make us feel disappointed, than we are to hate other men, and there being other sentiments arising towards such persons, we generally feel some other passion at the same time with hatred; and therefore what we have most commonly occasion to express, is really a *compound sentiment;* and for the compound we have no name: we are obliged therefore to express the compound by the name of one of its ingredients. Suppose then the compound to be made up of hatred and envy, it may be indifferent by which of those two names it is called. If indeed one of them were much stronger than the other, it would be natural to use the name of that which happened to predominate.

But the word hatred may not only express the pure simple feeling of hatred, or a compound sentiment of which it makes a part, but may be used, according to the custom of language, (so many more ideas have we than words,) to express the state of our minds when we feel, in any great degree, *as* we feel when we hate, in the strict and proper sense of the word. If therefore we only wish to *avoid* any object, we may be sometimes said to hate it; or if it be *irksome* or wearisome to us; nor must we think it strange or inaccurate if we are said to hate when we might with equal propriety have been said to *envy*, or *resent*, or *disapprove*. These uses of the word hatred will not appear forced or unnatural after the account which has been given of them: nor will there be more difficulty about what may be called hating *comparatively*, and hating *in effect*. Hating any person comparatively is preferring others to him: and hating in effect is doing that from some other principle, which is as hurtful as if it had proceeded from hatred.

13. Some *instances* will make these remarks more intelligible. And first of hatred in its strict and *proper sense;* in which we must understand what is said of Ahab and Micaiah, 1 Kings xxii. 8. Ahab was King of Israel, or Samaria, or of the ten Tribes; Jehoshaphat of Judah, or Jerusalem, or the two Tribes, Judah and Benjamin. "And the King of Israel said unto Jehoshaphat, There is yet one man, Micaiah the son of

Imlah, by whom we may enquire of the Lord: but I *hate* him; for he doth not prophesy good concerning me, but evil." The very idea of Micaiah made Ahab feel unpleasant to himself: mortified and disappointed: feelings uneasy to any private man; still more so to a Monarch. Solomon says, in the same sense, Prov. xxv. 17. "Withdraw thy foot from thy neighbour's house; lest he be weary (margin, *full*) of thee, and so hate thee." In the second Book of Samuel xiii. 15. there is an instance which may be important in practice, of a man's hating the partner of his guilt, though what is called love had occasioned the offence. "Then Amnon hated her exceedingly; so that the hatred wherewith he hated her was greater than the love wherewith he had loved her." The *partner of guilt* naturally becomes odious to any one who has any moral feeling, as strongly exciting remorse and dissatisfaction. When the connubial affection is said to be changed into hatred, we may understand the word in its proper sense: of this we find more than one instance in the book of Deuteronomy, xxii. 13. and xxiv. 3. Hatred is also to be understood strictly when the vicious are spoken of as hating *the virtuous:* the mere sight of a virtuous man may make one of an opposite character feel inward mental pain; and, if not wholly abandoned, remorse and shame. The virtuous continually, though silently, check all the desires, thwart all the views of the vicious. (see before, § 8.) The life of a good man is a perpetual reproach to a bad one; and what affects him more, he feels that all impartial, rational and worthy, spectators join in condemning him. Here is foundation enough for hatred; independent of actual reproof; independent of the opposition to worldly interests, which Christianity, whether incidentally or necessarily, occasions. "The blood-thirsty" says Solomon, "hate the upright," Prov. xxix. 10. "Reprove not a scorner, lest he hate thee," Prov. ix. 8. "They hate him," saith the prophet Amos, v. 10. "that rebuketh in the gate, and they abhor him that speaketh uprightly." Our Savior tells his twelve Apostles, Matt. x. 22. "Ye shall be hated of all men for my name's sake:" though nothing can be more amiable in itself, to any one who can relish what is good, than the Gospel. When the

Scriptures call vicious actions works of darkness, Eph. v. 11. and affirm that "every one that doeth evil hateth the light," John iii. 20. and that "all things that are reproved are made manifest by the light," Eph. v. 13. they confirm our solution of such hatred. I am induced to offer one more instance of hatred in the proper sense, by its practical utility. Solomon says, Prov. xiv. 20. (see also xix. 7.) "The *poor* is hated even of his own neighbour: but the rich hath many friends." Or, according to the marginal translation, "many are the lovers of the rich." It might be doubted whether the word hatred is to be taken here in its proper sense; but it is to be feared there may be, if we speak from fact, too much ground for such interpretation. Poverty is apt to be associated in the mind with ideas that make men shrink from it, if they are not upon their guard; if they do not ward off disgust by calling up moral feelings. It is associated with ideas of want, distress, hardship, sordidness, complaint, of helplessness, want of resource in time of sickness, age, infirmity; want of accommodations; cold, hunger, nakedness; oppression, mortification. It excites a fear that the spectator may be pressed to part with that by which he hopes to procure enjoyment; even refusal in such a case is very painful, and the apprehension of being driven to refuse is very repulsive. If poverty suggest to us every thing we want to avoid; no wonder we avoid poverty. Moreover, a man is never dwelling on ideas of poverty, but ideas of wealth and splendor interfere with his deliberations: and riches are associated in the mind with what we desire; with that which flatters and dazzles us: with hope, plenty, luxury, sensual pleasure, power, superiority, and ingratiating caresses. The fine arts also, when employed in ornaments, of dress, buildings, habitations, equipage, with politeness of behaviour, have great attractions; and contribute greatly to conciliate Love and prevent Hatred. Nor is vanity a little concerned. But one of the chief attractions of wealth, as viewed by a common spectator, is, that it rouses the imagination, and makes it expand, in grasping at happiness, far beyond any bounds of reason and moderation. The practical effect of all this is, that even those who in general mean well, deceive themselves, and

shun the poor more than they themselves imagine: they admit trifling excuses and pretences, all which would instantly vanish on the prospect of partaking of a splendid entertainment. Not that plain neatness, and cheerful simplicity, and virtuous indigence want charms; but to relish these the mind must be formed, the taste purified, beyond what is ordinarily to be expected; and the best dispositions may stand in need of some caution. I will only add, that if any should class hatred of poverty under *avoiding*, or under *comparative* hatred; the practical part of the subject, which is the most important, would receive little or no detriment from such an arrangement.

14. In the Epistle of Jude we meet with an instance of hating *things* inanimate. In the twenty-third verse mention is made of hating a garment. And the ablutions and purifications which were in use amongst the Jews, seem to imply the same kind of hatred. Many inanimate things excite disgust; but such disgust may generally be accounted for by the association of ideas and feelings.

15. When we determine to *avoid* any thing, we frequently feel, in some respects, the same as when we hate: the Psalmist therefore expresses himself naturally when he says, Psalm xxvi. 5. "I have hated the congregation of the wicked, and will not sit among the ungodly." And Solomon, when he says, Prov. xi. 15. "he that hateth suretiship is sure."

16. In like manner, when any undertaking is such that we have a repugnance to it; or when it is *irksome;* or when the remembrance of it is tedious and wearisome, we feel in some respects as when we hate. The author of the book of Ecclesiastes therefore naturally adopts such expressions as these; "I hated life;" "I hated all my labour which I had taken under the Sun." The recollection of it was disgusting to him. Human Life, and labour, appeared to him to be vanity, and productive of vexation.

17. *Envy* is frequently mixed with hatred; many qualities appear to us more odious in him who is the object of our envy, than in other men. A successful

rival always makes us feel unsuccessful. Accordingly, he who is at the same time envied and hated, may be indifferently said to be the one or the other; we having no name for the *compound* sentiment. Instances of this sort of indifference we may observe in the natural language of Scripture. It is said, Gen. xxvii. 41. "And Esau hated Jacob, because of the blessing wherewith his father blessed him." Here was a competition for favor; wherefore Esau's sentiment might have been called envy, or jealousy; and perhaps with as much propriety as hatred. And it probably would have been called envy, in some passage, had the incidents been told repeatedly. This we may reasonably conclude from what is said by the sacred writers with regard to *Joseph:* Gen. xxxvii. 4. "And when his brethren saw that their father loved him more than all his brethren, they *hated* him, and could not speak peaceably unto him." It is farther said, verses 5 and 8, that "they hated him yet the more for his dreams, and for his words." But almost immediately afterwards, ver. 11. it is said, "his brethren *envied* him." And in the Acts of the Apostles we read, vii. 9., that "the patriarchs moved with *envy* sold Joseph into Egypt."

18. After what has been said, and what we daily observe, nothing need be here offered in order to prove, that it is natural for *enemies*, if they do not regulate their passions, to feel some hatred towards each other: whether they are enemies as individuals, or as members of different societies; political or religious. And the sentiment compounded of hatred and enmity, not having a name of its own, may take the name of either of its parts. Accordingly, in Scripture we find it said, in one place, Gen. xxii. 17. that the descendants of Abraham should possess the gates of their *enemies;* and in another, Gen. xxiv. 60. that they should possess the gate of those that *hated* them. The Psalmist repeatedly uses as synonymous "*enemies*" and "those that hate." "I hate them right sore," says he, "even as though they were mine enemies. (See Psalm xxxviii. 19. lxix. 4. cxxxix. 22. Compare Lev. xxvi. 17. Deut. vii. 15.) *Hating the Lord* seems to mean being enemies to the Religion of Moses; or to Jehovah, as opposed to the Deities of the idolatrous nations. When (1 John iii. 15.)

St. John says, "Whosoever hateth his brother is a murderer," he probably has the idea of hatred producing, or produced by, enmity, and compounded with it; which, in a common course of things, naturally produces violence and bitter contentions, sometimes terminating in actual murder. He seems also to have that idea when 1 John ii. 9. he condemns hatred in general terms.

19. Moral *disapprobation*, or abhorrence of an action as wrong or vicious, is often compounded with hatred; because though these sentiments are in their nature distinct, many vices are the occasion of their being both excited at the same time, or jointly. Thus when we see instances of pride, arrogance, falshood, selfishness, cruelty, we both feel moral abhorrence of the conduct, and dislike, or hatred, of the persons who are guilty of it. And our compound sentiment may take either name. The Psalmist uses both. "As for lies, I *hate* and *abhor* them," cxix. 163. Elsewhere he says, "O ye that love the Lord, see that ye *hate* the thing which is evil," xcvii. 10. Whereas St Paul says, Rom. xii. 9. "*Abhor* that which is evil." And in the same Epistle he seems to use moral condemnation and hatred promiscuously. Rom. vii. 15. "that which I do, I *allow* not,"—"but what I *hate*, that do I." The expressions of Solomon in the character of Wisdom must hence appear easy and natural. "The fear of the Lord is to hate evil; pride and arrogancy, and the evil way, and the froward mouth do I hate," Prov. viii. 13. The Son of Sirach says, Ecclus. xxv. 2. "Three sorts of *men* my soul *hateth*, and I am greatly *offended* at their *Life:* a poor man that is proud, a rich man that is a liar, and an old adulterer that doteth." Here are qualities at the same time odious and vicious: and hatred is directed to persons, and disapprobation to conduct. When the Deity is said to hate sin, hatred may perhaps be conceived to belong to the present head. It now only remains, that we briefly exemplify what has been called hating *comparatively*, and hating *in effect*.

20. In the expression "Jacob have I loved, but Esau have I hated," Rom. ix. 13. Mal. i. 2, 3. nothing seems really to be signified but a *preference* of the younger brother to the elder. This preference might possibly have been otherwise expressed, had not a series

of blessings been conferred, for many successive ages, on the descendants of the younger brother, which were witheld from those of the elder. When blessings were so continued, it was natural to conceive them as the effects of *love* in the gracious and bountiful giver. As well as to call the laying waste of the mountains of Esau, and of his heritage, acts or effects of his hatred: especially in a poetical composition. Malachi, i. 2, 3. We find in the Law of Moses, Deut. xxi. 15. "If a man have two wives, one beloved, and another hated," I should doubt whether this meant any thing but that one wife was *more* beloved than the other. For in St. Luke's Gospel we find the expression; "If any man come to me, and *hate* not his father and mother;" (Luke xiv. 26;) And in St. Matthew's Gospel the same thing according to this form; "He that loveth Father or Mother *more* than me, is not worthy of me." Matt. x. 37.

21. Lastly, What we have called hating *in effect* is so little liable to abuse, or even to be misunderstood, that it will be sufficient to mention an instance or two. "Whoso is partner with a thief hateth his own soul:" Prov. xxix. 24. And Prov. xiii. 24. "He that spareth his rod hateth his son;" hateth him *in effect:* doth that, perhaps from a mistaken tenderness, which is as pernicious as if he had acted from principles of hatred.

22. Having now considered the *Nature* of hatred, and the language of scripture in relation to it; I proceed to the *second* thing proposed; (§4) which was to examine into its *Effects*, good and evil. For of its effects some are beneficial, though those which are hurtful are the more commonly noticed. We will begin with the *beneficial* effects of hatred.

23. In considering any part of our constitution we may have two different views; the one to justify the ways of *God;* the other to find out the best conduct for *man*. When we, in any degree, put ourselves in the place of the Governor of men, we conceive how men are *likely* to act; to what motives they are likely to yield; on such expectations all rules of Government are founded. And maxims of Government, neglecting

particular excepted cases, speak as if men were constantly impelled by certain motives; but when we point out the best sort of conduct to men, we suppose each man to be free to choose in every instance. Thus when a rule or law is made about admitting evidence, men are supposed to be influenced by private interest; and therefore it is a maxim, that no one shall be a witness, and the same of a judge, in his own cause: but when a man is exhorted not on any account whatsoever, to bear false witness against his neighbour, no such thing is supposed; he is addressed as one who is, what he really feels himself to be, perfectly at liberty to give either false testimony or true. Nor is there any real contradiction or inconsistency between these two modes of speaking: each is natural in the circumstances in which it is used; but if men are not aware of the two different situations in which two such different forms of expression naturally arise, they will be apt to suspect inconsistency when in reality there is none. This being premised, we may proceed with the greater security.

24. Hatred, like other malevolent sentiments, when considered as a *good*, or as the work of our Creator, must be classed with those remedies for evils, (for it is impossible but that evils will come) which are not in themselves perfectly free from evil. Poisons which are antidotes to poisons, medicines or operations which cause bodily pain in order to diminish bodily pain upon the whole, are of this class: And indeed so are all punishments, which are painful methods of preventing evils; of preventing hurtful attacks on person and property. And so is War, since that must be estimated as good which lessens evil; all these are good, so long as evil is lessened by them. *(c)* This was before observed of the Sword. (§3)

25. Each of the remedies which produce good by evil, has its peculiar manner of operation, and its own consequences. Our question is, what are the good consequences of hatred? I could wish to be permitted to answer, that they have not yet been studied and arranged with accuracy sufficient to make our account of them as satisfactory as other accounts may be hereafter. But we may say, in short, that hatred does good by

checking all odious qualities. If it be asked, what need of a passion for that purpose, since without hatred nothing could have been odious; we answer, it seems highly probable, that every thing which is odious to a well-formed mind, is of such a nature, as would, if not checked, prevent happiness, or promote misery, in one way or other. Either it would hurt the bodily health, or obstruct the pleasures of the imagination, or choke up that love of decency and order which is so powerful a support of Virtue: or contaminate that cleanliness which seems greatly instrumental to inward purity of heart, or prevent social happiness, especially that of the best kind, from diffusing itself through the mind of the meek and humble, the delicate and refined, or lessen the production, or the effect, or the utility, of things calculated to promote and embellish civilized life. It seems highly probable, in short, that whatever a good man, of an improved mind, hates, or is disgusted with, is something which, if suffered to run wild, and spread without restraint, would tend to impair, or to check the growth, or the enjoyment, of those perceptions and feelings, that are peculiar to human nature; those by which man is most eminently distinguished from the brute creation. (*f*)

26. Nor must it be thought trifling or unimportant to found the utility of hatred upon its tendency to civilize mankind, and polish human nature; It is as much the design of Providence that Man should be improved and refined, as that he should subsist, or continue his species. Were not this the case, numberless provisions of Providence would be wholly thrown away. When we say that odious qualities probably tend to injure health, it should at the same time be understood, that every disorder of our bodily frame affects the mind, and therefore hurts or impedes our finer faculties and perceptions, to an extent beyond any limits which we can assign. And these are parts of man, as much as his bodily members. In this sense it is true, that "Man shall not live by bread alone." Indeed the lowest classes amongst us are allowed to consider many accommodations as necessaries of life, to which an uncivilized human being is an utter stranger.

27. Now if things which ought to be odious, or which would be odious to the best regulated mind, are really of the nature of noxious weeds, or hurtful luxuriances, it is easy to see, that it is much better for mankind to have their growth checked by means of a *sentiment*, than by mere reason and experience. A sentiment acts instantaneously, whereas the deductions of reason and experience are slow. *(g)* Sentiment can repel any attack upon the finer parts of our Nature before they are thoroughly understood, and so lead us to study and esteem them; whereas if reason and experience alone inform us when we should restrain what would corrupt our nobler enjoyments, we must wait till our taste for virtue, and the fine arts has been reduced to a regular theory: a thing not very near now, but which would be at a much greater distance than it now is, if we never had any guide but what was purely intellectual. Not that hatred is a mere blind instinct: although it acts, or makes us act, instantaneously, it is subject to the correction of reason: its operations are examined, judged, regulated by our superior faculties; and after regulation it acquires the prudence, as it were, of calm judgment, at the same time that it retains the quickness, versatility, and energy of sentiment.

28. Still you may urge, that what has been said may all be called general, and that in some particulars it is not easy to see what good end can be answered by our hating some things usually accounted odious. Where, for instance, is the good, you may say, of men's hating *deformity?* You will not, I fear, state the question, Where is the good of men's loving *beauty?* because pleasing forms and graceful motions *(h)* cause a considerable part of human happiness; and there is no more incontrovertible proof of the Divine Benevolence than that we in some things enjoy happiness which may be called gratuitous: Happiness without which it seems as if all the ends of God's government might be answered: and yet our hatred of deformity seems to be a part of our love of beauty: It seems to be occasioned by the shock given to our habitual feelings and expectations, when they are disappointed by deviations from those forms or motions, which are most pleasing to the eye.

Should any one think this is not the whole of the matter, he still must allow, that we are under no necessity of being disgusted with deformity, inconsistently with the interests of Virtue: the only danger is in deformity of person; and man may bring himself to love every human being who manifests an amiable mind, and expresses lovely sentiments and principles, though the outward form be very far from beautiful. So that we may answer to the objection concerning hatred of deformity; either that such sentiment makes a part of our love of beauty, that is, a part of a copious ingredient of human happiness; or that it is harmless; or that it may be so overpowered by our relish for amiable qualities of the mind, as not to hurt the interests of Virtue. Indeed it seems likely, that till hatred comes to be well understood, and nicely disciplined, even well-disposed men may hate things, which, when more improved, they would not suffer themselves to treat as fit objects of disgust: such moderation of hatred we constantly perceive to result from a good education. And, no doubt, all our sentiments admit of perpetual improvement. Yet in some cases, as men improve they affect more and more *fastidiousness*, and indulge themselves more and more in disgust: this may sometimes be a fault; but it is not necessarily such: for though some qualities may grow less odious during improvement, yet others may grow more so. And affectation of any thing implies, that it is sometimes applauded. Whence we may collect, that Hatred is a sentiment sometimes held in honour and esteem. It would scarcely be deemed a recommendation of any man to say, in the present state of things, that he prided himself on being disgusted with nothing. Such a one would be called unfeelnig, hard, coarse, indelicate, undistinguishing. Nay, would himself become, to men of polished minds, an object of that passion, of which he had been ambitious to be thought entirely void. The all-perfect-being is said to hate sin.

29. The good effects of Hatred spring up, both in the character of him who feels the passion, and of him who is the object of it. If certain qualities, actions, appearances are hateful to you, you yourself will of course avoid them; and that person in whom you hate

them, is naturally induced to avoid them by the pain which your hatred inflicts. In this manner must the good effects of hatred, as it becomes better managed, increase and multiply.

30. In considering the beneficial effects of hatred we have admitted some diffidence, and have dwelt upon conjectures. But, if hatred, duly regulated, would tend continually to diminish odious qualities, there is one way of conceiving the subject which could scarcely be said to be clouded or shaded by doubt. Let us conceive what would be the case with human life were some superior being wholly to extinguish all odious qualities, and at once make men as amiable as they are capable of being. Should we not live in Paradise? Should we not have a heaven upon earth? If the sentiment of hatred is to be the means of our approaching gradually to such a state, its beneficial effects can need no farther eulogium. Some man may indeed say, that to such a state we cannot arrive until virtuous qualities are as near perfection as those which are amiable; but improvement in the latter would bring on improvement in the former. Supposing men to have become thoroughly amiable, vicious qualities must so interrupt that general happiness of which all men must be enamoured, that they could not be born: vicious qualities could have no continuance in a state where all odious qualities were extinct.

31. But the effects of hatred, as they commonly strike us, are frequently *hurtful*. Nay even its benefits are produced by means of some evil. That evil is indeed only temporary and occasional; it would cease with the disorder for which it is a remedy; but still it is evil. The sentiment is uneasy to him who feels it; and painful to him who is the object of it. Even in its best state it prevents the growth of benevolence, and weakens the mutual attraction of man to man: but what may be called its greatest mischief, is the danger which it occasions, of hurting the best dispositions, and of drawing men from their duty. We may therefore pass on to those bad consequences, which are most likely to arise from the want of a perfect regulation of it; especially in men, who neither profess nor intend to neglect the obligations of religion and virtue.

Hatred naturally generates *ill-will.* If we hate a person, on whatever account, we are impelled or prompted to do him harm; and though the impulse may be overpowered by motives of a kinder sort, yet the general effects of malevolence will be ill-offices and injuries. This observation receives force from the great stress which is laid in the scriptures on *love* of our neighbour: it is taken for granted, that love will occasion benevolence and good offices; but love does not tend more to make men do good, than hatred tends to make them do harm.

32. If we contemplate human life, we find but too many examples of this observation. The man who is easily disgusted, and is so proud of his fastidiousness as to indulge it, can scarcely be happy in any relation of life: he will soon contract an habitual *pesvishness;* and make all around him wretched in proportion to their desire of performing their several duties towards him, and of procuring for him every possible gratification. In *domestic life*, he will discern something in his nearest friend and most affectionate companion, which he will call ungraceful, vulgar, odious; or which he will imagine others to call so; and no attachment, no fidelity, prudence, even no chearfulness and good humour, shall be able to make atonement for it. His servants and dependants give him the same kind of shock; their virtues avail not; their submission only serves to inflame his malignance. Has he friends? in their appearance or behaviour he finds something that is illiberal, uncouth, or precise: or perhaps that is negligent and disorderly: their manner of conducting certain affairs does not exactly coincide with his preconceived notions; he is impatient, intolerant; he enters upon rebuke with acrimony; he forgets respect, and even equality; or if his expressions "be smooth as oil, yet be they very swords;" they inflict wounds on friendship, which are sometimes perhaps healed superficially, but are generally liable to break open afresh, on any occasional agitation. The case is still worse when a friend offers to administer the precious balm of reproof: this makes him feel so uneasy to himself, that every thing connected with it becomes the immediate object of his aversion.

33. *Public* authority is as much weakened by rash disgust and hatred, as are private friendship and affection. With what difficulty is it that any magistrate, or any person entrusted with any sort of power for the benefit of others, can keep himself from the odium even of those for whose advantage he acts! Whenever it becomes necessary to curb licentiousness, to combat prejudices, and interfere with private interests, what clamour, what disgust, what bitterness arises! yet to do these things, for the public good, is the very essence of the duty of men in public stations. The best friends of mankind, when in power, must submit sometimes to be hated as the worst enemies: this some are too weak to bear; they want resolution to stem the torrent of popular hatred; and so either temporize, and abandon the cause of the public, or retire from their station, and are succeeded by those, who have recourse to every mean artifice, in order to prevent the same humiliation. But here we speak of things as they are, not as they ought to be; we are describing facts, not inculcating duties. (Art. 23.) The regulation of hatred, as well as the conduct of those who suffer by it, remains to be considered hereafter.

34. The man who is easily disgusted, does harm not only to those with whom he is connected, but to persons who are in a great measure *strangers* to him. If he sees one only at a distance, and very imperfectly, when any dislike arises, he ventures to make an unfavourable estimate of his character. And every uncandid opinion, taken up in a malignant humour, promotes an unkind disposition, and unfriendly behaviour. Are men his superiors? they make him feel insignificant; he hates their ease and their insolence: are they his inferiors? he is disgusted with their meanness and vulgarity; or with their sordid appearance and manners, or with their wants, importunities, refusal to join in his pursuits. And thus do the powerful and worthy sentiments of respect and esteem, as well as those of pity and condescension, lose all their salutary influence upon his heart and actions. Nor does his indulging his disgusts do harm only by the loss of what he rejects, but by the interference of those whom he encourages;

some men he must countenance; and a specious exterior, with insinuating manners, will often be the means of introducing to his patronage a false heart, and an unprincipled conduct. He never considers, never endeavours to correct his first judgment, if judgment it may be called; never recollects, that the more intelligent may have less the appearance of acuteness; nay that the more polite may have less the appearance of politeness. For a man of a truly amiable disposition may not have acquired those external manners, which are settled by arbitrary custom as expressive of politeness, in a particular place, and at a particular time, and yet he may have all those delicate attentions, those generous sympathies, from which the fashionable laws of politeness have really derived their origin.

35. Thus we see how the indulgence of hatred may discourage virtue, and corrupt our most valuable enjoyments. When we say this, we speak of such enjoyments as are *seen*, and in some degree experienced; but we have reason to think that it wholly *prevents* the existence of many, which, but for its baneful influence, would have sprung up to bless and embellish human life. When men associate upon candid and benevolent principles, they soon perceive a copious increase of friendship and happiness: nay let them only live together, and give no offence, that is sufficient to engender mutual affection: this is so generally felt, that the same word *consuetudo*, which signifies custom, or the habit of living together, has been used to express mutual attatchment. We are naturally attracted to each other; and when we associate, we must partake of the same pleasures; we must have in common an interest, a tender fellow-feeling in many objects: pleasing recollections grow upon us, and multiply perpetually; and every advancement in kindness makes an addition to our good offices and our enjoyments, Faults may remain; but "Love covereth all sins." Prov. x. 12. Now suppose men to form large societies in this manner, their enjoyments must be very abundant; but the smallest knots of friends, so united, could not fail to produce a continual increase of good; and that of such a sort as would make a constituent part of more public good:

useless. Where the persons taught want impelling only one way. What utility could possibly result from advising men to eat and drink freely, whose principal fault was carrying indulgence to excess? And if a precept be addressed to mankind at large, enjoining them to avoid an evil which can be only avoided by avoiding the *occasions* of it, would it follow, that, till the occasions can be avoided, such evil is forbidden? Go not to Law, says a friend, be sure to avoid law-suits; that is, keep at a distance from all occasions of legal contention; but does such advice imply, that when such occasions cannot be warded off, a man is never to call in the protection of the Magistrate? why then is he a member of civil Society? That man, says another, is most comfortable who has nothing to do with medicine; true; that man is blessed indeed who always enjoys good health. Let the sword rest in its scabbard, says a third; an excellent precept, if understood as discouraging all *occasions* of war; but it is grossly misunderstood if it be taken as a prohibition of all self-defence. Now all this applies to hatred; which is generally found in an excessive and very rarely in a defective state: those therefore who give moral instructions, see and feel, that they have very great need to discourage, and little or none to encourage it. And the less systematical any set of precepts is, or the more artlessly arising from particular circumstances, the less likely are they to specify limitations and exceptions. Now no practical directions are so little systematical as those of the scriptures; none owe their origin more to particular incidents; it is therefore by no means matter of surprize if we find hatred there forbidden, in some passages, in general terms, and ranked amongst the works of the flesh, amongst the vicious passions of barbarous heathens, as opposed to the gentle and benevolent affections of true Christians: nor can we wonder if our church prays to be delivered from hatred. But we must not conclude from thence, that every emotion of disgust is sinful. "Do not I hate them," says the Psalmist, cxxxix. 21." that hate thee? I hate them with perfect hatred, "I count them mine enemies." "Ye that love the Lord, hate evil." Although therefore we ought to keep our minds pure from that kind

and degree of hatred which St. Paul reckons amongst the works of the flesh, and describes as unworthy of a Christian, yet we must not pretend to be more than men whilst we live amongst men. As it is no excellence to be slow in distinguishing between good and evil, so is it no way meritorious to be insensible to the difference when it is perceived; or to the qualities commonly called odious. Whilst we are liable to be incommoded by such qualities, we should judge ill to lay aside that defence which the author of nature hath graciously provided. Suppose hatred in its best state, not to be recommended in Scripture; neither is parental love: (Ogden Ser. xii. on Commandments.) If hatred, in its ordinary state, be forbidden in Scripture, so is killing, so is swearing, so is drinking wine,; yet none of these universally; though they are forbidden in general terms, and no exceptions are mentioned. The gratification of our animal appetites is not the subject of scriptural exhortation: and yet the scripture wishes not either the individual man or his species to be extinct; nor could any man be accounted the more perfect for wanting animal appetites. Hereafter, we shall be "as the angels which are in heaven;" but in this life we are not angels; we are men. *(i.)* Mark xii. 25.

Again; suppose some heavenly being were to address us, saying, 'Let there be no more hatred amongst you;' though we should not understand him of any particular kind or degree of hatred, yet we should conceive his true meaning to be, 'Let all *occasions* of hatred entirely cease.' It is indeed desirable that those qualities should cease which commonly excite hatred, in which case our hatred would die away, and soon vanish from the earth; but it is not desirable that the qualities should continue to corrupt our finest enjoyments, and we be deprived of that sentiment, by which we are enabled quickly to discern and forcibly to counteract them.

Thus much may be necessary in order to clear our way, and furnish us with distinct ideas of the subject before us. We may now proceed to some practical

consequences resulting from what has been advanced. Some *rules of action* belong to the object of hatred, and others to him who feels the passion in his own breast. Any man may conceive himself in either of these characters; for any man may be hated, and any man may hate. *(k.)*

38. A man may become the *object* of hatred, either by his own faults, or by the faults of others. In order to avoid becoming such *by his own faults*, he should make it his study to please. He should watch the means by which he at any time grows unpleasing, and the circumstances by which he seems to recommend himself to favour. Men who are very seriously and passionately pious and virtuous, are apt sometimes to neglect this part of their duty; but such negligence is very hurtful to the cause of piety and virtue; as well as to their own particular happiness. And it is by no means encouraged in the holy Scriptures. St. Paul tells us, that we must not let our "good be evil spoken of." Rom, xiv. 16. That we must "provide things honest," that is decent, honourable, "in the sight of all men," Rom. xii. 17. That every one of us must "please his neighbour for his good, to edification," Rom. xv. 2. And he sets forth himself as an example of endeavouring to please, not with interested views, but with a view to promoting the cause of religion. "I please all men," says he, 1 Cor. x. 33. "in all things, not seeking mine own profit, but the profit of many, that they may be saved." St. Peter, also, 1 Pet. iii. 8. enjoins the Christians not only to be of one mind, to love as brethren, and to be pitiful, but also to be courteous. Men must not then think an amiable behaviour and appearance a thing beneath the notice of a devout and religious character; nor must the devout be forward to accuse all who dislike them, of hating religion. Our Saviour warmly reproved the Pharisees; they would say that he disliked whatever was good and venerable; he reproved nothing but hypocrisy and spiritual pride.

It would be natural for any one who agreed to what has been said, and was desirous of doing his duty, to ask, by what *methods* am I to avoid being an object of hatred, and render myself pleasing to my neighbour?

We can only answer, that the methods of forming an amiable character are numerous, complicated and refined: they must constitute a separate subject of investigation. A considerable progress may be made by a sincere desire to please, founded, not on vanity or self-interest, but on truly virtuous and religious principles; by a high sense of the importance of the duty; and above all, by that which has the sanction both of reason and revelation, by perpetual attention to the feelings of others; by entering into their views and wishes; and endeavouring, without ostentation, to promote them in the most easy and effectual manner. Common men may do much good by acting after the best models, and according to their best feelings; and the more improved may do more by scrutinizing the mind, and analysing the principles of pleasing. *(l.)*

39. But a man may become an object of hatred chiefly or entirely by the *faults of others*; I mean by the faults of those who dislike him; or by their prejudices. No man therefore will be perfect, who after all his endeavours to please, has not fortitude enough to bear to be disliked, without wavering in his duty. We have before (13.) said so much of the virtuous being hated by by the vicious, that we need not dwell long on our present topic. If the poor man finds that he "is hated of his own neighbour;" if the deformed perceives himself to be regarded with some degree of aversion; if the magistrate, or the parent, or the preceptor, finds, that in order to prevent evil he must be contented to appear to those whom he loves, in an odious light; there is but one sort of conduct that is right; to pardon the effect of prejudice, and of first impression on the inconsiderate: to enter into their feelings; and to wait with patience for the hour of returning kindness: forwarding such a happy return by assisting them in every method of overcoming their aversions. And yet the fortitude here recommended should not be such as to admit of no diffidence. Whilst a man is the most resolute in bearing up up against what seems unmerited hatred, he ought frequently to ask himself whether it may not be merited. And he ought to take particular care, that a false shame

about yielding does not make him obstinate in retaining his faults, whilst he means only to be inflexible in adhering to his duty, in spite of the groundless prejudices of others against him.

40. But the duties of him who is the object of hatred, seem to lie in less compass than those of the man who is agitated and *impelled* by that passion. Although it does not seem needful for a good man to dread the displeasure of God upon every emotion of dislike, yet it should be remembered, that those who have laid down precepts for restraining hatred, have adapted their instructions to the ordinary state of things. What has been their state is so still, in a degree sufficient to make such precepts eminently and principally useful. Our great danger is, that our hatred will be excessive; our chief concern is to *restrain* it.

It is not indeed out of the reach of our conception that a man may have disciplined and tamed his passions in such a degree, as to allow of his giving them the rein for a while; of his even making use of their impetuosity; and applying it to his own purposes, according to a settled plan; but in order to have this done with safety, there must be a very clear and distinct view of the particular good ends to be attained; and a perfect facility of guiding and stopping headstrong passions with the greatest exactness. I know not that Hatred would be more difficult than another passion to manage in this way; but few men are skilful enough, or have sufficiently broken and subdued their passions to venture upon such an experiment: the generality must continually keep the rein tight, and the pace temperate, if they would be sure to proceed on in safety.

Some men are so far from attempting such feats, that they say they are unable to get the better of their passions. With regard to that now before us, they will tell us, that to some certain men they have a distaste which is *invincible.* And it may be true enough, that the more strongly any one feels hatred the less is he disposed to attempt to conquer it: but we cannot allow of any one's giving himself up to such a state of mind as this. The evil effects of hatred are important enough to engage any well-meaning man in a hearty

attempt to obviate them; though he may feel himself somewhat at a loss when he looks out for particular *expedients*. These therefore it shall be our next endeavour to suggest.

41. A man might begin such an attempt with something in the way of general preparation. He might think and learn beforehand what a great probability there is, that every one will frequently hate without a cause, who only follows his feelings. A due sense of this would naturally engage him to store his mind with observations, *maxims*, rules of conduct; formed in a dispassionate temper, under the guidance of calm reason. Such rules would be much more useful and efficacious than any which he could afterwards form when he came to be agitated and confused. A man during the influence of passion, may have command of himself sufficient to apply a maxim or rule already formed, who would be wholly impotent as to devising and settling any new resolutions.

42. It would greatly assist towards rendering the method now mentioned effectual, if a man, who found himself strongly impelled to do some act of hatred, were to determine to *suspend* for a time, not only ill offices, but even his judgment, that the person in question was really hateful. Such an interval would be extremely useful. It would afford opportunity for reason, benevolence, prudence to plead; and to point out any absurd, cruel, or hurtful consequences, which were likely to follow from indulgence of passion. He who adopted the expedient of suspending, would of course apply it to good purpose. He would summon all his candour, he would search for good qualities to counterbalance those which had appeared odious. He would contrive means of setting the object in a pleasing light: he would connect that object in his imagination with something pleasing. He would endeavour to hope all things; he would recollect how often he had wondered at himself for having taken up prejudices against those whom he afterwards regarded, not only as reasonable and worthy, but in the end, even as pleasing and amiable.

43. Should any man be too impatient to suspend his judgment and his acts of hatred for a time, it might be very useful that he should have accustomed himself to know mankind; that he should have acquired an insight into the real *characters* of men; and have learned to estimate them according to their intrinsic worth and importance. Nor is this direction to be confounded with the first: for it is one thing to form general maxims and resolutions by means of meditation and reading; and another to catch the tone of the day, the fashionable affectations, the living manners as they rise. The former tends to regulate the mind according to the universal principles of human nature; the latter to hinder us from being dazzled by a specious exterior and fair pretensions, in particular men. It is the weakness of Love and Hatred that they are apt to be too much attracted, or hurried away, by first appearances. Not that they are unmoved by solid merit and demerit; but if a good quality does not appear, it has no effect. Hence the great difference between those who can discern men's real characters, and those who are guided merely by the eye. If we applied ourselves to study, and learned to distinguish instantly superficial from substantial virtue, our love and hatred would then be guided by solid worth: first appearances would not mislead us, nor should we have occasion to repent of trusting to them: our first judgments would be approved and confirmed by reflexion. And the play and bias of our fancy, our taste and our sentiments, would coincide with the decisions of our reason and understanding.

44. Suppose a person to make some progress in softening his hatred, but not entirely to overcome it: he is determined not to indulge a decided disgust, but yet his mind continues in some degree embittered; his prejudice does not wholly quit its hold: let such a one try the expedient of *doing good*: let him endeavour to confer such benefits on the object of his prejudice as opportunities may allow. Our Lord tells us, we must do good to those that hate us; it would be productive of kindness to do good to those we hate. There is no consciousness so pleasing to us as that of our Benefi-

cence; especially if it has been exerted with success, and repaid with gratitude. And there is no person so little pleasing in himself as not to become a pleasing object to us, when he makes this consciousness to operate forcibly. At least we may, by beneficence towards him whom we fancy we cannot love, prevent hatred from proceeding to settled ill-will; which is to disarm it of a great share of its evil.

45. We may now imagine a disgust to arise in a connection which seemed to promise the reverse: between *friends*, or any who bear to each other regard and affection. It is here material to be aware, that all friendships and attachments between human beings are liable to occasional disgusts. Not that these disgusts would be of very great consequence if men were perfectly clear and ready in the notion that they are temporary: whilst we are under the influence of passion we see no end to it; *(m.)* and therefore we are apt to deceive ourselves so far as to fancy there is none: this is found a hurtful error, on many occasions. The very idea of our disgusts abating would naturally help them to abate; whereas if we conclude that because we feel something like hatred, all affection is for ever at an end, we shall be very apt to do something or other, which will materially shake and weaken its foundations.

46. Were a man desirous to do what was right in all cases where hatred is apt to arise, he would never indulge that passion to any one's disadvantage before he had asked himself one question. This man is certainly odious to me, but how does he become so? by his faults merely? or may it not be because he makes me feel *my own faults* too strongly? because by being the occasion of my condemning myself, he makes me feel uneasy and dissatisfied? He is the occasion of my being disappointed of what I earnestly desire; but ought I to desire such a thing? is it consistent with the general good that I should possess it? Let me take care that I do not hate the virtuous or innocent; that by me no man be persecuted for righteousness sake. To soften and restrain my dislike in this case is particularly important; for if my neighbour has incurred my

hatred only by thwarting my illicit purposes, then at the same time that I overcome my aversion to him, I reform myself.

47. From what has been said concerning the propagation of hatred, and the deceptions on which it is frequently founded, we may see what great caution we ought to use in *adopting* the aversions and antipathies of our friends. We can seldom expect to do that without involving ourselves in great difficulties, and in much blame. The least that any man ought to do before he takes up an aversion in compliance with a friend, is to view the object of the aversion, not only as he appears to enemies, but as he appears to those, whose love and esteem he is desirous to cultivate.

48. Many more expedients for the regulation and discipline of hatred might possibly be recommended; but I shall content myself with these; under a persuasion, that he who should make himself master of these, and acquire a readiness in reducing them to practice, would find them lead to others, such as new situations happened to demand: all which, when united, would gradually gather strength, meliorate themselves, and approach perpetually to a perfect rule of life.

END OF PART I.

Malevolent Sentiments.

PART II.

MISANTHROPY.

1. I MIGHT now dismiss the subject of hatred, and proceed to the consideration of another malevolent sentiment, were there not a species of hatred which seems to require a separate discussion; I mean, what is commonly called *Misanthropy*, or hatred of mankind. It is one actually prevailing in a considerable number of men, though it subsists in different degrees in different minds, and appears in various forms. It is dangerous, because it professes to be virtuous. And indeed it is a kind of luxuriance of virtue; an extreme or excess of moral feeling; and, like other extremes, has the effects of vice: it does much harm; it prevents much good; both in private and in public. What the scripture says against hatred, against reviling, judging, may often be applied to the Misanthrope: who frequenty acts and speaks in a manner inconsistent with Christian love.

2. As it must be the most useful to treat this fault according to some settled method, I will endeavour, in the first place, to give a *description* of it. Secondly to expose the *Fallacies* under which it shelters itself. Thirdly to describe the *mischiefs* attending it. And fourthly to propose some *remedies*.

3. In the first place then I am to attempt some *description* of what is usually called Misanthropy.

If we ask the Man-hater why he hates Mankind; he answers, because they are so vicious; so selfish, mean, cruel; so false and faithless. He cannot tolerate such infamous proceedings as he beholds in the world; he is too warm a friend of virtue to be placid and indifferent; and he is above flattery; he is too frank, sincere, and too little of a coward even to dissemble; therefore he must be permitted to vent an honest indignation; he means in private society; as to public matters, though he will not flatter the great, he will keep himself aloof. He can see that public transactions are all oppression, corruption, and iniquity; and therefore he will undertake no office; he will not appear to countenance abuses which he cordially detests. Is he a writer? he runs into virulent satyr—his pen expresses nothing but gloominess and malignity; sometimes it is envenomed with the most poisonous slander: it wounds, and there is no cure. If he is not a writer, he gratifies himself by embittering conversation with austerity and invective: he alarms the cheerful tranquility, the social security of convivial enjoyment, by representing every character and every transaction not as unpleasing only, but as shocking and detestable. He holds them up to view on the most unfavourable side, and rails at them as if they were incapable of any more favourable representation. His pleasure consists in the indulgence of his rancour and abhorrence: offer him an idea or expression that is candid or pleasing; he loaths it, as nauseously sweet and cloying. His companions, when companions he admits, are those who are best qualified to join with him in drawing gloomy pictures of mankind; in making malignant jests and acrimonious strictures: with such entertainment he gluts himself, as the savage animal with his prey. A cheerful moderate companion is at best but insipid to him, generally odious. Such a one is called unfeeling, time-serving, and a traitor to the cause of virtue. If any thwart his views, or interfere with his rights, they are immediately put upon the footing of enemies; however innocent they may be: no trial is held; they are calumniated with virulence, and hated with bitterness: chagrin and ill-humour, in various shapes, take possession of his mind; and leave

no authority to calm dispasssionate reason, no room for mild forbearance. Yet he pretends to reason; the form of argument is kept up; nay he would be thought a man of deep reflection; of such penetration as to see through all hypocritical pretences: the complacent mask which men wear, does not impose upon *him*; no; he can strip it off; and discover beneath it the hidden features of moral deformity.

This may give some idea of the hater of mankind: his character is indeed by some moralists too strongly charged; but that may make it the more plainly discernible: and if misanthropy be once understood, we can the more easily recognize it when it is mixed with other qualities, good or bad; or when it is but occasional, appearing and disappearing; when it is the temper only of an hour of disappointment, a day of mortification, or a season of bodily indisposition. *(a)*

4. Having done what was first proposed, I am, in the next place, to endeavour to detect some of the *fallacies* under which misanthropy is apt to shelter itself. To deny the man-hater some love of virtue would be neither candid nor just; but it may be truly said, that he presumes himself to be more the friend of virtue than he really is: that is, he deceives himself; and could the particular deceptions or fallacies, into which he runs, be exposed, and distinctly marked, he himself might be ashamed of some of them; and other men might be witheld from imitating him, or from feeding his malevolent humor by inconsiderate respect, or ill-judged admiration.

5. The misanthrope deceives himself by founding his pretensions to virtue on conduct inconsistent with human *happiness*. The grand design of virtue is to make men happy; the misanthrope is constantly engaged in making men unhappy; in destroying all their enjoyments: he never sympathizes with men in any thing which affords them satisfaction; he never encourages or accepts their endeavours to please; not a smile is seen upon his countenance; nor is suffered to display itself without interruption on the countenance of any one who is in his presence. The hospitable reception,

the charitable construction, to these he is a stranger. True, says he, but the reason of such coldness is, because other men are enemies to virtue, and I am her true friend. Why then do you not attempt to conciliate these enemies? Virtue continually exerts herself to do good; do you do what good you can? When you despair of success in more important instances of beneficence, do you apply yourself to such as come within your powers? the true friend engages in contention without any confident expectations of victory; he does as much as he is able, though that may fall short of what he desires to accomplish. If then you would be consistent, and would avoid deceiving yourself, promote any innocent cause of happiness rather than none: this will most clearly shew, that you rejoice not in iniquity, but really have that friendship for virtue which you profess. The author of the Christian religion says, "By this shall all men know that ye are my disciples, if ye have love one to another." Whom, as a friend to virtue, do you love? not all your brethren certainly: whom do you encourage in brotherly affection? by your conversation, or by your example? it would be difficult to find an instance. Yet misanthropy can exist amongst those who call themselves Christians!

6. The malevolent man who affects superior probity, is apt to deceive himself with regard to his *sincerity*; a virtue on which he particularly values himself, and the degrees of which he makes to be proportionate to the degrees of harshness and offensiveness adopted in his language; especially to persons of eminence, or in authority. His pretensions to this virtue are as if it consisted in exaggerating the unfavourable circumstances of every event, and in substituting declamation for truth: as if every description of favourable circumstances were falshood. Men in high stations and public offices, it seems, have such faults, that to pretend really to respect them is mere flattery. But may not respect be sincerely paid to rank and to authority? Is it not for the good of the world that it should be so? As you pay money to one who has faults, so should you pay respect, when it is a debt of justice; Honour to whom honour is due. Our Lord said, "The Scribes

and Pharisees sit in Moses seat. All therefore whatsoever they bid you observe, that observe and do; but do not ye after their works." Matt. xxiii. 2, 3. Would external respect to such personages as these have been deemed insincerity? When St. Paul says, "Thou shalt not speak evil of the ruler of thy people." Acts xxiii. 5. he cites the authority of Moses, and adds his own. Civility, or courtesy, is due also to persons of the same rank with ourselves, though we may have objections to their private characters; and that it should be paid, is an important concern of mankind: nevertheless, to prevent its nature from being misunderstood, is one duty of sincerity; though without complacency and candour even the ends of sincerity could not be answered. Sometimes the sincerity of the misanthrope is exercised in *reproof;* in which the limits of propriety are apt to be transgressed: for it is contrary to reason and to utility, that any one should administer reproof, without some warrant, either from public authority, or private friendship. To assume the office of reprover, without any regular appointment, may occasion much unpleasant altercation, but very little improvement. He therefore who reserves his reproof till he has a right to offer it, is not less sincere than he who breaking through all rules of decorum, and intruding into what he cannot understand, presumes to run into harsh animadversions and impertinent advice.

7. The misanthrope would have his mental malady so regarded, that he should be acknowledged the truest friend to order and good *Government.* But is not this a deception? Can he be said to support Government who will take no active part in the management of public affairs? If the generality of men are so full of iniquity, should they not be overlooked and restrained? If he is the only true patriot, there is the greater need that he should have authority. It is desirable that there should be one Magistrate at least of unshaken integrity. And what is his exemption? he does not give up all claim to the protection of civil society; he is not a Hermit; he has property; ought he not to make all the return in his power for the protection which his person and property receive? He has had

some disappointment, or mortification; but that cannot entitle him to throw all cares upon others, and bear no civil burden himself. Let him then, so long as he shuns all social duties, acknowledge himself to be on the same footing with those Scribes and Pharisees of whom it is said, "They bind heavy burdens, and grievous to be borne, and lay them on mens shoulders, but they themselves will not move them with one of their fingers." Mat. xxiii. 4.

8. The man-hater labours under deception with regard to the valuable quality, or virtue, of *Fortitude*. Because he hazards language from which wise and good men abstain, he calls himself fearless and intrepid; other men are dastardly and afraid to speak the truth; he is determined that no man shall silence him. This kind of bravery is greatly to be suspected: there is ground for suspicion that the misanthrope has in his composition, amongst other base ingredients, that of *cowardice*. For it certainly requires some resolution, when men have nice moral feelings, to bear up against the mean oppressions and paltry falshoods, the petty knaveries and treacheries of ordinary life: many have, after some struggles, been overpowered by them; nay have been able to bear most other evils with greater steadiness; and have kept clear of settled and professed misanthropy, till they have been, by such perpetual gratings on their moral sense, quite worn down, and teazed out of all resistance: now to want resolution is cowardly; and it is more so to assume airs of fortitude after yielding to fear: when a person of this sort has once given up the world, though really from timidity and want of firmness, when he has shrunk into his retirement, and has become possessed of some safe retreat, he fails not to make himself compensation for what he has lost; he affects to triumph in his defeat; determined to take the coward's revenge, by talking, when the danger is past, with courage and magnanimity.

9. In the complaints and railings of the misanthrope it is generally implied, that he is particularly free from *selfishness*. Another fallacy. Let particular cases

be examined, and it is well if *Self* be not generally found at the bottom of such complaints. We are told by those who bring railing accusations, that the poor are oppressed, the orphan wronged; and lastly, that merit is not rewarded. When merit is not rewarded, it is a neglect much to be lamented; but has the complainant no merit of his *own* which has been too little noticed? Let him scrutinize his own mind; is he sure that he does not blame the treatment which others have met with, in order the more decently and forcibly to introduce his own wrongs? If upon examination we seldom find a man taking up misanthropy till he has had some disappointment, and seldom retaining it when his own affairs have taken a prosperous turn, though the world has all the while continued much the same, we shall allow that there is good ground for such an enquiry. We need not however scruple to attribute to selfishness one kind of railing against the world; and that is, when a man endeavours to talk himself into an aversion to that world in which he ought to live, and has in reality no other wish but to retire from his proper station, in order to give himself up to his favourite amusements; or to companions who flatter and indulge him.

10. The misanthrope not only thus deceives himself in regard to the worth of his *virtues*, but also in respect of the validity of his *reasoning*. Whosoever *takes for granted* the point in dispute, reasons fallaciously; if he is sincere to others, he at least misleads his own judgment. A person of the character in question takes for granted that his Ethics, his ideas of right and wrong, are the only just ones: nay that this is generally acknowledged. He allows nothing for difference of education, or custom; or situation; his censure is entirely founded on his own narrow conceptions. If he be engaged in any dispute, he is confident that all honest men, who have common sense, are on his side: (*b.*) when therefore men happen to differ from him, they are dishonest, or incorrigibly stupid. When he hates any men for not hating the species as he does, just at the moment of his provocation, he both takes for granted the errors of mankind, and the errors of those whom he hates, considered as judges of mankind. And supposing the objects of

his hatred to have really offended against the Laws of Virtue, he still reasons ill whilst he takes for granted, hat the same temptations which seduced them from heir duty, would not have been equally powerful against himself. He often forms an illegitimate conclusion by taking for granted, that when men do not all the good which he prescribes for them, it is merely because they will not. Whereas the generality of men are inclined to do more good than circumstances *(c.)* permit: not only their powers are more confined than suits their wishes, but they are very frequently checked by dread of abuses, and despair of success. Will not the misanthrope acknowledge, that he finds this to be the case? But it is to be feared, that he seldom examines carefully the motives of his own actions, though every man must deceive himself that does not. His feelings are burdensome and uneasy to him; he shrinks from the pain of probing them; he checks his consciousness; to avoid it he gives scope to his unnatural rancour, and tries to regard it as a natural indignation, the work of the creator; whilst all other men rank it amongst the depraved and factitious propensities. *(d.)* He considers the pleadings of his passion as if they were the arguments of his reason; whereas every man who is not culpably negligent or disingenuous in forming his judgments, makes a wide difference between them. Every reasonable man suspects the former as he would the eloquence of an advocate, and relies on the latter as on the opinion of a judge. It is equally a defect of reasoning and of feeling to complain of evils, and express no gratitude for benefits; to blame bad actions, and yet never applaud those which are good and worthy. Can a man be said to take even a rational view of the various mixtures of good and evil in this world, who detests the bad with the utmost vehemence, and yet beholds the good without emotion; without any of those delicious raptures, with which the heart of the truly virtuous man is elevated and softened, on the sight of genuine greatness and generosity. Not to be too tedious, I will only farther ask, whether there can be a more fallacious Induction than that which is implied in hating the human species for the faults of a few

individuals? Nay sometimes, it is to be feared, the whole species is hated for the faults of a single person. But could not the evils arising from the faults of one, or a few, be repaired without totally abandoning the world, and deserting its interests? If the misanthrope will make an induction, and draw a general conclusion from particular instances, let him open his eyes to the *good* which the generality of men are sincerely desirous of promoting; I will venture to say, that he would discover enough to make him, with no worse reasoning than he uses for the ground of his hatred, regard the human species as an object of universal love.

11. Our next business after exposing the Fallacies of Misanthropy, is to point out the *mischiefs* with which it is attended. Many indeed have already appeared, whilst we were speaking of hatred in general, and of the nature of misanthropy in particular, (Art. 31. part 1. Art. 3. part 2.) yet others may be worth mentioning.

Excessive blame of persons and actions, *defeats itself;* men see its injustice, and resist it, as they would oppression, cruelty, or ingratitude. And not only the mild and candid do this, but the vicious see the advantage which opens upon them: they venture to become professed advocates for vice; and they are much more specious, and powerful, and therefore much more dangerous, on account of the unreasonable severity of their adversaries.

12. Misanthropy has a pernicious influence on *public* or social happiness. It disqualifies men for the hurry and bustle of public life; for the unmeritted blame and opposition which all must expect to encounter, who exercise authority. It indisposes men to act with such as are apt to push themselves into power; that is, with the generality; and, what is the worst part of the matter, it disqualifies and indisposes those men who have the most moral feeling; who are the most likely to be above perversion and corruption; and to apply their influence, according to the true intent and meaning of the Trusts committed to them; without falshood, fraud, or any manner of deception, or duplicity. Nor must it be said, that the temper here described is not so much a

constant state of mind, as the temporary effect of occasional dejection; that would only lead us to observe, that the man who has a tendency to contract an aversion to his species, is more apt to fall into fits of dejection than others are. This is true. He sees, that whatever is accounted valuable becomes, by the eagerness with which it is snatched at, a matter of illiberal contention and skirmishing; or of artful trigue and plotting: this he feels to be beneath the dignity of Virtue. Or if he can prevail upon himself to go so far as to enter into competition, he feels his hopes of esteem and honour blasted by malicious slander. Conscious that he deserves something much more encouraging, he is dispirited, and retires to meditation and solitude: but this does not send him back to the world, though dissatisfaction on quitting it is one of his torments. This dissatisfaction conspiring with those feelings which occasioned his retirement, generates, by degrees the fixed temper of misanthropy; and then only one step remains; which is, to believe that hating the wicked race to which he belongs, is Virtue. Virtue has always been the object of his pursuit: so long as he thought virtue consisted in resisting with firmness all prevailing corruptions, he sustained the conflict; but when it appeared to him to be perfected by hatred of men; the case became desperate; all motives to make himself useful lost their power and energy. Thus misanthropy does harm to the public by depriving it of those services which would be the most beneficial; the consequence of which must be, opening the avenues to power for those who have little or no moral feeling; who consider public trusts only as instruments of their ambition and rapacity.

13. Misanthropy is hurtful to that *private* good which is independent of Government and authority. The way to promote private happiness is to explore all the sources from which it seems likely to spring; to make experiments, and correct and improve them from time to time. On disappointment and failure, to find those remedies which the Author of Nature has provided; and to combat our feelings by enlarged views of general good, as opposed to that good or evil which is

partial; to retain also the activity and elasticity of the mind, by which, after being depressed, it returns to its wonted shape and tone. Now the man who abandons himself to sentiments of disgust and aversion towards his species, deprives himself of every one of these expedients: he takes no pains to examine the various circumstances from which human happiness may be derived: He never is employed by any such principle as the hope of good, and never regulates any rude trials made for the purpose of producing it. If he cannot at once enjoy what he fixes his heart upon, be will enjoy nothing: In this his example is of pernicious tendency; submission and resignation are made for man; and if they are genuine, leave the mind at liberty to find and pursue new resources. But the man-hater is too sullen to look about for those treasures of happiness which are diffused through the world; he sees not that when one mine is exhausted, there are numberless others unopened and untouched; he reflects not, that alacrity and address in quitting one expedient and flying to another; in bringing nearer to him the more distant sorts of good; in extracting from what is within his reach all possible enjoyment, would entirely prevent his ever being destitute of happiness. He takes for granted that which he can never know, that the good he now enjoys, or may enjoy, is inferior to that which he regrets. In such a state, his mind is so enfeebled as to lose its spring, and fall into habitual inactivity.

14. An evil which is of a *growing* nature, must he estimated as greater on that account. And misanthropy grows with age. Indeed every man, who attends to the nature of Duties, grows more clear and ready in discerning them, as he grows older; is more struck with deviations from them; feels more surprised that any thing so plain, depending only on common sense, should be so frequently missed; and therefore, if there were nothing to counteract this, and if perfection were always deemed indispensable, every man would perceive fastidiousness to grow upon him, and the circle of those whom he loved and esteemed to become continually narrower; but if a man with encreasing age retains his health and his benevolence, he finds fastidiousness re-

strained by increasing candour, and the circle of the objects of his esteem and love even enlarged, by the enlargements of his views and opinions. Youth is frequently indignant and intolerant; but the man who has observed things carefully, comprehends the great variety of principles upon which different persons act; sees how men equally well-meaning rashly blame each other; watches the manner in which error and vice creep into the mind unperceived; is able to discover in men unthinkingly condemned, good qualities, which make them on the whole equal in worth to those who presume to be their judges. Now misanthropy heightens the strictness and fastidiousness here described, and checks the growth of the candour by which it should be tempered.—a progression of sentiment that must greatly interupt those mutual regards, upon which the pleasing and useful intercourse of mankind chiefly depends.

15. Amongst the mischiefs of misanthropy there is no reason why we should omit such as the man-hater brings upon *himself*; although they may be more merited than such as he brings upon others. The mind of man is always restless and uneasy when deprived of the exercise of benevolence. He therefore who hates mankind, must feel himself under confinement of a very irksome and vexatious sort. He is continually tending towards a pleasing object, which his malignant passions will not suffer him to embrace. Shame, obstinacy, ill-humour, prevent his owning his uneasiness, and therefore his rescuing himself from it; though their influence upon his mind, and his secret consciousness of it, aggravate his slavery, and make his fetters more galling. Moreover, his temperament is such, that all the different *kinds* of malevolent sentiments take fire in his breast, and mutually inflame each other; so as to overpower all resistance from reason and conscience. Hence it is at one time anger which appears as the immediate cause of his excesses; at another time jealousy; though neither of them would have appeared at all had not his mind been previously heated. Impelled by this variety of malevolent passions, he runs into difficulties, from which he is never afterwards perfectly free; his want of self-government is so plainly seen, that snares are laid

for him; he is artfully exasperated, and becomes the dupe of men much inferior to himself both in understanding and morals: ensnared and entangled, he looks around him for friendly assistance: and friends he may find; more easily than he can rid himself of his suspicions, and his prejudices against them. But I fear it sometimes happens, that the securities and the sacrifices to his humours, which he suggests, revolt the most friendly; and their coolness must encrease his irritation. Deprived of the attentions of the most benevolent and disinterested, what can be his resources? It is well if the indulgence of some depraved passion or appetite do not grow upon him: there is but too much reason to dread the brutal stupidity of solitary intemperance. Nay when such indulgence permits any intervals of sensibility, may he not make his own destruction the principal subject of his gloomy deliberations?

16. But let us now, in the fourth and last place, endeavour to propose some *remedies* for the evils which we have enumerated. In all mental disorders, remedies must first be applied to the *Understanding*, and afterwards to the *heart* and affections. For though the weak arguments used to justify the irregular indulgence of passion are frequently more the work of feeling than of reason, yet it always happens, that when the affections are in disorder, some important *truths* are overlooked and neglected. In the disorder called misanthropy the following may serve as instances;

Virtue in all men is *imperfect*; it consists of rules gradually brought to light by experience; and that experience is imperfect amongst the wisest, and extremely defective amongst the less informed. Improvement may be an object of our hope; but perfection is beyond our ken. Hence we must expect to find in different men different degrees of *knowledge* respecting duties, even where there is not any opposition of opinions, or any faulty intention. Such imperfection requires indulgence, both for the ignorant and enlightened. And particularly for the enlightened when acting towards the ignorant; for your duties to any man depend not only on your own notions, but on his. You are not to trust a savage as you would a civilized person of good

reputation: your obligations to hospitality are not the same to a man of tried probity, and to one who has very rude notions of honesty and honour.

17. We have here supposed degrees of knowledge in morals without opposite *opinions;* but in fact, men hold different systems of ethics, even when their knowledge need not be considered as materially unequal. It may be doubted whether any two men act upon all the same principles; even when equally improved in intellect, and equally sincere and well-meaning. To be impatient therefore or disgusted when men do not conduct themselves according to our own particular notions of right and wrong, is to take that for true which is false; is to impose our opinions on all other men; and must be considered as a sure indication of a narrow, bigotted and contracted mind.

Had men therefore no opposite opinions, but only different degrees of knowledge of their duties, such difference would demand great candour as to what should be insisted upon from them; or had they the same knowledge, but only different opinions concerning right and wrong; such difference of opinion would be a just foundation for kind indulgence and forbearance; how great then ought the allowances to be when men are found to differ so very much as they now do, both in their degrees of knowledge and in their opinions concerning subjects of morality!

18. But remedies are to be applied to the *heart* as well as to the understanding. Indeed this is requisite even for the understanding itself; since, as was before observed, settled notions depend in a great measure upon habitual feelings. Give a new turn to the feelings, and opinions will be found pliable and accommodating. This may not be easily effected, but it is worth attempting.

Here the first attention must be paid to bodily *health:* for disorders of the body depress and irritate the mind, and embitter the disposition: those complaints especially, which are unfixed, and not well defined, and

which want a name, are apt to sour the temper; one reason is, they do not excite the same friendly concern and sympathy with well known disorders, nor are they alleviated by the same hope of recovery: and thus they bring on or heighten, the mental disorder under consideration: which would freequently abate and even die away, thought it had acquired some strength, could its bodily causes be removed. The misfortune is, that disorders in body and mind, are too seldom considered as connected with each other. Amongst bodily disorders which men of some virtue are apt to contract, I know not whether it might not be worth while to specify those arising from luxury and intemperance, when not carried to a degree that is disreputable. There is an insolence attending these, a disatisfaction, a craving, which effectually banishes all mildness; all gentle and candid benevolence; and greatly diminishes that Love, which all truly good men bear towards mankind.

19. In providing remedies for misanthropy it might be sometimes of use to make one man-hater the instrument of *correcting another*. This will be effected the most easily when disgust in two minds has arisen from different circumstances, and in different situations. The first hates the second, and the second hates the first; yet neither of them has any idea that he is an *object* of hatred: or would receive any pleasure from considering himself in that light. If a contention could be instituted between two man-haters, in order to determine which was the properest object, (for all hatred must have an object,) it might open the eyes of both: and might dispose them to a compromise and reconciliation, not only with each other, but with their whole species. *(e)*

20. But the gloominess and malignity of the misanthrope would generally be best dispelled by introducing into his mind some kind of *pleasure* or enjoyment. The dark cells and caverns of his heart should, if possible be illuminated. His hard congealed austerity should be thawed and melted away. Yet without some nicety and circumspection the experiment may fail: his moral feelings are become so delicate, that at first there are

but few sorts of pleasure which he could digest. His constitution stands in need of some preparatory expedients. Could his outward circumstances be improved and made more prosperous, that would have a great effect; but in giving general directions that expedient may be dismissed as impracticable: let him, however, change the scene; absence from the particular objects of his hatred, and from every thing associated with them, will naturally make some of his emotions subside; variety will cheer and enliven him: he will be put out of his course; he will become more capable of attending to advice, and of accepting assistance; and more open to new impressions; even to such as are of a pleasing sort.

21. The first pleasure to be administered to the Misanthrope must be of a *moral* nature; pure and peaceable. He should be engaged in studying the works of the *Creation;* in experiments on the various provisions which the author of nature has made for his creatures: though these may be called physical, yet their operation on the heart is moral: we cannot dwell on the beauties and exquisite contrivances of almighty wisdom, and conceive the degree in which we are interested in them, without exciting in ourselves strong moral sentiments; or at least such as are pure, and remote from every thing sensual. By superintending *vegetation*, a man is naturally induced to fix his thoughts for a length of time on such wisdom and beauty as is here understood. From admiring the works of Nature the transition is not difficult to receiving pleasure from works of *Art;* the best and most useful of which give moral enjoyment. Could the Misanthrope be conducted so far on his way towards mental sanity as to relish these, he must begin to view some of his own species in a favourable light; as being, in some sort, the sources of his gratification: which would be a great point gained. If he could be prevailed upon to *labour*, in any way which would be successful and productive, the fruits of his activity would not fail to raise in his mind a pleasing self-complacency: which would be greatly heightened and refined if his industry were exercised in acts of *beneficence*. And not only in his own employ-

ments, but in viewing the employments of others, he should dwell chiefly on what is most moral: as on instances of parental, filial, brotherly love; on acts of friendship; on transactions of benevolent associations; on the comforts of cheerful and contented poverty. These are to be found; and they should be sought for diligently, by the Misanthrope, and applied to his mind as precious balms. For a considerable time he should mix only with the more honest and virtuous part of mankind; carefully avoiding the false and profligate; without any attempt to reprove or reform them; as that would excite his indignation, and endanger a relapse. Nor is there any reason to doubt that a sufficient number of worthy persons may be found to answer his purpose. There are many families, in which relatives may be seen living together upon a kind footing; the members of which faithfully promote each others interests and happiness; affording examples both of the more manly and noble, and of the more feminine and delicate virtues. To be adopted into one such family, and continue in it till the ruling disposition of it was fully seized, might be sufficient to sweeten the temper of most misanthropes.

22. When our patient had recovered his health far enough to have a settled relish for moral pleasure; he might be presented with some of a *religious* sort: but religion has sometimes been gloomy, or even malignant: he must not therefore be left to wander at full liberty even through all the dispensations of providence; much less through all the tenets of religious men: he must, whilst under medical regulation, confine himself to the more favourable sorts, to such as make the Supreme Being, even to our narrow conceptions, an object of Love. In the divine benevolence he would find an inexhaustible source of salutary reflexion: which would gradually prepare his mind for wholesome meditation on those parts of the universe which have most the appearance of evil.

23. Should these remedies succeed so far as to make the Misanthrope feel some degree of satisfactory cheerfulness like the day-star arising in his heart, 2 Pet. i. 19. he might venture to taste some of the pleasures of

the *Imagination*, and of the *senses:* without which his cure would be always incomplete: he would not now either disdain them as mean and vicious; or devour them with too much avidity. They would enliven, and even strengthen him; as they would take off that softness or seriousness, which usually attends moral and religious pleasures: and enable him to bear the ruder gaity, nay perhaps some of the vices, of the man of the world, as far as the general good of mankind required that they should be born.

24. We may *conclude* our observations on the subject of misanthropy by observing, that the method here traced out appears as if it would not be wholly unsuccessful. Difficulties would, no doubt, arise in the execution of it, which would serve some men as pretences for desisting from it; but the mere attempt to execute it must be productive of much good: and the attempt is always in our power. Our expedients were, to improve our bodily health; to endeavour to rectify our notions; to apply ourselves to understand the works of the Creation; to aim at acquiring a relish for the more excellent works of art; to associate with the more worthy part of mankind; and to cultivate the Love of the all-perfect Being. These things could not but be useful to us, though they might not produce the full effect which we have had in view; though, at any particular season, we should still find some remains of gloomy malignity in our dispositions, We hazard nothing therefore; we have much to hope, and nothing to fear. Greater encouragement cannot be given to perseverance, nor can a stronger obligation be imposed to persevere.

END OF PART II.

Malevolent Sentiments.

PART III.

ENVY.

1. HAVING considered the passion or sentiment of Hatred, we now proceed to that of *Envy*; observing the same method as when Hatred in general (not the particular species of it called Misanthropy) was our subject. We are then to consider,

I. The *Nature* of Envy.

II. Its *Effects*, good and evil.

III. The due *regulation* of it.

2. The *Nature* of Envy is much more easy to be understood than that of Hatred. Envy is that uneasy sentiment, of which we are conscious, when we observe the success of those with whom we compare ourselves, to be greater than our own. It is spoken of as *malevolent* because in fact it usually prompts men to wish harm to its objects; and most expressions, if not all, are taken from fact. The circumstance of comparison, or competition, is so striking a mark of Envy, that there is no need to enter into distinctions here, as on the subject of hatred; neither is there occasion to describe particularly the object of envy; but it may be very proper to suggest a *caution*, lest our remarks should seem more rarely applicable to practice than they really are.

3. A person may say, if there is no envy where there is no competition, I may make myself easy; for it very *seldom* happens that I am any man's competitor; but, in truth, we are engaged in more competitions than we are commonly aware of. Whenever any person has any sort of pretensions to what another acquires, be it advantage, or only applause, there subsists some degree of competition between them. Nay by sympathy we adopt the competitions of our friends. We have therefore only to reflect how very frequently partiality persuades us that we have pretensions, in order to see how constant is our danger of being influenced by the passion of envy.

We very frequently, or continually, feel pretensions, to what is attained, or pursued, by our neighbour, our companion, nay by our nearest and best beloved relation: Envy therefore may mix itself with our noblest affections, and may disguise itself under various shapes, so that we shall act from it, whilst we are conscious of no evil intention; and without having it clearly and distinctly in view.

4. Envy is less *personal* than hatred; for any one may cease to be the object of envy, though he retain all his personal qualities, if only he be removed to a situation where he does not interfere with our pretensions. Nevertheless the personal presence of him whom we envy, heightens the passion considerably: and our speaking or thinking of him, so as to make our idea of him more lively than usual, has the same sort of effect, in some degree.

5. Envy has been well distinguished from *emulation; (a)* or the faulty sort of envy, to which the name is commonly applied, from that which is innocent. When our uneasy sentiment, on seeing the success of our competitor, makes us endeavour to depress him to our level, it has the name of envy; when its effect is to make us exert ourselves in raising ourselves to his level, it takes the name of emulation. This distinction is made when occasion requires it; otherwise, that species of envy which most commonly occurs, is most usually expressed by the general term. Indeed, the difference be-

tween envy and emulation, when they are opposed to each other, lies not so much in the feeling itself as in the use and application of it: or in the other feelings with which it is apt to become united.

6. *Jealousy* seems to be that particular branch of envy which arises in the mind when the good for which men are competitors, is personal favour, affection, esteem, respect, honour. It may be called an universal sentiment: a child, nay a brute animal, occasions it, and feels it.

7. Our description of the Nature of envy is confirmed, not only by the circumstances in which it is felt, but also by those in which it is *not* felt. If men are so much above us, or so much below us, in any particular, or are in any way so far removed from us, that their pretentions and ours do not interfere, no envy arises.

8. This passion seems not only to be universally felt, but also to be universally *acknowledged*. The most learned and the most illiterate are found to ascribe the differences and quarrels which they observe to this *(b)* cause. No man therefore ought to think himself *exempted* from examining his own breast with a view to it; or from providing against its excesses, and its pernicious effects.

9. As the nature of envy is more easy to be understood than that of hatred, so are the *scriptural* expressions concerning it.

The scripture generally uses the word envy in its *proper* sense; answering to the account now given: but sometimes the greek word *zelos* literally *zeal* is translated envy or emulation: this should seem to be a name for the sentiment taken from the most ordinary cause or effect of it, which is striving for superiority. Envy sometimes signifies what might be called *party*-envy; as when a party are considered as one individual, and different parties envy each other, like different individuals: Or when each individual envies, or is envied, as a member of a party. The Scripture also uses the word envy for a *compound* sentiment, of which proper

envy is a principal part, as was mentioned on the subject of hatred. (Part I. 17.) *(c)*

10. Before we quit this part of our subject it may be proper to observe, that though *Jealousy* is in strictness what we have defined it to be, yet in reality it is seldom found to be one simple sentiment: it is generally mixed and *compounded*; and when it is so, it is the most important, because it is the most violent: it sometimes is seen to rise into such fury, as sets at nought all restraints of prudence, reason, virtue and religion. When this is the case, Jealousy is compounded with love, and with hatred; it contains also a strong sense of injury, and therefore resentment: A feeling sense of shame and ignominy, of wounded honour, is also a powerful ingredient. Nor must we omit that dejection of mind, which is occasioned by a heavy and irreparable loss; or that dreadful vacancy amongst the feelings, which arises from the sudden and recent removal of an object of strong and habitual affection. Each of these component parts is very strong; and when kindred passions mix, they heighten and inflame each other; what then must be the violence of a passion made up of them all! The very idea of danger, when the evil in view is extreme, disorders the mind, and confounds even the senses: it is like looking down a precipice, and conceiving a fall, which would dash us to pieces.

11. We may now proceed from the Nature of Envy to its *effects*, some of which are *beneficial*, others *hurtful*. The *beneficial* effects of envy must be seen in the same light with those of hatred; it is a remedy for evil, itself not wholly free from evil. In order to make ourselves sensible of its value, we must consider how men probably would have acted, and what improvements they would have made, had they felt no uneasiness on seeing themselves surpassed. As far as we can judge from experience, the want of such a spring, or spur, or motive, would have occasioned a very great difference in human exertions, and therefore in human improvements. Men would certainly have had their *Reason* to prompt them to improve themselves and their con-

dition ; and a prospect of advantage ; but it has been observed, that it is chiefly uneasiness which impells men to determine on any change. (Locke Hum. Und. 2. 21. 29.) Taking men as they are, our most natural conclusion is, that without some uneasiness they would have continued in a state of indolence and stagnation. The finer feelings would have lain dormant ; that alacrity and animation, which we now perceive, would have remained unseen and unknown. It may not indeed be easy to ascertain the precise quantity of good which envy has occasioned in the world ; because we do not know exactly what we should have been, and how we should have acted, without it ; but every man's experience must have shewn him instances of beneficial exertions owing to it. And he who wished to justify the ways of God to man, must produce such instances, and dwell upon them. He must also observe, that in cases where men are impelled to do good and to improve themselves, by higher motives, this spur does not necessarily act ; and that its action ceases when the want of it ceases. For men are sometimes induced to exert themselves in a beneficial manner by virtuous and religious considerations ; tho' ordinarily, judging of men from experience, it is not to be expected, that they will exert themselves so beneficially without the spur of envy, as by its assistance. And moreover, any one, thinking of envy as the work of the Creator, is at liberty to remark, how much its pungency and its mischievous influence are capable of being moderated and softened : to what degree it is capable of being purified from evil. We see many amiable examples of generous rivals and competitors ; tho' in common life envy takes its ordinary course, and by being felt by some and recognized by all, it excites an universal animation. The best state of any passion is that which was intended by God.

12. That Envy has some *hurtful* effects is not doubted. Those whose view is to regulate that sentiment in such a manner that it may produce the greatest possible good and the least possible evil, will enumerate not only such evil effects as appear in the decidedly wicked, but such as are not sufficiently guarded against by men tolerably well-meaning. The immediate *unea-*

siness of the sentiment itself naturally occurs in the first place; this admits of a very great variety of degrees; but in some instances, particularly those of Jealousy, it rises to great and exquisite misery: (*x*) in others it is more moderate. We may next mention what may be called its *malevolence*; that is, its disposing men to do ill offices towards its objects: these may be of greater or less importance; but they will seldom fail to produce a settled *enmity*; and enmity with equals is an intercourse of hurtful actions amongst those who live most together, and are most capable of being comfortable friends to each other. In scripture we find envy and strife conjoined, "Where envying and strife is," says St. James, "there is confusion and every evil work." Indeed, when envy is indulged against any one, there is such a desire to lower him, that neither his reputation nor his property is safe. That attacks are sometimes made on these under an appearance of candour, and upon specious pretences, or under a cloke of religious zeal, only aggravates the evil; as the abuse of what is good always tends to bring it into disgrace. Envy as well as hatred (Part I. Art. 33.) is hurtful to government, or to the exercise of useful *authority*. For though envy is in strictness amongst equals, yet the imagination can sometimes reduce different ranks to a level; at least sufficiently for the inferior to repine at his being subject to one who deserves power no better than himself. When this is the case, the Subject can take pleasure in thwarting and embarrassing the measures of the Magistrate, whom he ought to obey and support. (*x*) Nor need we suppose the inferior to envy his superior, in order to see how envy obstructs government; the magistrate has competitors and rivals for power, who are confessedly his equals; these delight in disappointing his plans and weakening his influence; so that a person in authority has sometimes more difficulty in obviating the cavils and overcoming the contradictions of those of his own rank, than in ruling his inferiors. This is one instance in which "envying and strife" produce "confusion." Magistrates stand in need not only of Laws but of voluntary support. When the lower orders are disposed to be refractory they are but too ready to follow the example

of any person of eminence, whether for riches and rank, or for abilities and eloquence, in counteracting the salutary regulations of those, who watch over the public welfare. The harm which any thing does, depends not only on the positive evil created, but upon the *good prevented.* This was explained under the subject of hatred: *(w)* (Part I. Art. 35.) we have only to add, that the good which is prevented by envy in particular, is by no means insignificant. There is no virtue more purely benevolent than rejoicing with them that do rejoice; than sympathizing with the prosperous, and enjoying their prosperity: this sympathy it is the peculiar province of envy to damp and discourage. It also checks those improvements which must be conducted by the joint endeavours of several; and these are numerous, and more important, than those which can be carried on by each man separately. Friendship also, which tends in so great a degree to adorn and bless the life of man, is either destroyed, or so loosened and debilitated, as never to recover its strength and firmness, by childish rivalships, perhaps in some pursuit of ambition, or in something still more trifling. Solid confidence, affectionate fellow-feeling, some of the best things this world affords, are wantonly thrown away, for the sake of seizing before him whom we love and trust, some distant and uncertain advantages, which our imagination has painted in splendid and glowing colours. When the evil effects of hatred are compared with those of envy, it is worth observing, that hatred tends to check something which approaches to the nature of vice, but envy aims its stroke at something which partakes of the nature of *Virtue.* Indeed, a man whom we should call virtuous, may be hated, (Part I. Art. 13.) and a person whom we should call vicious, may be envied; but yet, generally speaking, odious qualities are faulty, and what every man ought to endeavour to avoid; and qualities which excite envy, are such as ought to be pursued. Those qualities which lead to eminence, and so occasion envy, are generally virtues, in one sense or other, though they may accidentally promote vice. Industry is a virtue, though it may be exercised in gratifying vicious propen-

sities: and the same may be said of other valuable qualities, which are generally productive of some partial good, even when misapplied. It should therefore be noted as an evil attending envy, that it may frequently be considered, not as punishing vice, but as restraining virtue.

The *growth* of envy resembles that of hatred. (Part I. Art. 36.) If you envy any person, he will be the more disposed to envy you; not in that matter in which you envy him, but in others; he will be forward to rival you and oppose your claims: this will encrease your envy whenever he gains an advantage over you; and yours will encrease his. This reciprocation may proceed so far that every advantage gained by the one party shall be felt as an injury, or as a great misfortune by the other. In such a case, envy must generate hatred, hatred enmity, and the actions resulting from a fixed, mutual resentment. "Bitterness and wrath, anger and clamour," evil-speaking and malice, must all be let loose; what could stop their fatal career?

13. As we have defined *Jealousy* separately, and described its strength, we may mention separately its *effects*. They are *good*, when it promotes the improvement of him whom it actuates. The desire of standing as high as another, with whom we compare ourselves, in the favour, affection, esteem, of some person, whom we account to be the source of honour, pleasure, or other good, is a very powerful incentive to exert ourselves in acquiring such qualities as seem likely to answer our purpose. These qualities are, generally speaking, what in a large sense may be called virtues. Qualities agreeable or useful, to ourselves or others (Hume's Morals). And though we may have some desire to please such a person, or to gain his favour or esteem, when we make no comparison between ourselves and any rival, yet it is found by experience, that security relaxes the endeavours of most or all men; and that nothing makes a man so earnest and vigilant as the fear of being surpassed by one, who seems to have no better claim than himself to the good which is the common object of pursuit.

14. The *mischievous* effects of Jealousy are sometimes very striking. The evils arising from rivalships of friends have been already described, (Art. 12); and friends are more likely than others to be rivals, as they have generally the same taste, the same relish for certain sorts of good. Rivalship for favour is most likely to have place amongst great personages, those of high rank, those who have no need to contend for subsistence, or ordinary emoluments: and all the efforts of these, being connected with pride and a high sense of honor, and being supported by numbers, are important. This rivalship for favour seems to be the most general and prevailing principle of action in the Courts of Monarchs.—But Jealousy is the most violent in the attachments of the sexes; and its mischievous effects are there the most tragical: especially when marriage, or other engagement, has made preference to be injury; and when infidelity has been the occasion of corrupt education of offspring, or of ruined fortunes. In savage life we are told, that the jealous husband has been seen to dash his suspected partner, in the height of his fury, "against the stones." And in civilized countries, Jealousy has occasioned the loss of life; by attack on one or both of the offending parties; by suicide; *(d)* by the gradual operation of disappointment and despondency; or by that private war between individuals, which still is carried on, to the disgrace of all Religion and Government.

15. The *Scriptures* afford us instances of envy and its evil consequences. The history of *Haman* and Mordecai might be referred to this head; and we are expressly told, that "the Patriarchs, moved with envy, sold *Joseph* into Egypt." Acts vii. 9. And, we may add, that the greatest and most important of all events, the death of Jesus Christ, is in part ascribed to this passion; to the envy of the Jewish Priests. Matt. xxvii. 18.

16. We now come to the *Regulation* of envy: and the first question which occurs, is, can envy ever be *right?* any kind or degree of it? We considered a similar question so fully with respect to hatred, (Part 1. Art. 37.) and what was said of hatred is so immediately applicable to envy, that it would be superfluous to re-

peat our observations. We will therefore content ourselves with observing briefly, that we dare not throw away a spur which the author of nature has thought proper to give us; especially as it may be polished, and the evil of it mitigated, without limit. Uneasiness on the success of our competitor may be so softened as to become little more than a generous pride and esteem of ourselves; dictating nothing mean or malevolent. We may so improve our principles, as to do kind and noble actions towards our competitors, even whilst they continue in some sort the objects of our Envy. Appetites and Passions seem necessary for such a being as Man, in his present condition. It is not impossible to make use of their vehemence, and at the same time to curb it, so that they shall not hurry us into dangers. (Part 1. Art. 40.) Those who have the charge of education, find emulation useful upon the whole, and would be sorry to find any youth entirely void of it. Prayers and precepts against envy are calculated to suit the actual state of things; and sometimes to cut off occasions of evil: We pray against envy as we pray against battle, or against lightening; though in some circumstances a battle may be desirable on the whole, and though we thank God as the giver of all victory: lightening too is, no doubt, a good on the whole, though some of its effects may be hurtful, The holy *scriptures* take their expressions from occasions; they inculcate those duties which were much wanted, but omit unnecessary injunctions. What is taught with regard to anger may safely be applied to any other malevolent sentiment; "be ye angry and sin not." As we may be angry without sinning, though *all* anger is to be put away, and though wrath is reckoned amongst the works of the flesh, see Eph. iv. 31. and Gal. v. 20. so, it should seem, we may allow of some emotions of uneasiness on seeing ourselves surpassed, though envy is subject to the same prohibitions. St. Paul appears to me to aim at saving some men by provoking them to emulation; to commend the charity of the Corinthians, because it had made others emulate their generosity; and to exhort the Hebrews to regard or contemplate one another in order to excite a general emulation in love and good

works. See Rom. xi. 14. 2 Cor. ix. 2. and Heb. x. 24. *(e)* What is here said of envy in general must suit that species of it which is called *Jealousy:* yet it may not be useless to add, that when Jealousy is ascribed to the Supreme Being we may infer that it is a quality not essentially evil. Jehovah was not so universally worshipped as he ought to have been; the folly of men made them worship those who were no Gods. Here is a sort of competition; something resembling the ground of human Jealousy.

17. What has been said is not meant to deny, that the regulation of envy will generally consist in *restraint.* This will be incumbent on both the *object* and the *agent;* that is, both upon him who is envied, and on him who is disposed to envy others. When you are *envied,* your duty is, to endeavour to mollify your competitor; to bear with his weakness. You will the more readily do this whilst you keep in mind, that envy is a sentiment which is apt to die away, if there be no reciprocal selfishness to nourish it; no pride, insolence, or ungenerous triumph. The selfishness and meanness of him who envies you, may sometimes seem provoking; and you may feel yourself disposed to treat him with indignation; but patience here cannot be construed into meanness; it is not only rational, but great and noble: let it then be your endeavour to shew, that had your competitor been successful, you would have rejoiced in his success: yet even here there is danger; too much complacency, too visible security and composure may seem to be the effect of your victory; and therefore may be felt as so much insult; the utmost plainness, the most unaffected simplicity and humility, are requisite for disarming your adversary's chagrin. This is said upon the supposition that envy has been excited; but might it not have been wholly *prevented?* The circumstances which excite envy, may be remarked, and avoided. Moralists might be of use in discovering them, (Aristat. Rhet. Lib. ii. § 12.): but as newly-acquired prosperity is one of the most certain, it should be watched with peculiar care. *Insolence* is so natural to sudden exaltation, that it takes its name from change of circumstances; it is the temper of those, who are in a

situation more honourable than that to which they have been accustomed. But besides that it is difficult for one newly raised to keep himself free from insolence, some envy will attend such a one, though he be ever so discreet, for a time; because men acquiesce in a claim habitually, and habits are formed by degrees. The best method for any one recently put in possession of some accession to his wealth or dignity, is often to appear in his usual manner; for appearances have a great effect: the coat of many colours was no weak incentive to the envy of Joseph's brethren. He should moreover, exert himself with great diligence to promote the welfare of his former friends, so that they should consider his increase of fortune as eventually an increase of their own: so that he should still be deemed their equal, only with a little additional power of promoting the common good. And when he could not wholly prevent envy he might greatly weaken it, by kindly entering into the feelings of those who were now become his inferiors; by delicate, unaffected, unassuming attentions, by making advances, by supplying every possible consolation, information, and protection. *(f)* And though the scope of his kindness might sometimes appear; yet his motives are so worthy, that, with due uniformity and perseverance, he would be sure to succeed. His successors would have an easier task; and theirs an easier still; till at length the title would be universally acknowledged, by the feelings of private men, as well as by the laws of Society. It should not be here omitted, that a man may have the care of not only guarding himself from being hurt as an object of envy, but also of protecting *others*, who are dependent upon him. A Parent does not always sufficiently consider how much evil he may occasion by making one child to be an object of envy to the rest. And the caution is not to be neglected in other situations; undue praise, capricious preference may do great harm among friends, or even ordinary acquaintance. We here approach to *Jealousy*: men must avoid being objects of that passion, by avoiding all triumph in the favour which they enjoy; by using it to promote good; good even to a

rival; by speaking as if he enjoyed favour of others, equally valuable; by treating affection as liable to change; and as losing a great proportion of its value by its unsteadiness.

18. The regulation of envy in him who feels it, *in the envious*, will generally, as the world now is, consist in *restraint*: to the best methods of restraining it, let us therefore, for the present, confine ourselves. And first, it is necessary, as a foundation, that we should learn to recognize every emotion of envy the moment it arises in our minds; how likely we are to deceive ourselves in this matter has been already shewn. (Art. 3.) Envy may be our *real motive*, when we are willing to persuade ourselves that we act from a better: but so long as we do not allow ourselves to be influenced by this passion, all rules of self-government, relating to it, must be vain. No man will attend to the right methods of resisting an enemy till he is aware that there is an enemy to be resisted. The *jealous*, in particular, are apt to do ill offices, and use unkind expressions, really from jealousy, when they flatter themselves that they are following the guidance of some better principle.

19. The method now mentioned is of the *preparatory* or preventive kind: a kind, which may in general be deemed very useful; to repair any damage can never be so useful as to prevent it: we will therefore recommend one or two more expedients of the same kind. One is, to accustom ourselves to distinguish between the colourings of fancy and the arguments of reason; and particularly, between the imagined *means* of happiness and happiness itself. We frequently envy persons, whom we should pity, if we knew their real condition in every respect: we see them possessed of some things which we account means of happiness; and prejudice leads us to conclude, that the means must produce the end; sometimes we make this conclusion when the reality is very different; when, if we were for a while in the situation of such persons, we should be very glad to recover our own. In such deception we are helped forward by finding a great effect from some small indulgence, and by rashly concluding, that a greater

indulgence in the same thing, such as our neighbour can have, would produce a proportionably greater happiness: whereas it does not follow, because one glass of delicious liquor, when we labour under extreme thirst, occasions much pleasure and refreshment, that ten times the quantity would produce ten times the good: yet we frequently suffer ourselves to be mis-led by fallacies nearly as gross as this; and frequently our envy is built on no better foundation. This train of thought is the right one to enable us to feel the full force of some scriptural expressions; "Let not thine heart envy sinners"—"neither be thou envious against the evil-doers."—"I was envious at the foolish, when I saw the prosperity of the wicked." See Prov. xxiii. 17. and Psalm xxxvii. 1, and lxxiii. 3.—The man of a *jealous* turn is apt to fancy that appearances imply more than they really do; his rival appears easy and secure; he immediately imputes to success what is merely the effect of indifference: or perhaps the person whose favour is the prize contended for, treats his rival with complacency and cheerfulness; and that he construes into attachment, when it is really occasioned by the want of attachment; or at least by the want of serious and ardent affection. Tastes, feelings, manners, vary so much, that no man can safely require from the person whose favour he values, any precise mode of behaviour, in more minute particulars.

20. It would frequently hinder us from being envious, if we were attentive to check our pride and *vanity*; and to cultivate in ourselves an habitual *humility*. The lower our estimate was of our own merit, the lower would be our pretensions; and when we did not pretend to have an equal claim with any man to any certain honour or advantage, we should not be uneasy at his success. Besides, it frequently happens, that our aim is not so properly to possess an advantage in preference to a rival, as to be *known* to have gained such a preference. The applause and admiration of the world is really our wreath and crown of victory: therefore to moderate our ardour for eminence and distinction would be, in effect, to moderate our envy. The *jealous* temper might frequently be cured by the virtue of humility:

if a jealous man was to admit amongst his various deliberations such reasoning as this, what right have I to make myself unhappy because another is preferred before me? how easy is it to deserve such preference! it would do more towards alleviating his uneasiness than laying circumstances together and forming a chain of suspicions.

21. A great help towards obviating the suggestions of envy would be, to exercise the mind in every thing that would give it a strong relish for *moral* and religious excellence; for truth, merit, virtue. In reality, the envious man values his own importance beyond all other objects: to cure him of his fault, therefore, we would raise up in his mind other views and pursuits, more worthy of a rational and moral being: we would exhort him to bring himself to love and highly esteem religion, virtue, truth; to think their success more desirable than his being preferred to any one of whom he is envious; were he to adopt this opinion, he would say, shall I obstruct this useful discovery, that generous action, or the interests of religion, because the manner in which they are carried on, happens to make me insignificant? No! such things are more truly valuable than any fame or self-esteem which I can acquire. *(g)* Shall I discourage the promotion of such merit as I now behold, because it is accidentally the means of throwing me into obscurity? No! let the world have all the profit of employing the best men in its service!—This manner of seeing things would make the suggestions of envy to be little heeded: strong feelings of religion and virtue enlarge and soften the heart, and make the task of waving all competition easy to be performed; the pain of envy is overpowered by the pleasure of success in that which we think the most valuable and excellent. Nay, let a man be only a real enthusiast in any art or science, he will be more pleased with its advancement than hurt by finding himself of little importance in the work. And the same is true of any useful plan or undertaking. With regard to *Jealousy*, it may be observed, that a warm and high esteem of merit might dispose a man sometimes even to prefer his rival to himself: at least a man animated by such a spirit would never misrepre-

sent or lower the merit of his rival; nor would ever damp or discourage any conversation or intercourse, however likely to conciliate that favour which he himself desired, so long as it appeared to be the occasion of displaying any amiable or estimable qualities.

22. But suppose a man not to have furnished his mind with good principles, or that they have not their proper effect; suppose, in short, a man tormented with envy: suppose that it fills his mind and corrupts his enjoyments: what practical directions are most suitable to one so situated? Let him not by any means conclude, how strong soever his feelings, that he has no resources. If he cannot stop the current of any sentiment, or imagines he cannot, let him endeavour to alter its direction. If he cannot clear his mind of uneasiness when he sees his neighbour surpass him, cannot he make his mental pain act as a spur to his own improvement? cannot he change sordid envy into generous *emulation*? We have talked of allowing some vehemence to passions (Part I. Art. 40.), and of using it for our own purposes: Emulation may perhaps have the rein given it as safely as any other passion; but envy, as opposed to emulation, ought to have no indulgence whatsoever. Nay even emulation taken singly, is not the best of all possible motives: he who aims at improvement, only with a view to surpassing others, will scarcely be uniform in his endeavours: when he has once secured a preference or superiority over his competitor, emulation has finished its work: and some other motive is requisite to preserve him from indolence and inactivity. Nevertheless a change from envy to emulation is a change much for the better. What we have said of the good effects of *Jealousy* (Art. 13.) shews, that when a man has not succeeded in subduing a jealous spirit, it is in his power to make such use even of his uneasiness, that it shall be the means of improving him in every quality that has a tendency to conciliate favour and esteem.

23. If emulation has its imperfections, we must, as a supply, look out for some expedient more extensively useful. The Apostle says, "Charity envieth not:"

of ironical asperity on himself: those who are witnesses of its deceitful insinuations, should not be silent; but should detect and expose them, with friendly and delicate raillery, under the guidance of discretion. On both sides, an ingenuous frankness will generally be found sufficient to shew the true state of the case; and thereby to check all petulant and perverse humours, before they have gathered strength enough to engender any serious mischief.

26. In these methods of restraing envy in general we have included that important species *Jealousy*; and we might have added, with regard to slight and trifling jealousies, that they probably would be stopped if the jealous person would, by smiling at his own weakness, encourage his friends to be open and communicative; but nevertheless Jealousy is often attended with such consequences, that an observation or two tending to restrain it in particular could not be deemed superfluous. All jealousy may be considered, when taken as mere rivalship for favour and affection, in the light of *injustice*; because it implies, that a man is not at liberty to fix upon his own friends and favourites, according to his taste and judgment. Jealousy may arise in a case where a man has rights; but as far as injury is concerned, resentment seems to be the passion excited: that these passions may mix has before been mentioned. Again, as jealousy is sometimes extremely *violent*, it seems right to observe, that every degree of violence in any passion demands a proportionate degree of caution in indulging it: a prudent man may run hazards when the worst he can suffer is of no great consequence; but if the danger is very great, he will keep himself at a distance from it. And the more *selfish* any passion is, the less will a wise man trust to its suggestions, and the more suspicious will he be of its deceiving him; the jealous form and connect a long train of circumstantial proofs, but find them, on calm examination, little better than dreams, which vanish at the dawn of reason and common sense: had self been less concerned, they would not have given such circumstances a moment's attention. Combine all these qualities of jealousy, and the result will be, keeping a strict watch over ourselves

whenever we find ourselves in the least degree disposed to encourage it: and allowing it no liberty, till our minds have been thoroughly disciplined by reason and virtue, and fully stored with prudence and discretion.

27. The affecting story of *Joseph*, related in scripture with beautiful simplicity, turns upon the passion of envy: it might serve to impress on our minds what has been said, and might frequently assist our conduct, were we to conceive how his brethren by a timely resistance to their selfish passions, might have prevented the evils destined for him, and their own remorse. He must have been a truly amiable youth: to pass by the graces of his person, if in mature age misfortunes and unmerited injuries had produced no rancor in his mind; if unexpected despotic power had generated no insolence or hardness in his heart; if his bowels yearned twards his cruel persecutors, when vengeance was ready at hand; if he could ascribe his persecution to the kind providence of God, instead of the envy of his brethren, it is beyond a doubt, that in the bloom and gaity of youth, when his brethren conspired against him, his character must have been that of candour and tenderness: he must have been an affectionate brother; and if he was made to appear in the light of a rival by the fondness of an aged parent, and by illuminations from above, he must have been one perfectly ingenuous and undesigning. *Reuben* was his advocate; we will endeavour, by way of Recapitulation, to conceive the disswasives which he might offer. 'Surely, my brethren,' we may imagine him to urge, 'ye cannot be *aware* of the nature of the passion by which ye are impelled: how mean, how selfish, how unbrotherly it is: ye must impose upon yourselves, and fancy that ye are vindicating wrongs, when in truth ye are meditating the most unjustifiable cruelty. And what is it that alarms you? the loss of your father's affection? this ye dread, because fondness shews itself in his manner to the child of his age, the memorial of his lamented partner: but affection must not be measured by endearing words and minute attentions; the most powerful is sometimes silent on ordinary occasions; and there are different shades and species

of parental love, suited to the several ages and characters of its objects.—But perhaps ye are afraid of incurring *disgrace* in the eye of the world: ye would receive honour from men; do not then deceive yourselves; do not imagine that to be a spirit of doing justice, which is only pride or *vanity*: were we all to cultivate a genuine spirit of *humility*, it would be the best means of rectifying our dispositions. May not God supernaturally enlighten whom he thinks fit? as he gives natural powers to one, which he withholds from another. Are the gifts of God to be seen with a malignant eye? nay by the very Family which the divine bounty distinguishes? But on all occasions, if ye act from too high an estimate of your own worth, ye will infallibly interfere with the appointments of divine Providence. And have ye no regard for *moral* worth? does the virtue, the excellence, the amiable character of the youth whom ye persecute, pass for nothing? have ye no desire to contribute towards its being acknowledged and adored as it deserves? surely the least spark of love for what is praiseworthy, must be sufficient to prevent your consigning to Slavery and Bondage one truly ornamental to human nature!—But ye complain, that the uneasiness which ye feel when ye see your Father's partiality, is such, that ye cannot get the better of it: exert yourselves; is there no resource, besides cruelty to your unoffending brother? could not your inward pain find some relief in an attempt to *acquire* some kind of *merit* which should be equivalent to his? there are various sorts of excellence; learn to excell in something: any one of you may probably be your brother's superior in one way, if he remains superior in another: and perhaps at last ye may fill different departments equally well. The use which ye make of your uneasiness is the worst possible: even a noble and generous submission to superior merit would bring you nearer, than the pain which ye now indulge, to that equality to which ye aspire. After all, is their any necessity for dwelling so much as ye do on the comparison between your brother and yourselves? If it only generates unkindness, drop it wholly: regard him simply as your brother: be *kind* and affectionate towards him, with brotherly love: he has never injured you; he loves you all; it would make

him most happy to promote your happiness: think of this; dwell on the idea; rouse your *benevolence*, nay your gratitude, for he certainly wishes to make you happy; and be assured, that when ye once find yourselves his friends, ye will no longer be his rivals. Should this happy change in your dispositions seem to require time, ye might without delay *do him good;* it would not be long ere ye felt the sentiment corresponding to your *beneficence.* Assist him therefore with all the powers which nature, education, and age have given you; draw forth his virtues; direct, strengthen them; educate him, inform him, protect him. *Speak* kindly and favourably of him to your common parent; let others mention his faults; trust not yourselves on that topic; but let no good quality of your brother be unknown to him, whose heart will be delighted with the report of it; let every virtue be placed in the strongest light: he who makes use of this method, will soon find his envy overpowered by kindness; he will also raise himself in his own esteem; will feel a warm and solid satisfaction, valuable beyond that kind of preference which is the ground of all the evil now before us. Think, my brethren, which is the part to be chosen; to feel a perpetual stream of satisfaction, self-approbation, and benevolence refreshing your hearts; or to have remorse and horror perpetually corroding them, when you have irreparably injured the most amiable of youths, and brought down the grey heirs of your venerable parent with sorrow to the Grave.'

These disswasives from envy are not peculiar to patriarchal manners, nor wholly confined to domestic society. Were the generality of men to adopt them, envy, as a vice, would be extinct; and the only thing like rivalship which could remain, would be a man's feeling some discontent on seeing any one surpass him in genuine benevolence, and successful endeavours to promote the true happiness of mankind; which is exactly the competition recommended in the Epistle to the Hebrews; "Let us consider one another, to provoke unto Love and to good works."

END OF PART III.

Malevolent Sentiments.

PART IV.

MALICE.

1. THERE seems to be no reason why we may not use the same method which we have used before, in treating that sentiment which we call *Malice.* We will therefore consider,

I. The *Nature* of Malice.

II. Its *Effects*, good and evil.

III. The due *regulation* of it.

2. With regard to the *Nature* of Malice, there is a difficulty, but it is one which is occasioned only by the imperfection of *words*, not by any abstruseness in the subject. Although it is very common for one word to have different senses, in all languages, yet it seldom happens, I believe, that any word is unknown to many in that sense which is proper, or philosophical. But let us, in the first place, see what the senses of the word Malice are; and then we may attempt to account for their difference, or to see what connexion there is between them.

3. *Malice*, in the strict or proper sense, means that pleasing sentiment of which we are conscious, when we perceive the success of those with whom we compare ourselves, to be less than our own. Or we might define malice, the pleasure which we receive from the

failure of our Rival, or Competitor: and, as our rival may fail in a great variety of ways, and on numberless occasions, and as imagination creates rivals continually, this sentiment must be extremely diversified; though it will always correspond to the simple definition here laid down. It is a counterpart to Envy; so that if you and I are competitors, when I feel towards you the sentiment of envy, that is, when you succeed better than myself, then you feel towards me the sentiment of malice. *(a)*—Malice, in the popular manner of using it, is more vague than as it is used by moral philosophers: a thing which often happens. Words are invented, or borrowed, as they are wanted: the philosopher wants a word to express some definite part of his system; the common man wants a word to convey his feeling, or idea, seldom with precision, only just with regularity enough to answer some present purpose; to carry on conversation, or to bring about some particular action. A word may answer such purposes when considerably turned from its proper meaning. The word malice seems, in popular language, to have three different senses. The first and principal of these is, a secret desire to accomplish the ruin of an enemy. This desire is called secret, because, though it may sometimes appear, in some degree, it is usually dissembled; and its effects are ascribed, by false pretences of the malicious, to better causes. Again, Malice is sometimes used, in common life, for mere ill-will; in that sense it seems substituted for Malevolence. If a malevolent action is done, and no particular motive appears; no interest, revenge, or other principle prompting to evil, we say such action arose from pure malice. Thirdly, there is such a popular expression as bearing malice; but this belongs chiefly to resentment: indeed it is of so familiar a nature, that we need not dwell upon it; more especially as it does not seem likely to be useful in illustrating the holy scriptures. It might tend farther to make our ideas clear and distinct, if we endeavoured to account for the little use made of the word Malice, in common life, according to its proper sense: and to trace out some affinity amongst its different senses. The moral Philosopher must be in absolute want of a word

to express that triumph of the successful, which is so very frequently felt, and so often attended with serious consequences: a Grecian could compound two words into one *(epichairecacia)* denoting such triumph; but others must use an old word for a new purpose. Yet common men, having various phrases to express the thing as exactly as was needful for purposes of ordinary life, might go on, using the word borrowed by philosophers, as before. They could speak of a man's triumphing, rejoicing, insulting, or of his being puffed up with success; and need never be compelled to mark the counterpart of envy by a simple appellation. *(b)* There is evidently an affinity between the four different senses of the word Malice now mentioned: rejoicing in the fall of an enemy is nearly allied to plotting his fall; contriving an evil and rejoicing in it when carried into execution, are connected, like our appetite for food and our relish of it. Pre-sentiment of such rejoicing is connected with accomplishing the fall of a rival, as cause is with effect. Contrivance in such case will be secret, or dissembled, because the open appearance of it could not be born: evil designs, founded on selfish principles, excite hatred and detestation: many have wished to ruin an enemy, who have been anxious to retain general esteem: hence the malicious have often a specious exterior; nay perform some duties with attention and regularity. We have said, that the malicious man, in the popular sense, plots the fall of his enemy; in the proper sense, rejoices in the fall of his competitor: now, every competitor is not of course an enemy; but yet very frequently competition occasions enmity; and sometimes enmity occasions competition. We are the more ready to act as enemies to a man if we envy him, and are insulted by him in our disappointments: and when we are in a state of enmity with any one, I fear, we are sometimes the more easily induced to supplant him in any thing, which is the object of his wishes. It may be added, that he who secretly contrives the ruin of his enemy, must frequently do malevolent acts without any apparent reason; that is, must act, according to the popular expression, from mere malice. It might also be remarked, that when a person

s vulgarly said to bear malice, that is, when he perse-
veres in a revengeful disposition, though the phrase
mplies resentment, yet the word malice needs only to be
considered as the name of a compound sentiment, of
which malice is one part and resentment the other.
Part 1. Art. 12.) How easily these two coalesce has
been just now shewn. In a word; a competitor is the
object of malice, in the proper sense; a competitor be-
comes an enemy: men have pleasure in the fall of an
enemy; they contrive it; secretly; do him ill offices
without any visible reason; an intercourse of injuries
arising, they contract an habitual resentment against
him. Thus may the different senses of a term be
raced up to one source. A thing particularly useful on
he present subject; with a view to morality; and also
with a view to the Holy Scriptures.

4. But as what has been said is more in the way of
lefinition than description, it may be proper to mention
ome *facts:* some appearances, which every one must
ave observed: at present we speak of Malice in its
trict or proper sense, that being our immediate con-
ern. The difficulty is, in examining any passion, to
ee it unmixed and undisguised: for this we are some-
imes obliged to have recourse to savage life, sometimes
o the openness of early youth. And how is the savage
lelighted when he beholds what, in the language of
onversation, we call mischief! when his snare suc-
eeds! when his adversary is tormented! The sport
f boyish years consists, in a very considerable degree,
n entrapping men into difficulties; or in seeing them
un into perplexities of themselves; sometimes without
he least idea of revenge; sometimes without their suf-
ering any material harm; though indeed when the
vent is materially hurtful, youth is often too inatten-
ve, or insensible to it; *(c)* and so long as such insen-
ibility continues, malice remains open and evident.
ometimes other feelings mix with malice, and in such
manner as not to disguise it: ridicule, disapprobation,
esentment, may heighten malice, and diversify its ap-
earances: when the proud, formal, or vain-glorious
re disconcerted and mortified; or when the oppressive,
uel, envious, revengeful, fall into snares, especially if

they have laid those snares for others, (Esther vii. 10. Psalm cxli. 10.), the emotion of which we are speaking, is the more lively and powerful. When men come to be conscious of their own feelings, and of the reception which such sentiments as theirs meet with in the world, they disguise and dissemble their malice; and though it be not carefully dissembled, it naturally mixes so with other feelings, that it cannot be seen separately and distinctly. Not that it is the less strong on that account; but it is the less adapted to the purpose of informing those, who have not reflected upon it. The desire of mortifying others and of triumphing over them (not to insist at present on the dread of being mortified) must be regarded as one frequently in action, as one very strong and durable, by all those who wish to conceive mankind as they may expect to find them; not in appearance and profession, but in reality. And how often have political measures of great importance been impeded and frustrated, in order that one set of men might triumph in the mortification of another! Nay there is sometimes a tragical and sublime triumph, which is as truly malicious as the most boyish and ludicrous exultation: a triumph over an object that is overwhelmed with calamity, and sinking under the most exquisite distress. When the Romans dragged captive Princes at their chariot wheels, when it was said, "his enemies shall lick the dust;"—"the righteous shall wash his footsteps in the blood of the ungodly;" was not the chief pleasure implied that of gratifying the passion or sentiment now under consideration?

5. In these observations on the appearances of malice in the world, we have not hitherto mentioned such as occur relative to the *object* of that sentiment; yet these must not be wholly passed over, as they are necessary to prepare us for our practical conclusions. It may, however, suffice briefly to observe, that the pain of being the object of malicious triumph is sometimes exceedingly poignant and powerful: this is observable in early youth; and men of mature age dread such mortification as a very serious evil; they will sometimes exert all their powers, will labour, study, undergo

a variety of evils, rather than they will submit to be the cause of joy and exultation to their rivals or competitors: and if they have once been compelled to suffer such disgrace, they will remember it during their whole lives.—Some men cannot bear to be pitied; *(d)* but if expressions, implying their inferiority, feel harsh, even when sweetened with real benevolence, how must they feel when embittered by insult! when they imply a rejoicing in our humiliation! To be the object of hatred is discouraging; but it is some consolation that he who feels hatred towards any one, feels not contempt; to be the object of envy is dangerous; but the consciousness of prosperity elates and flatters us:—The object of malice seems to have no consolation, or support; malicious insult seems to be pure evil; he who suffers it is unfortunate, depressed, and rejected, without a power of returning the contumely. He suffers the persecution annexed to envy, without enjoying the benefits of it; he is despised, when contempt is the most intolerable.

6. As there is a difficulty relating to malice arising from human language, so is there one arising out of the language of the Holy *Scriptures*. The case is this; in the original of the scriptures there is not found any one word which signifies malice in its proper or philosophical sense; that is, rejoicing in the failure of an adversary or competitor. Yet there is a word *(kakia)* which is translated malice; but malice in the English, is always used in what we have called the popular sense. Hence the English reader, finding scriptural malice to mean something different from what we are considering, is apt to conclude, either that there is some imperfection in the sacred writings, or that the sentiment to which we annex so much importance, is not thought worthy of notice by the inspired authors. *(e)* But, in the first place, the language of scripture is popular; else it would not be perfect in its kind; perfection being suitableness to the purposes for which any thing is used. As there is no philosophical system of morals in the scriptures, there is not any systematical language. Our duties are delivered in occasional discourses, ad-

dressed to plain men; and words must be used as they will be understood. If there were ever so many words used differently in active life and in systems, we might expect to find them all in scripture used as would be most suitable to common practice; and in systems, as would best suit speculation and theory.—But though the term malice be not used in scripture for joy in the failure of an adversary, yet that *sentiment* is frequently expressed. And it were as well-founded an observation to say, that the sacred writers notice pity but not congratulation, as that they notice envy but not malice. "Rejoice with them that do rejoice", is a precept as much enjoining congratulation as if the term congratulation had been made use of. Indeed it may be said, that the term congratulation is only omitted, whereas the word malice is used, and not according to our definition. Let us then have recourse to scripture; and perhaps our most satisfactory method may be, First to look at some passages which express the sentiment of joy in the failure of an adversary, that is, malice in the proper sense. Next to take some which express the pain of being objects of proper malice. And thirdly to produce some instances, in which the word malice is used, though in a popular sense. First we are to view scriptural passages which express the sentiment now called malice in systems of morality. *Baal* was once set up as competitor with Jehovah for the honour and worship due to the supreme God. These Deities were to be invoked by their respective votaries to give a sign of power. The Priests of Baal called "from "morning even until noon;" they "cut themselves, "after their manner, with knives and lancets, till the "blood gushed out upon them;"—"at noon Elijah "*mocked* them and said, cry aloud: for he is a God, "either he is talking, or he is pursuing, or he is in a "journey, or peradventure he sleepeth and must be "awaked." Here is malice mixed with delicate and refined ridicule. (1 Kings xviii. 27.)

The Psalmist says, "The righteous also shall see this and fear, and shall laugh him to scorn, (lii. 7, 8.) "lo, this is the man that took not God for his strength; "but trusted to the multitude of his riches, and

" strengthened himself in his wickedness." The person who was the object of this malice, which, we may observe, was to be indulged by the righteous, was Doeg the Edomite. In another Psalm, (lviii. 9.) " the righteous shall rejoice when he seeth the vengeance :" and in another, (xcii. 10.) " mine eye also shall see the " lust of mine enemies." *(f)*—In the book of Proverbs (i. 26, 27.) we find the following words put into the mouth of wisdom; and we know that wisdom, in that book, means not only speculative knowledge, but a right moral choice and disposition. " I also will laugh at your calamity, I will mock when your fear cometh." The fear here spoken of, was by no means of a frivolous sort; for it follows, " when your fear cometh as " desolation, and your destruction cometh as a whirl- " wind , when distress and anguish cometh upon you."

During the time our Saviour was hanging upon the cross, he was attacked by malicious insulters. " Thou " that destroyest the Temple and buildest it in three days, " save thyself."—" He trusted in God, let him deliver " him now if he will have him."—It seems worthy of mention, that the Son of Sirach, though always mild, benevolent, and discreet in his precepts, reckons amongst the nine happy things in human life, " he that liveth to see the fall of his enemy :" (xxv. 7.) but though this author may rightly describe the feeling, he might nevertheless recommend, that this enemy, after his fall, should be comforted, and treated with humanity.—I will produce but one passage more; and that is from a song of triumph on the fall of *Babylon.* (Rev. xviii. 20.) She fell, because " in her was found the blood of pro- " phets, and of saints, and of all that were slain upon " the earth :" " Rejoice over her thou Heaven, and ye " holy Apostles and Prophets, for God hath avenged " you on her." This last example may be called Christian.

In the second place, we were to view some passages of Scripture which express the pain of being *objects* of malicious triumph. These are not difficult to be met with. When David laments over Saul and Jonathan, (2 Sam. i. 20.) one of the misfortunes of

which he makes a topic, is, that the Philistines would insult the children of Israel. " Tell it not in Gath, publish it not in the streets of Askelon; lest the daughters of the Philistines rejoice; lest the daughters of the uncircumcised triumph.—The Psalmist says, (xiii.) " consider and hear me O Lord, my God:" the reason alledged is, " Lest mine enemy say, I have pre- " vailed against him; for if I be cast down, they that " trouble me will rejoice at it."—Again, (xxxv. 19.) " O let not them that are mine enemies triumph over " me ungodly:" a wish uttered with a view, not so much to the actual mischiefs attending such triumph, as to the mortification: we learn this from what follows soon after: " let them not triumph over me; let them " not say in their hearts, there, there, so would we " have it: neither let them say, we have devoured " him." (ver. 24, 25.) The feeling must have been lively when the Psalmist used these words; " But in my " adversity they rejoiced, and gathered themselves to- " gether: yea the very abjects came together against " me unawares, making mouths at me and ceased not. " With the flatterers were busy *mockers*, who gnashed " at me with their teeth."—The Prophet Jeremiah speaks the same language. " He hath caused thine " enemy to rejoice over thee, he hath set up the horn " of thine adversaries."

As to the third selection of passages of scripture in which the word malice *(kakia)* is actually made use of, though not in the proper or philosophical sense, such passages are rather numerous: were it not that one accustomed to the English scriptures might be apt to prefer the popular as seeming to be the scriptural sense, I know not that there would be a necessity, on our present subject, for referring to any of them: though indeed a sight of a few of them, after what has been said, might afford matter of caution to Christians disputing on this subject, that they did not use the same word in different senses, whilst their arguments were formed, as if it was always used in the same sense. There is so much uniformity in these passages, that if we take the word translated malice, for the secret contriving of the ruin or failure of an adversary, the word

will seem natural and well connected in every passage where it occurs.

Malice then seems sometimes to be mentioned in an enumeration only, as one of the principles which constitute enmity; in this popular sense it is certainly an important principle, and naturally opposed to forgiveness. Sometimes it is joined with slander; and our enemy, who secretly, or artfully, contrives our ruin or harm, is as likely to attack our reputation as any thing else: he can attack nothing with greater safety, nor with greater secrecy: slander means much the same with evil-speaking, blasphemy, prating with malicious words. Sometimes malice is joined with envy and hatred; sentiments with which it easily unites. Sometimes with words expressing disguise, guile, hypocrisy: the secrecy of contrivance accounts for this, and makes the "cloke of maliciousness" a natural expression; as well as all those phrases in which malice is opposed to sincerity.—When, therefore, the Apostle says, "in ma- "lice be ye children" (1 Cor. xiv. 20.), we may conceive him to mean something to this effect; 'With re- 'gard to all secret malevolent artifice, to all plotting 'against those whom ye imagine to be your enemies, 'adversaries, competitors, boast not yourselves, as if 'such artifice were an attainment really valuable; af- 'fect no superiority in such cunning, aim at no applause; 'rather endeavour to keep quite clear of it, to act with 'openness and sincerity, to be unfeignedly kind and 'benevolent, and to retain the innocence and simpli- 'city even of childhood itself.'

7. Having now considered the Nature of Malice, and made our remarks a ground for introducing some passages of Holy Scripture, we proceed to examine its *effects*, that is, the good and evil annexed to the operations of that sentiment by the all-wise and all-bountiful Author of Nature; or permitted to be derived from it by the free actions of man. Much of what has been already advanced is applicable to Malice, both respecting malevolent sentiments in general, and Envy in particular, of which Malice is the counterpart. In Malice we see pleasure and pain, reward and punishment,

somewhat more plainly and distinctly than in envy, though both passions are founded on competition. There is an immediate pleasure in comparative success, and an immediate pain in comparative disappointment; both of which may be accounted *good;* for neither of them needs do any harm, and both may be made beneficial. Pleasure itself is good, when not attended with any bad consequences; taken independently of the good which may be made to follow from a right use of it: and the pain is a spur to industry and improvement; one which needs not be felt when a greater evil would not arise from the want of it. And surely every thing should be esteemed a good which it is in our power to make one.—When we speak of reward and punishment, in the present case, we suppose the pleasure and pain to be seen beforehand, at a distance; and then they excite hope and fear: the hope of enjoying victory and triumph animates us to exert every faculty; and the fear of being conquered and mortified co-operates with it to the same end.—As man was not likely to act so well without this principle as with it, we may say, that God gave it in his goodness; and the effects now mentioned as arising from it, when rightly used, cannot be otherwise than good. These, we say, are industry and exertion, and, according to the natural course of things, improvement.

But it should moreover be observed, that those who have the care of educating others, find themselves able to derive great benefit from this rejoicing in comparative success; as well as from mortification in a comparative failure. They can make the rejoicing, when seen beforehand, operate as a proposed reward; and the mortification as a threatened punishment. Discretion, no doubt, is requisite in administering all rewards and punishments, to prevent abuse and particular inconveniences; but supposing these to be administed discreetly, nothing can be more efficacious. It may here be useful to observe, that education is capable of a very extensive sense; it may include communicating useful knowledge of any sort, and at any time, and in any manner: also forming any kind of good habits, of body or mind, in another. It may

well be understood to comprehend the improvement of the Apprentice by his master; and not improperly that which the member of civil society receives under the protection of the Laws, and from the modes of conduct which they point out. Not to omit the edification which religious Societies receive from their Instructors. —Such are the *good effects* of that sentiment which in systems of morals is called Malice: they may seem to come into a small compass; but they keep arising incessantly; and they are very powerful.

8. Our next business is to examine the *hurtful* effects of Malice; in doing which we shall, as before, attend chiefly to those evils, which are to be found amongst men managing that sentiment imperfectly, though not professing any gross or general neglect of Duty.

Malice, in the sense of triumphing in comparative success, is not less likely than Hatred and Envy to produce, in the common course of things, *malevolence*, or ill-will: this evil arises first in the mind of him who feels himself insulted; but passion spreads like a flame; therefore in whose breast soever the malevolence first arises, the mischiefs of it are much the same in the end: (see Part I. 31. and Part III. 12.) And these have been described before.

Malicious triumph also, however innocent in its first impulse, is apt to turn to *insolence* or arrogance of behaviour; to external pride; and then it strikes deep on the heart of him who is obliged for a time to bear it in silence: his wounds, covered over, fester, and sometimes become utterly incurable. It is thus that malice may make even prosperity a curse; not only to him whom it elates, but to those over whom he triumphs; and by propagating a temper which must embitter human life, to mankind at large. Such insolence, moreover, affects those with whom the successful person might live on terms of friendship; it checks returning kindness, and prevents the growth of friendly attatchment, which requires both equality and benevolence for its support.

When malicious rejoicing is much indulged, it is apt to give men a brutal hardness of heart towards the unfortunate and unsuccessful in general, however amiable their character, or prudent their conduct. Those who have acquired this unhappy temper, can regard very serious afflictions, in mind, body, or estate, with an inhuman levity, and speak of them in trivial or even ludicrous language. In common life this is shocking; but when such arrogant insensibility is shewn towards the wretched captive, who has bravely defended his country, his religion, his family; or to the Slave, who with the feelings of a Man is degraded below many a pampered brute, it makes ones heart melt with pity, or burn with indignation. *(g)*

As there are different senses of the word Malice, it may mark their connexion to use such an expression as the following; malice in the proper or philosophical sense, when not duly restrained, is apt to generate malice in the popular sense. Or, too free a joy and triumph in comparative success, and in the failure of a rival, is apt to set men upon secretly contriving those disappointments, by which their joy is excited. The evil qualities which compose the character of the malicious man, in the popular sense, have been enumerated; (Part IV. art. 3. and 6.); and it is alarming to think, that a sentiment which at first seems to be something noble and elevating, may, by degrees, bring us to be mean, selfish, insolent, cruel, false, hypocritical, slanderous, secretly malevolent, revengeful, envious, "hateful and hating one another". Tit. iii. 3.

9. From estimating the effects of malice we pass on to consider the due *regulation* of that sentiment. And the same question occurs as before (Part I. 37. and Part III. 18.), is there any degree in which it may be indulged? or must we literally and totally put it away from us? Eph. iv. 31. The answer to this question approaches so near to what was said on the subject of Envy, that it will not be easy to avoid repetition.

In some degree, the sentiment of joy in our comparative success may be deemed the work of our Creator, and in that degree, supposing the circumstances such

as were intended, it is innocent; nay when it subsists precisely in that degree, the putting of it away must be dangerous. So long as we have no higher motives to make us exert ourselves, this must be wanted; when we have higher motives, this will not intrude. If, as before, we have a spur given us, we may at least keep it ready for use. Our feelings seem, by the manner of their operation, to be on several occasions, intended as guides, to lead us on, till mature reason supplies their place: they are our "Tutors and Governors" Gal. iv. 2, 4. till "the fulness of time" arrives: what modest and prudent man dares peremptorily to dismiss them? That they are productive of partial evil is no sufficient objection; what in this life is not? though good upon the whole? Let us keep them under the command of benevolence and enlarged prudence as much as we are able; but to extinguish them wholly would be presumptuous. To look forward to a state of perfection; to a state wholly free from competition, may have its use; to take some steps towards introducing such a state, even before the generality of men are fit for it, may be laudable; but to forget our present imperfection would be hurtful and wrong. True prudence cannot always adopt those measures which are best and most perfect in themselves; it considers also which are most likely to be effectual in the present state of things. An able warrior and an upright judge are now truly estimable; though in a state of perfection neither wars nor crimes could exist. At present, we have not reason to blame a Judge if he shews some rejoicing, some temperate triumph, when he is able to stem the torrent of vice and profligacy; nor to condemn a warrior, if he is not wholly insensible to honor and patriotism; if, without departing from the duties of humanity, he shews some exultation in the successes and victories of his Country.

With regard to *precepts* of moralists, or of Holy Writ, we have before observed, that they take their tone and stile from the actual state of mens passions and conduct; which is vicious and corrupt. Or that they speak of mankind collectively, on a kind of supposition that the human race may act, and follow advice,

as one person. But besides this, we may observe, that St. Paul's exhortation, Heb. x. 24. about considering one another, belongs as much to malice as to envy, both being founded on comparison and competition: and we may add, what perhaps may appear still more strong to some, that if we were duly to regulate malice in the proper sense, or our rejoicing in the failure of our competitor, malice in the popular sense, would be literally and wholly put away. That is, were our triumphs in the disappointments of those who oppose us, kept under the control of benevolence, we should not in any degree secretly contrive the ruin of our enemies. But the passages which have been already quoted in order to shew that proper malice is spoken of in scripture, tho' without the name, and not treated as always vicious or sinful, confirm the truth of our decision beyond a doubt: they do not prevent our aiming at perfection; they only shew that we are not yet arrived at it. The words of our Saviour and St. Paul will illustrate this part of our subject; "I have yet many things to say unto you, but "ye cannot bear them now." John xvi. 12.—"I have "fed you with milk, and not with meat: for hitherto "ye were not able to bear it, neither yet now are ye "able." 1 Cor. iii. 2. By way of concluding this matter it may be worth while to repeat, Part I. Note *(l)* that as we may be angry and yet not sin, though *all* anger is to be put away; Eph. iv. 26, 31, our being commanded to put away malice does not imply, that we must never feel any triumph on the success of virtue or religion: or that we must never rejoice at the defeat of the enemies of our Country.

Indeed the different senses of the term Malice add weight to our reasoning in the present case; because popular malice might be wholly put away, and yet the sentiment of which we are treating might remain. We are not then to condemn ourselves unnecessarily, nor to misemploy our moral and religious efforts in combating that which is really not sinful; but we are to endeavour to rectify our notions by reflexion, and by Scripture, according to its true intent and meaning. Our notions once rectified, we may with advantage apply ourselves

to restraining the *excesses* of Malice; which will be, in fact, our ordinary employment.

10. But in suggesting practical directions we may here, as on the subjects of Hatred and Envy, (Part I. 38. and Part III. 17.) first address ourselves to such as are *objects* of the sentiment under consideration. It generally happens, that when any persons triumph over us, we feel towards them the passion of *envy*; therefore the temper at which we should aim, is in some measure that already described; but it may be proper to add, that, in general, those who are insulted are apt to see their situation in too gloomy a light; they are apt to feel indignation and resentment, when conscious dignity, not wholly unmixed with contempt, would be a sentiment not only more noble but more reasonable. He who triumphs over us must be our superior in something; but we may be superior to him in other things, and in things more truly valuable. Suppose that not to be the case, yet the insolence of any man is so much real degradation of himself; and it will infallibly appear such if we do not prevent it; either by being too much dazzled by false greatness, or too impatient to appear of consequence in vulgar eyes. Merely standing our ground, with mildness and gentleness, and with a right sense of what is truly great, will generally be sufficient, in no long time, to make arrogance feel its own littleness.

11. We are next to endeavour to point out some useful methods of *restraining* the sentiment of malice in the breast of him who is actuated by it. And it would give weight to our suggestions if we were previously to take a view of a few passages of *Scripture*. "Rejoice "not when thine enemy falleth, and let not thine heart "be glad when he stumbleth: lest the Lord see it, and "it displease him." Prov. xxiv. 17. The word "stumbleth" expresses well the ordinary trivial misfortunes which are apt to excite some degree of malicious pleasure in the generality. "He that is glad at "calamities" (which men seldom are, without some idea or feeling of competition) "shall not be unpunished." Prov. xvii. 5.—"If I rejoiced at the destruction of

" him that hated me, or lift up myself when evil found " him ;" Job xxxi. 29. then, Job may be understood to say, all my calamities would be merited.—Phil. ii. 3. Doing things through strife and vain glory (which should be compared with doing things through strife and envy) is opposed to our esteeming others better than ourselves.—To these passages of canonical scripture we might add,—" neither provoke a man in his distress :" —" add not more trouble to an heart that is vexed." Ecclesiasticus iv. 2, 3. Though there are various ways of tormenting the distressed, yet, in fact, malicious insult is that which occurs most frequently, and is felt most acutely.

12. We have repeatedly compared Malice with *Envy* ; and as they are counterparts to each other, directions for the *regulation* of the one will be little more than *applications* of those given for the regulation of the other : yet as there may be some little difference, it may be best not to leave such applications wholly unmade ; though, to prevent disgust or satiety when they are made, it will be useful to have previously intimated the relation and resemblance subsisting between the rules for regulating envy, and those for the regulation of Malice ; which last come now to be proposed.

13. Those who are desirous to prevent all the evils which may arise from their inconsiderately indulging malicious triumph, should, in the first place, learn to prevent their being deceived by themselves : men may really act from one motive, and yet may flatter themselves that they are acting from a different one. In the case before us, self-deceit works by hiding competition : which is no very difficult matter, as men are often competitors secretly, when no open and avowed competition subsists : to examine ourselves therefore faithfully, to learn to be *aware* that we are acting from rivalship, is a fundamental Duty in the part of morals which we are now considering. If men deceive themselves, and persuade themselves to imagine, that their joy is excited by a love of public happiness, when in reality it is wholly selfish and personal, all rules and precepts will be easily evaded.

14. An habitual *humility*, and freedom from vanity and ostentation, is still more requisite, if possible, to prevent malice than envy. The truly humble man will think all the advantages which he obtains for himself so unmerited, and will estimate their value so modestly, and those of his rivals so liberally, that he will maintain a great degree of general respect for those whom he has surpassed in some particular pursuit. This will effectually hinder his satisfaction in his own success from running into any hurtful or offensive behaviour. The prohibition of St. Paul to which we lately alluded, deserves to be here repeated at length, as it will give a cast and character to all the conduct and demeanour of him who is at the same time prosperous and humble. "Let nothing be done through strife or vain-glory, but in lowliness of mind let each esteem other better than themselves." Phil. ii. 3.

15. A general love of *Virtue* and of the more valuable kinds of excellence, will also restrain malice as well as envy. The more we love and admire Virtue, the less value shall we set on the ordinary pursuits of the world; and the less shall we assume upon our superiority in all trifling acquirements. Should we confine our triumph to our superiority in Virtue, supposing that virtue real and genuine, our malice could never be pernicious: and much the same might be affirmed concerning other liberal and estimable qualities and advantages, which are nearly connected with Virtue, and are distinct from every thing sensual, vulgar, or brutish.—There is one branch of virtue which ought here to be particularly mentioned; and that is magnanimity, or true dignity, or greatness of mind. Most of the evils of malicious triumph arise from false notions of grandeur: could the man of the world, when swelled and elated with ideas of his own importance, see himself for a moment with the eyes of superior beings, or only of reasonable men, he would frequently change his contempt into respect, and his insolence into a desire of cultivating the friendship of his inferior.

16. In the common course of things some men will succeed in competitions who do not possess the qua-

lities here recommended; nay who will not endeavour to acquire them. Discipline of the mind is to them something uncouth and strange. What should be advised in such cases? Whatever may seem adviseable in such cases may be proper as a *first step* in those, of whose advancement in morals we entertain considerable hopes. When therefore men find their exultation in victory or superiority growing too powerful, the first attempt may be, to give it a right *turn*; that is, a *benevolent* one. When we are kind-hearted and generous our success does less harm to ourselves on that account, and gives less pain to others: when we evidently desire that all men should participate in our happiness, that as many as possible should be sharers in the fruits of our success, it can scarcely be attended with any harm, nay may be productive of great good: and there are many who will obey the impulses of benevolence and generosity, though they are disgusted with every appearance of rule and discipline. Some men, disappointed rivals in particular, may find peculiar difficulties in sympathizing with our joy, how generous soever it may be; to such we should make all possible submissions: and what submission of the kind could be chargeable with meanness? There is some mortification in accepting benefits from the most benevolent of conquerors; to obviate that is amongst the most arduous tasks of real and delicate goodness; but every well meant attempt to remove such difficulties must set the successful man far above those, whose delight is, to trample underfoot all who had contended for that superiority which they have attained.

17. There may be some cases of competition and rivalship, in which contention has exasperated the minds of the contending parties, so as to make the benevolence now recommended extremely difficult. Cruelty may have been practised; or harsh or acrimonious measures may have been persevered in with obstinacy, or executed with violence; a glimpse of some advantage may have drawn forth insolence and contumely. Certainly the mind may be embittered, so as not immediately to feel that kindness which is desirable. We may therefore suppose a person, not generally malevolent, to urge, that he cannot at once assume a real and cordial good will

towards his competitor; what is he to do? The reply is, as before, you may perform benevolent *actions*, before your disposition is perfectly benevolent: nay, though *words* should always express the mind, yet you may avoid all such language as has a tendency to provoke, and in your conversation you may dwell upon your general desire to promote universal happiness. By doing good and speaking kindly, you will acquire benevolence. Nay merely abstaining from malevolent words and actions will leave nature to return to her wonted tone; and the mind of man, especially of the Christian, can only find repose and satisfaction in a propensity to good. This method of restoring internal kindness, by means of kind actions and expressions, was recommended to the envious man, who looks up to his superior; but the task must be much easier to him who has to restrain malicious triumph, because the object of his attention is his inferior: attention to an inferior naturally generates self-complacency; and kindness to such a one is flattering to him who exerts it.

18. Were we to distinguish the failures on account of which we are liable to insult others, into *trifling* and important, we might observe, that a habit of bearing with equanimity success in trifles might prepare us for due moderation on greater occasions. Indeed, in the most frivolous contentions, our immoderate and insolent joy may give our adversary a mean opinion of us; and may occasion pain, which he will remember longer than we shall the advantage gained: we should therefore accustom ourselves to a sedate and modest behaviour whenever we gain any advantage; we should, in the moment of our success, shew, that we duly notice the vicissitudes of fortune, and we should labour to prevent, by some sort of applause, or encouragement, the dejection or despondency of the disappointed. And we should endeavour to form others to the same kind of conduct.

19. But if the tide of our joy be so strong that even the important calamities of our rival are unable to stop it, our best plan seems then to be, to make our immediate object the exciting of *compassion* in our own breasts. And the most probable method of effecting this is, to give

ourselves a powerful *check;* to contrive some *pause;* in order that we may have leisure to enter into the feelings of those, whom we are so strongly prompted to insult. Were we to do this, the scene would be totally changed, and our minds, ere long, would be filled with sympathetic tenderness and candid indulgence.

If in such an attempt we found that our sense of some great enormities, committed by our rival, prevented our feeling sufficient compassion whilst our views were fixed only upon him, we might turn our views towards his nearest *friends;* particularly towards such as were most affected by his sufferings, though they had not contributed towards them, by either vice or indiscretion: we might think what wounds we were about to inflict on the partner of his fortunes and his affections; on his offspring; on many who were interested in every thing that concerned him. Compassion might be thus excited, which would soften malicious triumph till it was no longer an evil; till a generous rival could bear it without pain.

20. Lastly, we ought to animate ourselves to follow all good precepts and directions by dwelling on any good *examples* of moderation and forbearance which may occur to our notice That of Jesus Christ is eminent above all others, both on account of its excellence and its authority: and some of his early followers seem to have caught a portion of his mild and truly great spirit. But as our Lord, though very man, was also a divine Being, some persons, more accustomed to active life than to religious researches, may, when looking up to Him, feel something of an awe obstructing the free course of their imitative faculties; therefore it may not be useless to propose, for the imitation of such persons, characters more within the limits of their observation. Those who have had no higher principle to act from than a species of honour of their own creating, have thought moderation in success and victory, a becoming virtue. It is not only after the sanguinary fierceness of national battles that animosity ceases, and the enemy is changed into the convivial companion; in private war, so shocking to reason and humanity, the fallen antago-

nist is supported, assisted, caressed, with all the assiduity and tenderness of friendship. When we see this, can we encourage malice in our own breasts, and not be ashamed to profess ourselves the advocates of religion, the supporters of virtue?

It is not easy to think in this train and not call to mind that Prince of our own Nation, who vanquished and lead captive the Monarch of our rival Kingdom. *(h)* In battle, the splendor of his exploits, and the wisdom of his conduct had established his renown;—but what are these when compared with the tenderness, and the respect, with which he treated his royal Captive? His words and actions expressed the same humility, the same deference and delicate veneration, as if the hapless Monarch had still retained his Army and his Crown. He refused to sit down with Majesty; and made himself an attendant on the will of his Prisoner. When such a disposition shewed itself in such a person, without affectation, in an hour of triumph and success more than human, no wonder that tears of affection and admiration should burst forth from every eye; from hardy warriors, from friends and foes promiscuously. It was a sight worthy to be contemplated by men and Angels; worthy to be remembered by all who rejoice in the honor of humanity: most worthy to be studied as a Lesson by all those who dare call themselves Christians, whilst they allow themselves to insult a fallen enemy. Let not any such say, that this conduct was only dictated by the romantic spirit of Chivalry and false refinement, and therefore is no model for them: Christian conduct is not the less Christian for being adopted into a system of liberal manners.

But if refinement is their excuse for neglecting a Christian Duty, let us again have recourse to times of the greatest simplicity: The history of the Patriarch *Joseph* was useful in illustrating the methods of regulating envy: let it now be applied to the regulation of malice. We have seen (Part III. Art. 27.) how his brethren ought to have behaved themselves towards him; let us now see how he did behave himself towards his brethren, when he might safely have

indulged any degree of malicious triumph. In the character of an Ægyptian Magistrate, unknown to them, consistency and propriety obliged him to speak roughly unto them: indeed he seems to have raised in them some groundless fears; but these were always mixed with hopes, and sweetened by favors, which might prevent any serious alarm: and they were merely sufficient to prepare the Catastrophe, and heighten that Discovery which he was impatient to make: but when his plan was ripe for execution, he threw off all disguise, and all superiority; he was merely the brother: he gave free course to his fraternal love, and indulged all those tender emotions which had laboured within him, and which he had sometimes in vain endeavoured to overcome. It was impossible for him to prevent his brethren from feeling some remorse; but he was so far from insulting them, that he ascribed the vicissitudes of fortune which he had undergone, not to their envy, but to the kind Providence of God; in these simple and unassuming words: "Now therefore be not "grieved nor angry with yourselves, that ye sold "me hither; for God did send me before you to pre-"serve life." He tells them the particulars of the famine, and concludes with the same sentiment; "So "now it was not you that sent me hither, but God." Gen. xlv. 5, 8.

The man who can read this, with all the circumstances of the story upon his mind, and allow himself to torment a fallen adversary, is unworthy of the mercy of heaven; unworthy to be a partaker of human nature; and surely he must be particularly unworthy to hold any rank among the Disciples of Him, who when insulted himself, disdained to triumph over his Adversaries; though legions of Angels would have ministered unto him; though he might have overwhelmed them with shame, and sunk them into everlasting contempt.

END OF PART IV.

Malevolent Sentiments.

PART V.

RESENTMENT.

NATURAL LAW.

1. FOR the sake of regularity I will again mark out the order in which each malevolent sentiment is treated. We consider,

I. Its *Nature.*

II. Its *Effects,* good and evil.

III. The due *regulation* of it.

This method will suit *Resentment,* as well as Hatred, Envy, or Malice; but so many observations are common to all the malevolent sentiments, that what has been already delivered may reasonably be allowed sometimes to shorten our present disquisitions.

2. By resentment we usually *mean,* that sentiment which is excited in the mind when we receive an *injury.*

The distinction between harm and injury should be understood: a man may inflict evil upon us innocently, without intending to violate any right; this is *harm;* but if he inflicts evil by designedly violating a right, it

is *injury*. The former is natural evil, the latter is moral. If we seem frequently to feel resentment when no evil is really intended, the difficulty may perhaps be solved thus; we are so accustomed, or habituated, to suffer designed evil, that our imaginations represent most of the evil which is offered to us, as in some way designed; and when we view it in that light, we resent it as an injury. Yet there are some instances in which evil is evidently undesigned; so many, as to afford us opportunity of seeing, that mere evil, or harm perfectly clear of all suspicion of injury, does not excite Resentment. And the more orderly and rational any man's mind is, and the more calm his temper, the more instances does he find of harm which is free from injurious design. In this respect the improved mind differs considerably from the unimproved. It should be remembered, that what is done through *neglect* may be injurious, though not designed.

3. Resentment may be classed amongst *malevolent* sentiments, because that feeling which we experience on the reception of an injury, prompts us to inflict evil on the injurer in return. A wish to inflict evil is malevolence; or ill-will; for whatever ultimate purpose it may be intended. Evil inflicted in return for an injury is most usually denominated *Punishment*.

4. One of our methods of acquiring a clear and distinct idea of any sentiment was, to distinguish it from others, with which it is apt to be confounded: or to mark out the different modes, or *species*, comprehended under the same general term.

Anger, as a general term, seems to be synonymous with Resentment: though sometimes the word anger denotes the *sudden* emotion, and resentment the more *deliberate* sentiment. Inconstancy in the use of terms arises from the want of written discussions concerning them; in the use of them, when men speak, circumstances, gestures, and looks determine their sense, on any particular occasion: and as men come to write more and more attentively, on moral subjects, the senses of moral terms will become more definite. *(a) Pas-*

sion, Rage, Fury, are terms used to express the strongest and most violent effusions of anger. *Enmity* denotes a fixed and habitual resentment in the mind, of which some person is the constant object, who is considered in the character, or relation, of an enemy.

Resentment often occurs, in writers not very ancient, as meaning only *feeling*. *(b)* In which sense resentment of *favors* is as proper as resentment of injuries.

5. It would be well to have a distinct idea of *Revenge*. It has been already mentioned, that Resentment prompts to punishment; so does Revenge: yet inflicting punishment is a different thing from executing revenge. When a man executes Revenge, he has nothing in view but himself; he considers the injury which he has received, as merely personal; and he is gratified by the evil which his injurer suffers, merely as evil, without any regard to what good consequences may follow from it: but when a man inflicts *punishment*, he has regard to what is right and merited; his aim is to make such a retribution as equity requires; his feelings are gratified by a consciousness of rectitude and propriety. Sometimes he looks farther, and endeavours to produce amendment to the individual, and security to the public; but this he may do under the influence of Resentment, though, in cases where public spirit prevails the most, a man may be rather said to be assisted and supported by resentment than to be following its impulse. In all cases it is worth while to distinguish between public and *private* punishment; as there will always be a difference between the application of legal provisions to any offence, and the punishment of that offence by the discretion of the injured.

Thus the same action may be an instance of revenge and of punishment; but the motives in the two cases, differ very materially. Revenge turns wholly upon injuries to the avenger; punishment considers actions rather as *crimes;* and though crimes are injuries, yet attention may be paid to any injurious act, by one man as affecting himself, by another as wrong, or iniquitous, and of ill desert.

6. It does not seem right, through any apprehension of introducing what is familiar or vulgar, to omit that species of anger, or Resentment, which is commonly called *Peevishness:* so great is its influence on private and domestic comfort. It is a kind of habit in the peevish of turning every trifling incident of ordinary life, into neglect, affront, injury; and of treating the persons deemed guilty, with a feeble, but never-ceasing, resentment and unkindness. *(c)*

7. The last species of Resentment which shall be noticed, is *Indignation.* This seems to have its foundation in our moral sense: it arises in the mind on seeing wrong and vicious management of the affairs of the world. When we see virtue depressed, neglected, despised; when we see vice prosperous and triumphant; when we find men, unworthy, unqualified, unprincipled, placed in situations of authority, to the exclusion of those who would serve the public with success; when we see honesty defrauded, and low cunning entrap sound sense and integrity; manly fortitude and generous dignity entangled in the snares of malicious or selfish cowardice, we are provoked, exasperated; and the kind of resentment of which we are sensible in such cases, is *Indignation.* The contrast between what is and what ought to be, raises a violent fervent in the mind, particularly of any one who has strong moral feelings. Yet is not he so much agitated and offended by what immediately affects himself, as by what appears to be destructive of the general happiness of mankind.

With regard to Indignation I formerly observed, *(d)* that it bears some kind of analogy to *Envy;* the remark was made chiefly for the purpose of adding, that there is also in Indignation a something, which in some degree is capable of being compared to *Malice.* That is, as we feel uneasy and indignant whilst vice is rising above our control, and soaring above our reach or influence, so we are sensible of some triumph and exultation when it is brought low and disappointed; especially when the very measures intended to oppress virtue, become the instruments, by which the oppressor is punished and degraded.

8. Although I describe no more sorts or species of Resentment, yet before we quit the consideration of its nature, a few more *remarks* may be useful.

It makes a great difference in the happiness of mankind, whether Resentment be *frequently* alive, or seldom. It might be always in action, as with some men is nearly the case; it might seldom break forth, and when it did, it might soon disappear, and be perceived no more for a length of time: In men of generous and candid dispositions this does happen. Let us therefore briefly observe, that the frequency of the instances in which the passion of Resentment will act, must depend upon the number of injuries which are conceived to be offered, and on the strength of sympathy, with which any one enters into the passions and feelings of those with whom he is connected.

9. Allied to this is the observation, that Resentment is less confined in its operation than Envy, or its counterpart. Envy is only excited by competition and Rivalship; and there are very great numbers of men, who are so much above us, or so much below us, that with them no competition can take place; but any man, high or low, may injure us. This gives some idea of the *extent* of Resentment, as to the *number of its objects*, in comparison of the other malevolent sentiments.

10. It may hereafter afford us ground for practical rules, if we see on what the different degrees of *strength* or liveliness of the passion of Anger depend. Of different dispositions, as to readiness to take offence, we have said enough: still some circumstances, external and internal, occasion variations in the intenseness of Resentment.

That passion, like others, acquires strength by the approach of its object: personal *presence* has a great effect: in absence the same opinion, or judgment, of the injury may subsist, but the feeling of it is very much heightened and enlivened by personal appearance. And an earnest and attentive meditation on the object, a conception of its presence, may produce the same sort of effects, in a lower degree.

11. It is also useful to take notice of the influence of our passions and sentiments upon *each other*. We are so formed, that some of them heighten others, and some have a contrary effect.—We may say, generally, Resentment heightens Resentment, and Love lowers it: and this, whether these sentiments are taken in the same breast, or in different ones. If you feel resentment towards any person, his feeling resentment towards you in return will increase your passion; but if he returns nothing but kind regards, and shews nothing but benevolent sentiments towards you, your resentment will not even keep the same warmth which it had; it will be moderated and cooled.—And if you do not see what return is made to your resentment; if Love only contends with it in your own breast, the effect will still be to diminish its force and bitterness. It is not a rare thing for a man to imagine that he has been injured by a beloved friend; and in such a case, resentment is apt to be vehement; but when the time comes that friendship and affection resume their wonted powers, their operation tends towards the softening and disarming of every malevolent purpose.

12. The last observation which I shall make under this head, of the Nature of Resentment, is chiefly intended to prevent misconceptions as to the language in which our remarks are expressed. Resentment is frequently so mixed with hatred, envy, and malice, as to constitute a *compound* sentiment, which wants a name. We are obliged to express this compound, such is the imperfection of language, by one of the terms which in strictness signifies one of the ingredients of which the compound is made up.—I need not dwell upon this at present, as it was illustrated on the subject of hatred. (Part I. 17.) I need only mention, that if the language of good writers, or of the holy scriptures, seems, in any instance, to contradict the definitions which have here been given, it may be a proper exercise of candor to consider, whether, in that instance, the sentiment expressed be simply Resentment, or some mixture of sentiments, bearing an affinity to each other, but signified by the term which might most properly express one of them taken separately. *(e)*

13. We may now quit the nature of Resentment, and come to take some notice of its *effects* on the happiness of mankind. Some of these are *useful*, though others are *hurtful*.

Of such as are *useful* it may be said, in general, that they are to be considered as appointed by our all-wise Creator, being suited to our present condition: Resentment does even its good work by some sort of evil, but that evil which prevents a greater evil, promotes good upon the whole. And the same is true if evil produce a positive good which overbalances it. When the Creator implanted resentment in our constitution, we say, as before, he did the same sort of kind act as a friend does when he supplies us with a *sword*, in order to enable us to resist the attacks of the robber, or assassin: and as the sword inflicts no wound when no robber or assassin appears, so resentment would prompt to no punishment were all appearance of injury to cease. *(f)*

14. But to be more particular;——

Resentment is that which excites and *enables* each individual to resist and to prevent evil; nor can we conceive that any person who wanted that passion, could, or would, hinder men from overpowering him, and trampling him under their feet. It is his mental armour. It seems also wanted in order to strengthen a man for exercising *authority*; over servants, children, or others. It is moreover, very useful in the restraints which it imposes upon *Benevolence*, when that sentiment would become excessive, and enfeeble a man, so as to make him dread to inflict any kind of correction, or exercise any discipline. Indiscriminate bounty does great harm, and would do more, if anger and indignation did not check and restrain it. *Education* cannot be carried on without correction, nor can *Laws* be enforced without punishment: yet both Education and Laws are necessary for the good of Mankind. Nay it might be worth while for any one to consider, whether *Brute* animals could be tamed and made subservient to the convenience of man, if he had no such impulse as that of Anger. Man is Lord of the Creation, in the world

which he inhabits; but could he now enjoy that important pre-eminence, had it pleased God to make all things else as they are, and to leave man void of every species of resentment?

In each individual, it might also be mentioned, that when the emotions of anger and indignation are excited in a good cause, they are *noble* and elevated; they lift the mind above every thing ordinary and vulgar; they give a fine and sublime animation, which cannot be accounted evil in itself, and must be reckoned amongst those things which make a man truly estimable. That lofty disdain, with which men of superior minds look down upon all meanness, fraud, baseness, and sordid selfishness, is not only a good upon the whole, to the world, and to the individual, as securing good conduct; but it is, as an inward sensation, immediately valuable.

15. Although *the world* is composed of individuals, yet it may be of use to take notice of the benefits which men, taken collectively, receive from the passion under consideration. The general effect of Resentment, taken in all its forms, on the world is, that much less evil does subsist, than would, if no such passion opposed it; though still less would subsist if anger were used in conformity to the Laws of Virtue and Religion. The general *indignation* of the world, I conceive to be the grand check upon destructive vice: though the resentment and displeasure of particular men, no doubt, operate successfully, each in its own sphere.

16. But in whatsoever case men are hindered from doing evil, it should be considered, that good arises, not only to him upon whom the evil would have been inflicted, but also to him who would have been guilty of inflicting it. To preserve a man from the commission of a vice or an injury, is to do him an important service. Thus Resentment is sometimes beneficial even to its *object*. And it does not only influence a man after an offence, by deterring him from subsequent offences, but its appearance and threatning aspect will restrain evil imaginations and designs. The threatened anger of wicked men may perhaps excite only fear, though that

is no bad guard; but in the disapproving and menacing frowns of good men there seems to be something more: the indignation of the virtuous, on the first appearance of a design to offend, especially when mixed with benignity and true wisdom, co-operates with the remonstrances of conscience in him who was meditating evil things: it points out duty, it intimates sanctions; and all this previous to actual offending.

More might be urged; but what was before advanced, on the sentiments of Hatred, Envy, and Malice, in describing their good effects, may render more superfluous. Any one possessed of the full meaning of our observations on Hatred, Envy, and Malice will see, that they are most of them applicable to malevolent sentiments universally.

17. Let us now pay some attention to the *mischievous effects* of Resentment.

If we speak of them on a *general* view of men in their present state, we may say, that they are the work of *Man:* that they arise from *abuse*, perversion, misapplication; or at least from want of a due degree of vigilance and good management. And therefore they are such as might be *avoided;* not such as God, in his wisdom and goodness, *intended:* though all evils have necessarily his permission.

18. Some of the mischiefs actually arising from some species of Resentment, strike us, when we are observing any individual who is the *object* of that passion; we see him hurt and injured, merely because he is such. Nay in the natural course of things, he comes to be hated; and hatred is apt to generate a fixed enmity, which breaks out after intervals, even when a perfect cure seems to have been effected. Nor can the persecuted person be ignorant that this is generally so; he therefore not only suffers at present, but trembles with perpetual apprehension: he is full of care and anxiety; his peace of mind and security are destroyed.

19. And if we expect to find the person who causes all this uneasiness and solicitude, serene and easy, we shall be grievously mistaken. He whose thoughts are

intent upon revenge, or only clouded continually by the subordinate malevolence of domestic peevishness, enjoys no sunshine of the soul; his life is uncomfortable, because his feelings are gloomy, and tormenting: and knowing that it is the nature of Resentment, of every kind, to beget resentment, he anticipates the hostile returns which he shall be sure to experience: and so becomes more wretched than even the object of his revenge; by both feeling the stings of malevolent passions, and by dreading their being exercised against himself. The effect of such feelings on the habitual disposition must be extremely pernicious.

It has indeed been said above, that some emotions, belonging to some parts of resentment ennoble the mind; but besides that these lie in a narrow space, which is only to be hit off by exact mental discipline; it should be remarked, that they do not belong to those parts of resentment whose effects we are now esimating; that is, to such as arise from abuse, perversion, or neglect.

20. But the evils of ill-governed resentment appear most striking when we contemplate them in the *world* at large. Though when we do this we do not form a complete estimate, unless we conceive also what happiness would be perceivable, were there no such thing as ill-governed resentment; or, what happiness is *prevented* and cut off by the abuses of that passion.

That mens living together generates, of itself, mutual affection, has before been observed; (Part I. 35.) And there is no saying to what magnitude such mutual affection might encrease, did nothing arise to check its growth. Any intemperate anger, enmity, or revenge, which nips it in the bud, is the cause of mischiefs incalculable; but as they are invisible, it may be more convincing to dwell on positive and visible evils. Resentment then, when abused, disturbs and interrupts all social commerce; under which expression may be comprehended all the intercourse which is carried on between man and man, either for the ascertaining and exercising of rights, or for other purposes of utility and beneficence. It occasions perpetual contentions, which, when confined to civil affairs, fatigue the mind with

vexation; but when carried on by arms, bring destruction and desolation upon whole countries and regions; —and, what adds to the mischief, if once it be indulged, it *grows* without limit: Every return is rendered, if possible, more violent and mischievous than that which preceded it,—*sympathy* continually spreads the contagion wider and wider, and engages more and more men to unite in furious attacks, in hopes of overpowering the adversaries. Nay, if by some providential event, Resentment be appeased, and at last seem to be extinguished, it is the nature of some sorts of it to break out afresh, when danger is removed; and perhaps in acts of destruction and murder.

But without supposing any flagrant abuse, speaking only of ordinary Life, and of what may be commonly expected, we may say, that anger, when not very carefully and strictly disciplined, or softened and refined, is always likely to produce ill-offices, against which it is difficult to guard; as well as detraction, which may make all the world our enemies.

21. Though much more might have been advanced, both on the Nature and on the Effects of Resentment, yet what has been offered may serve as a Foundation for some practical rules, tending duly to *regulate* it, and apply it to its proper ends.

In *general*, our aim must be, to secure all the good effects of Resentment, and to avoid all such as are hurtful. And if we wanted to have only one compendious Rule for this purpose, it must be the following: 'Let your Anger be always under the command and direction of *Benevolence*.' We might thus make our sentiment to act within us as a goad or a *spur*, but always so as to impel us forward, or quicken our steps, in the right way, in that way which would lead us, not only to our own good, but to the good of many others.

22. Some may wish to have the passion of Anger entirely *annihilated*, or extinguished; but this would be extremely dangerous; as has been shewn with regard to other malevolent sentiments. *(g)* Were our condition so to change as to be in no want of Anger, that

passion would gradually vanish of itself;—so long as we have need of it, we should counteract the provision made for us by the all-gracious Governor of the world, if we set it wholly aside; such despoiling ourselves would be saying, in effect, God has given us Armour, but we will be above making use of it. *(h)*

It may be replied, Armour we are *active* in using; but the passion of Anger is that by which we are agitated and impelled: under this, as the very word implies, we are *passive*. But I presume we need only refer to what has before been explained (Part I. 40.) with regard to the sentiment of hatred, in order to see, that although we are in some degree passive, yet that we are capable of using the impulse of passion for our own purposes. As the skilful charioteer can occasionally give the rein to the fiery coursers by which he is drawn; and guide them with precision, when they seem to be furious beyond controul.

Many men must be conscious, that when they have been reprimanding a servant, soldier, &c. they have incited themselves to the unpleasing task by encouraging a degree of Anger or Indignation, which they could have discouraged if they had judged that expedient.

If an objector only pleads, that Resentment is usually in want of restraint, we must confess the fact; but is every thing which needs restraint, to be entirely cut off? numberless things in this world exceed their proper bounds, but our business is, to reduce them to order, not to reduce them to nothing. And this is the end and design of practical *Rules*.

23. Some indeed seem to be so far from trying to annihilate Resentment, that they submit to it as all-powerful, and declare themselves incapable of bringing it under due Regulation. They, in effect, declare it to be *invincible*:—'that man,' say they, 'has used me so injuriously, or cruelly, that I never *can* forgive him.' If this declaration is taken as proceeding from the judgment, or intellect, we must consider it as a mere prejudice; if from the feelings, it must be treated as evasion

and hypocrisy. It is not new; what men are unwilling to resist, they usually call irresistible.

24. The same kind of thing has been noticed on the subject of Hatred; and rules have been suggested, which, by shewing how the passion may be regulated, take away every pretence for affirming that it is incapable of regulation. Let those *Rules* be *applied*, and they are easy of application, to the present subject. No one who adopts this method, will any longer so much as wish to deceive himself. Let each man then, who has found himself in fact the slave of anger, revenge, or any other part or species of resentment; (Part I. Art. 40—47.)

First—Store his mind with good maxims and principles, and resolutions; ready for use.

Secondly—When he feels a disposition to take offence, let him determine to *suspend* his judgement, and not to indulge his resentment just at that season.

Thirdly—Let him be very cautious of trusting to first appearances, because the resentments which they excite, are generally such as will not stand the test of time and reflection. First appearances affect us rather according to our prejudices, than according to the real worth of things When indeed, men have accustomed themselves to study *characters* attentively, and have learned to admire and approve only in proportion to *solid excellence*, their first judgments may nearly coincide with those which are more mature; but common men fall far short of such penetration; and therefore their first endeavour must be, to learn to discern readily the marks of genuine worth.

Fourthly—Let the man who is willing to persuade himself that he cannot conquer his resentment, so as to forgive, try the experiment of softening it by kind offices, and *acts* of beneficence. A man may certainly act kindly, whose mind is not yet attuned to perfect concord and reconciliation.

Fifthly—Let the person who imagines himself injured and affronted, whether by neglect or actual insult,

recollect, that such imaginations are not peculiar to a state of enmity; that incidents which give birth to them, frequently happen even amongst the best friends. And as amongst friends suspicions are only *transitory*, flame out for a moment, and then die away; let him hope that the same will happen to those unfavourable appearances which alarm his feelings. And in confidence that this may prove to be the case, let him hope the best, and encourage all possible candor and forbearance.

Sixthly—Let him be aware, that men are frequently at bottom only angry at *themselves*, when they vent their anger on others: and let him ask himself how far that is his case: In anger, the irascible persecute the innocent, and make those unhappy, who are free from blame; whilst they might, with great advantage, be employed in searching their own spirits, and in sweetening their own dispositions.

Seventhly—Lastly, Let him be upon his guard against catching, by *sympathy*, the resentments of his friends. A lively concern for our friends, when they seem to be injured, is praise-worthy; but our first views should be to pacify, and not to inflame. He who adopts all the animosities of his friends indiscriminately, will probably adopt many groundless prejudices and hurtful mistakes; more perhaps, than he himself would have run into had he been immediately attacked. And there are better excuses to be offered for error in the person actually offended, than in the friend who rashly intermeddles in the business, without having been perhaps so much as a spectator of the offence.

Any person who, with constancy and resolution, made these rules to be the ground of his conduct, tho', looking on the world at large, he might think the passion of resentment generally in want of restraint, yet would never try to persuade himself that what he felt in his own breast was invincible. These Rules are not perhaps the most obvious, or what an adviser would lay down in the first place; their design is rather to point out those methods which a man might *overlook*; and the inattention to which is in reality the cause of his getting wrong. Such rules will always appear to the

inconsiderate, minute, or trifling; or, at least, to be of less importance than they really are.

25. And if a man was once convinced that every one may enable himself to regulate his passion of anger, and that he is bound to use all his endeavours for that purpose, he would not only adopt the rules already laid down, and any others which might occur to him, but he would make it a serious business to provide against any thing which might *hinder* those endeavours from being successful.

Now a person intent upon discovering hindrances, in such a case, would perceive that *self-love*, *pride*, and *prejudice*, heighten the imagination of injury, aggravate every seeming affront, or neglect, and thereby mislead the judgment, and inflame the passions; he would therefore consider how he should guard himself against all undue influence.——Such thought, or foresight, is highly prudent; if sincere, it would not fail to suggest useful precautions: *self* is likely to pervert judgment; might it not be well to commit to others the punishing of injuries done to ourselves? or, if that should prove impracticable, we might, at least, determine, that we would not, on any account, punish an injury offered to ourselves, more severely than we would have punished the same had it been offered to another: And we might determine also, if we were ourselves obliged to be active in punishing our injurers, to *consult others* on the due measures of punishment; and to take care, that those whom we consulted, should be friends that would not flatter us, or persons who entertained no remarkable partiality in our favour. Were this expedient to fail, nothing seems to remain, but that we *examine ourselves*, as to the purity of our motives in punishing; solemnly, and as in the sight of God. Such a self-examination might run into considerable length, as it might comprehend a view of the whole subject, and of all the consequences, which might follow from pursuing all different plans. Particular care must be taken, that it be not contaminated and frustrated by *Hypocricy*; that our real motives be investigated; that we do not pretend to be

aiming at good, whilst we are in reality only indulging our own revenge and malevolence.

Are we sure, we should ask ourselves, that we would not, even though there were no chance of a discovery, hurt our enemy in his Fortune by some secret stroke, or blast his character by some scandalous insinuation? Would we lay open to him any conspiracy which we perceived to be forming against his person or his interest? if we met with him in necessity, would we do our part to relieve him? if he hungered, would we feed him? if he thirsted, would we give him drink? were he reduced to distress by our persecution, would we prove ourselves to be really his physicians and friends, by healing the wounds which his malignant humors had obliged us to make? And would we, lastly, upon signs of repentance and submission, give a general encouragement to repenting offenders, and afford an incontestible proof of the sincerity of our own benevolence, by receiving him to our arms?

Many other questions would occur in a careful examination of ourselves; but perhaps none more important than these.

26. It is to be feared, that some men will be less ready to set seriously about practising what is here laid down, than they will be to search for its imperfections; and to try what *objections* may be brought against it.

Obj. 1.—In the first place they may say, that this whole matter of regulating the passion of resentment, is here left to the management of each man for himself; and will not the consequence be, that most men will find some pretence or other for *evading* such a Duty? —and if so, can the regulation succeed, in fact?—— The only answer which can be given is, that if a man does make it his choice to evade this Duty, he does it at his peril; he makes himself liable to all the penalties which the Judge of the World annexes to the Violation of his Law; and those penalties are many in this world, and, no doubt, very important in the next. Some Laws may be enforced by more checks and impediments than others, but the obligation to obedience is common to them all. Some Laws seem as if, by their very nature,

they must be left open to evasion; and if so, there is no remedy; they are not the less right and reasonable on that account: any man's abuse of such laws proves nothing against their rectitude.—Beneficence is a duty easily evaded; but it is a duty nevertheless; and of the first utility.

27. Obj. 2. Worldly objectors are apt to treat as chimerical and *visionary*, as *encouraging* and multiplying injuries, that regulation of resentment which true Philosophy and Religion prescribe; that is, the *forgiveness* of injuries; by which I understand, a constant endeavour to forgive, in cases which do not make punishment absolutely necessary; a very great willingness, promptitude, and desire, always to make the experiment, whether forgiveness will not preclude the necessity of more severe measures. This objection well deserves an attentive consideration.

I am not aware that either Philosophy or Religion absolutely prohibits all punishment universally; if a man clears his judgment as much as he is able from prejudice and passion, and does determine, upon the most calm deliberation, in any case, that a certain degree of punishment will be productive of greater *good* than forgiveness, I apprehend that he is obliged to try that degree of punishment: and no case can seem more clearly to require such a determination, than when an offender purposely fixes upon a person of a forgiving temper, and attacks him rather than another, merely because he thinks he can do it with impunity: for as no disposition of mind is more base, or more worthy of punishment than this, so none is more unlikely to be reformed and amended without punishment; punishment answering here a twofold purpose; both its usual one of deterring from future offences, and that of taking away the very foundation of the injury, which was the prospect of pardon.

But a remedy may be efficacious, and yet so *dangerous* in the application, as to make us wish to exchange it for one more safe and less powerful. Punishment, though the most obvious remedy for injurious treatment, is certainly dangerous; to inflict it rightly, requires

such a strength of understanding, such a steadiness of principle, such a purity of intention, as are not commonly to be expected: and therefore, if injuries of the greatest importance must of necessity be punished, yet it is to be wished, at least, that in the more ordinary sorts of offences it might be omitted: and to every benevolent man it would be desirable to have it appear, that he may often, or generally, forgive, without so much danger as is vulgarly apprehended.

Imagine yourself then wholly unconcerned with any animosity or quarrel: an injury is offered you: the question is, whether, in an ordinary way, your punishing that injury, or your pardoning it, will more strongly induce the offender to injure you a second time?

First, consider the motives, in both cases, which are likely to make a man *averse* from future insults: if you execute punishment, I know of none but *fear*. Now fear is an inconstant and imperfect principle of action, especially in performing duties between man and man. He who but fears to offend you, is only hindered from offending by want of opportunity; a prospect of concealment may deprive you of all your security: so may the loss of power on your part, or the attainment of fortune or influence on the part of your enemy: for as to that contrite and humble consciousness which misfortunes are sometimes the means of exciting, that is very rarely caused by hasty and angry punishment, or by any thing which has the appearance of revenge; though it may arise from reproof, and the lighter kinds of correction, when prudently and kindly administered.

But should you *pardon* an offence, there are severa things likely to make an offender averse from persis ing. There is that natural *benevolence* which every m has for every man, before any disgust arises;—this s cred stream, whatever pollution it received in the co mission of the original injury, will soon recover former brightness, when it meets with the pure unruffled current of benignity, which flows from heart of the placable man.

There is also *gratitude*; a principle which me

general are not unwilling to admit, *(i)* and which, when once admitted, depends not for its continuance on fortune, or outward circumstances, but is naturally stable and permanent.

We may add too *prudence*, or self-interest; for let a man once shew himself to act upon principles not easily shaken; to be possessed of a temper not captious, not jealous on every unfavourable appearance; to be actuated by a steady benevolence, which is not ruffled by every little meanness; and he will find the prudent part of the world more desirous of engaging him as a friend, than of provoking him as an enemy. Nay an injury might be pardoned with such indisputable marks of true *fortitude*, and genuine greatness of spirit, that the offender should be as much influenced even by *fear* to decline a second injury, as if he had been actually punished: for where punishment has been inflicted, it is not, strictly speaking, reflection on the past, which deters from injuries, but dread of the future; founded on such reflection.

In the next place, consider the motives, in both cases, (of punishment and pardon), which are likely to *incline* a man to repeat offences. And it is undoubtedly true, that when you execute vengeance on any man you raise in him a desire of requiting and punishing you for that action by which your resentment was gratified. He will look upon your action as an injury, even though it should have really been, what is unlikely, no more than an equitable punishment. Self-love will represent to his fancy his offence as far from heinous, and your requital as cruelly severe: and should he return the evil, partiality will again have the same effects: The desire of revenge, like other desires, when once indulged, will grow impatient of restraint; what can be expected from such an intercourse, but rancour increased by every return? ere long drawing into its vortex your dependants; and descending, as an inheritance, from generation to generation?

But should you *pardon* an injury, what can incline the author of it to persist in offending? It must be some habitual malevolence, or stupid insensibility, or, if he

gains by injuring you, a selfishness of the basest kind. But no one who made any pretensions to the countenance and esteem of the world, would dare to act from such principles: and so few give up the world, that the experiment might be hazarded without imprudence. Indeed though a person so abandoned should repeat an injury, that would not make against our reasoning; because such a one would injure any man. He who forgave might not be safe; but neither would he who punished: except the offender was to be actually deprived of his Liberty.—There would still be one difference; the second injury would not, in case of a pardon, be of course greater than the first, as it would be in case of retaliation.

Thus the motives which prevent the repetition of an injury are stronger after a pardon than after a punishment; and those which encourage it, weaker. And we should, moreover, consider, that men often *seem* to injure us when they really do not: now having forgiven a seeming injury, which was not real, cannot possibly do harm: no man will injure us because we have treated an innocent action of his as innocent. And mistakes of this sort are so common, that even those who determine to revenge *all* injuries, ought to overlook some; otherwise they will be, not only severe, but unjust; they will exceed even that severity in which they allow themselves, and punish more than all the injuries which have really been committed against them.

But an injury may be real, and yet it may be very ill-judged to inflict punishment; this indeed has been shewn before, generally; but take the instance of the man of a *warm but generous temper;* such a one does injurious things, in a paroxysm of passion; but he soon reflects upon them with concern and remorse; and is as earnest to make reparation as he was rash in offending. Yet some time and forbearance are required; if resentment is shewn before he recovers himself, it keeps him in agitation, or exasperates him still more: it sets him upon justifying and defending himself; it excites him to new outrages, each fertile in mischief; whereas patience and self-command, though but for a time,

would cut off long trains of evil, and confer an obligation on a grateful mind, the remembrance of which would never be effaced.

As this warm and generous temper is by no means uncommon, and as it both requires and deserves that restraints particularly strong should be laid upon the passion which we are considering, it may not be improper to make some impression in its favor, by observing, that the same vehemence which hurries a man into injurious attacks, may shew itself in warm and delicate friendship, in nice honour, in mercy and compassion. For that sensibility which makes a man burn with friendly zeal, and melt with kindness; by which he is susceptible of all the charms of moral beauty and the liberal arts; which makes him thrill at the sound of praise, and sink under disgrace, will also make him jealous of his honour, and indignant at every appearance of meanness, dishonesty and ingratitude. We need therefore only conceive such a man to have a partial and unfavourable view of any affair, or to listen to the misrepresentations of art, or malice, in order to conceive him rushing into injury, and attacking the innocent: but let the stroke be yielded to; its force will soon be spent; humanity and judgment will return together, and you will be hailed the guardian and protector of all that is valuable in human life.

28. I will conclude this calculation of the consequences of punishment and pardon, by marking out the difference between *public* punishment and *private*; as it may solve some mens difficulties best to see, that public punishment may sometimes be inflicted, when private should not be used without great caution. *Public* punishment of any injury is that which is inflicted by the Magistrate in obedience to the Laws, or constitutional government. This was settled by the wisdom of the Legislature without any knowledge of the particular offence to be punished, merely from estimating the mischief of the kind of crime, on general principles. And it is inflicted with temper and calmness, and most usually with reluctance. But *private* punishment results from the feelings of the injured person: it is contrived, as to

its kind and degree, with a view to the particular case in question; and during the warmth of resentment, heightened by self-love. How much more likely is the former to be right and equitable than the latter! how much more likely also to be successful! for who would not *submit* more willingly to public than to private punishment? It may indeed depend on a private man to *sue* to those in power for public punishment; but that is a very different thing from letting loose private Resentment; different, both with respect to the punishment which would be inflicted, and to the effect which it would have in reforming the Offender.

29. And now what is the *result* of the whole? very greatly in favor of forgiveness.—You receive an injury, or imagine that you receive one; shall you punish, or shall you forbear? there are more things to be taken into consideration in answering this question than is generally imagined; the question seems to be single, but it is resolvable into many cases.

First.—What you imagine to be an injury may be really *no injury;* it may be a plain, simple conduct, on the part of the offender; such as he has a *right* to pursue; or such as he is under *obligation* not to omit. To punish in this case would be to plunge into an abyss of mischief and iniquity. Yet it is a case by no means uncommon.

Secondly.—A man may commit against you what is, as a fact, a real injury, or violation of your rights, (that is, we will suppose its reality, though there may often be difficulty in settling that matter), but he may have done the action through *inadvertence;* he may not have intended so much as to do you *harm*, much less to injure you. Now to punish, in this case, would be to treat a man as guilty who is innocent; and would be a measure productive of evil upon the whole; consequently wrong. It is for the general good that innocence should receive all possible encouragements.

Thirdly.—The *harm* which is done you, may be intentional, but the offender may think he has a *right* to inflict that harm; perhaps as self-defence; perhaps as

punishment: still he is, in his own mind, an innocent person.

Fourthly.—Suppose the person who offends you, to be conscious, both that he does you harm, and that he violates your rights; yet his injurious disposition may be *shortlived;* it may have arisen from some seeming meanness or oppression in your own conduct; from some warmth in his temper not wholly dishonourable. If you punish, you make the matter worse: if you pardon, such an offender will *repent:* nay he may be actually returning to kindness and humility and concern, at the very time when you are beginning to provoke him afresh: here you may have the alternative of making a warm and constant friend, or a bitter enemy: how ill-judged will be your choice, if you voluntarily take the latter part!

Fifthly. Your offender may have nothing particular to plead in his excuse, and yet you may *over-rate* the injury. In this case, if you punish according to your own estimate, for as much evil as you inflict beyond the true estimate, you become the injurer. This may not easily be settled in fact, but it is a solid foundation of conduct for a conscientious man.

Sixthly.—Suppose you to estimate justly the injury committed against you; yet you may not know the right *method of punishing*, in the case before you. You may not be able so to comprehend the nature of the offence, the situation of the offender, and the circumstances attending the crime, as to fix upon that mode of punishment which suits them all. And *unsuitable* punishment must be wrong, as far as it is unsuitable; and productive of mischief.

Seventhly.—Nor is this supposing you particularly deficient in sense or judgment; (though how few your opportunities have been of learning those things on which right punishment depends, may be well worth your considering); punishment is a subject so comprehensive and *complicated*, takes in such an incalculable number of views, relations, causes, and effects, that no one can be said to understand it completely: and those

modes of punishment, which are instituted, may be rather considered as rude attempts at self-defence, than as satisfactory and faultless retributions. The best of them require to be tempered by discretionary remission.

Eighthly.—Suppose you knew the best punishment that could possibly be *attempted*, yet your attempt may *fail*. And if it does, evil will probably result from the failure. It may fail in a variety of ways: to have it succeed perfectly, it must be such a one as the Offender will *submit* to: if he resists, you are in a state of *war*, rather than in a course of inflicting punishment. Now I conceive the guilty find submission difficult, because it is embittered by their consciousness of guilt: consciousness of innocence might sweeten any sort of humiliation.

Ninthly.—Supposing you punish, and are quite right in strictness of *Justice*, yet you may incur much evil by shewing a want of *mercy;* under which term I include candour, moderation, forbearance, and the whole set of indefinite virtues of the mild and gentle temper. And what is man without this class of Virtues? can he be an object of love, or of esteem? can he be deemed capable of permanent friendship? can he be really admitted into human society?

Tenthly.—You are impatient to punish; are you aware from what motives your impatience may arise? *cowards* are cruel; even to a proverb: are you ambitious of the character of a coward? or would you wish to have imputed to you the mean *insolence* of shewing that power which another man's fault has accidentally given you, by heaping upon him all the evil which you can inflict with safety? Summon resolution enough to be patient; your rights may find many protectors; you may do yourself more harm by defending them meanly, than by waving them generously. You may lose the protection of the world, if you become an object of general contempt and aversion. You may miss gaining the protection even of him who has offended you: a protection which might have proved highly valuable.

Eleventhly.—Before you punish, you should consi-

der, not only your own good, but that of the *public*. Punishment may light up a flame very difficult to be extinguished: one which may rage and spread to general conflagration.

Twelfthly.—Although a man, as was just now observed, may incur the imputation of cowardice by punishing, yet some inflict punishment in order to avoid that imputation. Much will depend upon particular circumstances. A man may possibly submit to injury through fear; as in the case of oppression from the great and powerful; but in general, supposing men nearly on a footing of equality, submission is much more *honourable* in the injured than in the offender; and much more easy to the feelings. The best thing, no doubt, which any man can do, who has injured another, is to expiate his fault nobly; and when men see any one shew such a design, they do it all the honour in their power. Yet still there will be some degradation, some debasement from guilt: some spot, some stain to be concealed and obliterated: and of this the offender continues conscious; and under this he labours in the midst of his expiation. But whilst the *injured submits*, he has honor and esteem without, and heart-felt satisfaction within: such is the power of guilt and innocence. Not but it may be worth the while of any man, offender or injured, when he liable to a suspicion of cowardice, to do his duty in such a *manner* as to shew the suspicion to be groundless: But what methods are to be used for this purpose depends so very much on particular circumstances, that it cannot be made the subject of any general rule.

Thirteenthly.—It might be wrong not to remark, somewhere or other, that all which we have said must be understood to be *addressed to the person injured*, and to him only. The injurer must make no *claims* to forgiveness; he must not be supposed so much as to hear or know what religion and virtue dictate on his behalf. If he offends with any view to taking advantage of mercy, he forfeits all title to be forgiven.

30. Thus I have offered several considerations tending to shew the reasonableness of that moderation

of our Resentment, which will frequently amount to forgiveness of injuries: When therefore your arm is lifted up to strike the blow of vengeance, think! reflect! in what a number of ways you may be wrong, how very improbable it is that you should be right; hazard then forgiveness: or delay the punishment, till all the world exclaims, it is necessary. You may take some method, which is brave and spirited, of shewing your sense of the injury, and of proving that you are not afraid to punish it; but let your indignation be tempered with something benevolent; some enlarged philanthropy, some lofty compassion, some comprehensive concern for consequences of such conduct as yours to all mankind.—So shall you be most likely to act as you shall ever approve; so shall you take the most probable means to convert an enemy unto a grateful and constant friend.

31. I will now presume, that what has been here said on Resentment, with what was before offered on other passions, and is easily applied to Resentment, will be sufficient to put a man, if well disposed, on governing that unkind affection: I will therefore now proceed to examine how the expressions and precepts of *Scripture* correspond with what has been dictated by reason and observation. No directions indeed have been given to him who is the *Object* of Resentment; but those which have been proposed to the Objects of Hatred, Envy, and Malice, may easily be made to supply the defect. (Part 1. Art. 38, 39. Part iii. Art. 17. and Part iv. Art. 10.).

END OF PART V.

Malevolent Sentiments.

PART VI.

RESENTMENT.

SCRIPTURES AGREEING WITH NATURAL LAW.

1. ALTHOUGH nothing of what has been offered on the subject of Resentment was introduced with a view to any particulary passage of *Scripture*, yet it must be a satisfactory, and to many a pleasing employment, to review the remarks which have been made, and compare them with those parts of Holy writ, where the same sentiments and the same practical observations occur.

2. But in order to avoid erroneous conceptions, and disappointments arising from them, it is necessary to premise, that the language of Scripture is *popular language;* and therefore of course, that it bears all the marks and characters of such language; it takes for granted things generally allowed; it only alludes to facts, opinions and manners, when they are established by custom; it spares and omits exhortations to things which men practice of themselves.—How necessary it was that such language should be used to the persons whom revelation was first intended to instruct, needs scarcely to be mentioned: Popular language may have its imperfections, and may, after a length of time, want interpreting by circumstances; but scientifical language

would generally have given wrong ideas; where it gave any at all. The sacred writers were no system makers; they spoke and wrote naturally from their feelings; and suited their expressions to all the various cases which came before them.

If we keep this in mind, and make the proper allowances for it, I imagine that we shall find a sufficient *agreement* between the sacred oracles and our investigation of nature and fact.

In considering such agreement, it will be proper to pursue our wonted method; taking first those expressions of scripture which describe the *Nature* of Resentment, next those which point out its *Effects*, and lastly those which give any rules for its *Regulation*. —If the words in our Translation are not always exactly the same with those in modern use, that can make no material difficulty.

3. First then with regard to the *Nature* of Resentment;

The difference between *harm* and *injury* must have appeared to the sacred writers. When St. Peter says, "Who is he that will harm you if ye be followers of that "which is good?" 1 Pet. iii. 13.—When our Lord declares, that if believers "drink any deadly thing it shall not *hurt* them;" Mark xvi. 18.—When in a vision he says to Paul, "no man shall set on thee to *hurt* thee; Acts xviii. 10.—the idea of harm or hurt, seems perfectly distinct from any notion of injury.

But when St. Paul says to the Galatians, "ye have "not injured me at all;" Gal. iv. 12.—When the Psalmist says of Jehovah "he suffered no man to do "them *wrong*;" Psalm cv. 14.—and the housholder to his labourer, "friend I do thee no *wrong*;" Matt. xx. 13. the natural evil suffered is not properly the object of attention, but the moral violation of rights; the injury.—Sometimes the sense of a word is in a good measure denoted by others with which it is *joined*. In the present case, oppression, fraud, persecution, are

terms which exemplify our interpretation. Samuel "says, whose ox have I taken; or whose ass have I "taken? or whom have I defrauded, whom have I "oppressed?" 1 Sam. xii. 3.—St. Paul, blaming the Corinthians for going to Law, says, "Why do ye not "rather take wrong? why do ye not rather suffer "yourselves to be defrauded?" 1 Cor. vi. 7.—and elsewhere he joins "injurious" with "persecutor." 1 Tim. i. 13.

4. A violation of right effected by culpable *negligence* has the nature of an injury; and therefore expiation or atonement, is ordered for such violation, in the Law of Moses; that is, atonement is enjoined, "if any "one of the common people sin through ignorance, "while he doeth somewhat against any of the com-"mandments of the Lord, concerning things which "ought not to be done." Lev. iv. 27.—And leaving an ox at liberty that has been "wont to push with his horn "in time past," Exod. xxi. 29. is even a capital offence; supposing the ox to have killed any person.

5. Resentment has, by us, been called a *malevolent* sentiment; particularly because it excites to *punishment*. The Psalmist says, "Leave off from wrath and let go "displeasure; fret not thyself, else shalt thou be *moved* "to do *evil*." Psalm xxxvii. 8.

That the natural effect of injury is *punishment*, appears from those passages where punishment is spoken of as following wrong actions of course; as confessedly annexed to them. Sarai says to Abram, when he treats her with unmerited contempt, "My wrong be upon thee"; Gen. xvi. 5. so the Jews, when Pilate has cleansed himself from the blood of our Lord, cry out, "his blood be on us, and on our children:" Matt. xxvii. 25. Acts xviii. 6. Similar expressions occur several times.—"O Lord, thou hast seen my wrong; "judge thou my cause". Lam. iii. 59. Here judgment is annexed to injury; and to the same effect the Magistrate is called by St. Paul, "a revenger to execute "wrath upon him that doeth evil". Rom. xiii. 5.—Job says, "Be ye afraid of the Sword: for wrath bring-

" eth the punishments of the sword, that ye may know " there is a judgment". Job. xix. 29.

6. We may see from these instances, that the word *wrath* is much in use in our translation; but the word *anger* is also used; and, to express its warmer emotions, *rage* and *fury*; much as we use them at present. *Enmity* also bears the same meaning in scripture as in modern writings. Anger and wrath seem sometimes to be *general* terms, sometimes to denote the quick and sudden species of anger: the latter sense seems implied when we are exhorted to be *slow* to anger, and to wrath. Prov. xvi. 32. James i. 19.

Naaman, when the simple prescription is given him to bathe himself in the river Jordan, turns and goes away in a *rage*. 2 Kings, v. 12. Jehovah pours out his *fury* on the adversaries of pure religion; and in his fury tramples them under his feet. Nor does the word *displeasure* need any particular explanation.

Despitefulness, by the manner in which it is introduced, appears to signify a *lofty* species of anger, for which I do not recollect a modern name. *(a)* The Psalmist says, " Our soul is filled with the scornful re- " proof of the wealthy, and with the despitefulness of " the *proud*." Psalm cxxiii. 4. And our Lord, in his Sermon on the mount, " pray for them which despitefully " use you, and persecute you." Mat. v. 44. The persons here meant are such as have *power* to persecute; such as we can benefit only by prayer. St. Paul also, when enumerating the sins of the heathens, joins together the words despiteful and *proud*. Rom. i. 30. Yet the word *spite*, in familiar language, seems to be used when some particular mischief is contrived against some person, who is intended to be mortified, disappointed, lowered by it: its meaning comes near to that of malice, when used strictly.

And as things are often explained by opposition and contrast, it may be worth while to observe the scriptural *negations* of resentment. *Forgiveness* is a negation of any resolution to punish:—*reconciliation* is something more; it implies a return of old *affections*, the course of

which has been interrupted by some seeming injury. *Love* of enemies denotes that constant benevolence, which is continued to men even whilst they are in a state of enmity.

Of *enmity* we have given scriptural instances under *Hatred.* In the law of Moses, a man is an enemy who seeks the harm of another; Numb. xxxv. 23. To *do* another harm may not be injurious; but to seek, to aim at, and *design* ultimately the harm of another, cannot but be so. And the idea of *constancy*, or continuance, which we made a part of our idea of enmity, is expressed in the enmity of Saul to David. "And Saul became "David's enemy continually." 1 Sam. xviii. 29.

7. *Revenge*, as a word, occurs but rarely in scripture; *(b)* but the idea of desiring to punish for the sake of evil, rather than with a view to any good effects of punishment, may be found. In the dying benediction of Jacob we have these words; "Cursed "be their anger, for it was fierce; and their wrath, for "it was cruel." Gen. xlix. 7. Here is nothing like punishing with a view to *good*; (Part v. 21.) the effect of anger, in this case, had been murder. It might indeed be sudden anger; but whilst it continued, it was malicious.

That revenge which is fixed and settled in the mind for a length of *time*, is forbidden in the Mosaic Law: "Thou shalt not avenge nor bear any grudge "against the children of thy people, but thou shalt love "thy neighbour as thyself: I am the Lord." Lev. xix. 18. Here the word *grudge* shews the continuance of the anger, or revenge, which may be supposed to have been unknown to its object. And that which is *opposed* to the fault, serves to describe its nature. This indeed, as was now observed, is commonly the case; if we had no other description of revenge but that which is contained in the mention of the virtues opposed to it, that would be sufficient.

St. Paul makes freedom from wrath and doubtings, *(c)* necessary for rightly performing acts of *devotion*,

that is, fredom from malice and grudge, and all malicious machinations; this must imply what is commonly called revenge. He also twice, Eph. iv. 31. Col. iii. 8. reckons anger and malice together. And the word *bitterness*, Eph. iv. 31. conveys the idea of continued malevolence aiming at no good: what we call *rancour* seems bitterness in a high degree.

Punishment in scripture means the same as we have defined it to mean: that which makes *retribution* for injury; (before, we spoke of it as the *effect* of anger). In the description of the general judgment it is said of the wicked, "these shall go away into everlasting pu-"nishment." Matt. xxv. 46. And the Apostle to the Hebrews compares the punishments due for rejecting the Mosaic and Christian Religions. If a man deserved such a punishment for apostacy from the religion of Moses, "of how much sorer punishment suppose ye, "shall he be thought worthy who hath trodden under-"foot the Son of God?" Heb. x. 29.

The scriptural sense of *vengeance* approaches nearer to the idea of punishment than to that of revenge. We may conceive it to be punishment inflicted with *warmth*, and to be more *discretionary* than usual.—*Chastisement* is always understood to be punishment inflicted, merely with a view to the good of the offender.

8. The word *Peevishness* does not occur in Scripture; but the fault and the feeling seem to be recognized. Sometimes the state of mind seems to be called *fretting*; sometimes we judge from *circumstances*, that the sort of anger which is indulged would by us have been called by our term. We read of *Hannah*, the mother of *Samuel*, that "her adversary provoked her "sore, for to make her fret," 1 Sam. i. 6. the subject was, Hannah's not bearing children; as Peninnah did. —"It is better to dwell in the wilderness than with a "contentious and angry woman". Prov. xxi. 19.—"The contentions of a wife are a continual dropping" Prov. xix. 13.—wear the temper, as a continual dropping wears a stone. "Husbands, love your wives, and be not bitter against them". Col. iii. 19.—"Moses,

" because of the hardness of your hearts, suffered you " to put away your wives." Matt. xix. 8. The sorts of anger here described, or implied, being all in domestic life, not of the most serious and tragical nature, and being habitual, may be ranked under that ordinary sort of malevolence, of which we are speaking just at present.

9. *Indignation* appears in various places of scripture, and under the same name. Our Saviour's chief anger must be against vice and sin. In the twenty-third chapter of St. Matthew's gospel we find many instances of his indignation against Hypocrisy: and in St. Mark's we read, that he was indignant at the Jewish Zealots; " he looked round about on them with anger, " being grieved for the hardness of their hearts". Mark iii. 5. Also when his disciples, through an officiousness which implied some arrogance, and want of feeling of the kind spirit of Christianity, repulsed those who brought infants for Jesus's Benediction, we are told, that " when Jesus saw it, he was much displeased". Mark x. 14. Nor can we conceive, that, when he made a scourge of small cords, drove the money-changers and others " out of the temple, and the sheep, and the " oxen, and poured out the changers money, and over- " threw the tables," John ii. 15. he was entirely free from indignation; especially as to this act is applied the prophetic saying, " The *Zeal* of thine house hath eaten " me up".

When the ten Apostles were " much displeased" " with James and John", Mark x. 41. their displeasure was a sort of indignation; because they looked upon those two Apostles as endeavouring to gain, unfairly or unhandsomely, an advantage over the rest.

John Baptist addresses those self-sufficient persons who came out into the Desert to be baptized by him, with considerable asperity. " O generation of vipers, " who hath warned you to flee from the wrath to " come?" Matt. iii. 7.—" God shall smite thee, thou " whited wall";—were the words of the Apostle of the Gentiles, when Ananias had ordered him to be smitten on the mouth:—nor are we deceived when we

give an angry meaning to these words, because St. Paul applied to himself "thou shalt not speak *evil* of the "ruler of thy people." Acts xxiii. 3—5. The anger here I call indignation, because the moral evil of the blow was, no doubt, chiefly in view. The same Apostle calls some persons "abominable and disobedient, and to every good work reprobate." Titus i. 16.

Jehovah is very frequently represented as angry; we ought, perhaps, generally to conceive his anger as belonging to the species Indignation; though as it a retribution, and as suffering from it, or the expectation of it, promotes good, it may be conceived as *punishment*. It cannot be necessary, though it may be most regular, to mention, that the anger of God is metaphorical; as much so as his hands and his feet. Any faculty, of body or mind, said to exist in the supreme Being, means only the cause, in the Deity, of those effects, which, if they were produced by man, would be produced by that faculty. (My Lectures in Divinity I. xix. 5.)

Indignation may relate either to more heinous moral disorders, or to such as are of inferior moment; in the former case it will be strong and lofty, in the latter it may mix with the peevishness of ordinary life. "Fret not thyself because of the ungodly," Psalm xxxvii. 1. may afford us an instance of the latter case: as far as ungodliness excites anger, it is to be referred to the head of Indignation; but yet fretting has been thought to belong chiefly to the lower and more familiar sorts of anger. It is certain, that in the daily and trivial transactions of common life, moral failures and irregularities do excite a great deal of anger: nay it often happens, that such irregularities bring a man by degrees, to a habit of misanthropy.

Oppression is one great cause of indignation; that is, compelling a man to submit to power against right; when the oppressed wants nothing but power to resist effectually; to repel the attacks of oppression. The scriptures speak freequently of oppression, and of the indignation which it excites. "Rob not the poor be-"cause he is poor," says the wise man; "neither op-

" press the afflicted in the gate: for the Lord will " plead their cause, and spoil the soul of those that " spoiled them." Prov. xxii. 22. 23. Similar passages are numerous, and well known.

Indignation after punishment, as analogous to malicious triumph, has been mentioned before. (Part v. 7.) " Let the ungodly fall into their own nets, and let me " ever escape them". Psalm cxli. 10.—" The righte- " ous shall rejoice when he seeth the vengeance": " he " shall wash his footsteps in the blood of the ungodly". Yet still a good end is in view, which may distinguish this indignation from revenge; and shew, that it arises from a zeal for virtue and religion. " So that a man shall " say, Verily there is a reward for the righteous: doubt- " less there is a God that judgeth the earth". Psalm lviii. 9. 10.

10. What has been said may enable us to judge how nearly remarks drawn from fact coincide with the ideas of scripture, in respect to the *Nature* of resentment; *(d)* I therefore close the first part of our subject with the solemn declaration or denunciation of St. Paul. " Unto them that are contentious, and do not obey the " truth, but obey unrighteousness, indignation and " wrath, tribulation and anguish upon every soul of man " that doeth evil, of the Jew first, and also of the Gen- " tile". Rom. ii. 8. 9.

11. We are now to view some expressions of Scripture which have relation to the *effects* of Resentment. And as the *beneficial* effects of a malevolent sentiment are apt to cause some hesitation in some minds, and as additional doubt arises from the Scriptures taking for granted, that which, had they been systematical and scientifical, they might have expressed; it may not be improper, in this place, to repeat, that whatever averts evil arising in any particular state of things, is a good to that state; and though that which averts evil be itself an evil, yet if it averts a greater evil, it may still be considered as a good.

We may also repeat, that popular language, such as the scriptures must be written in, or lose a great part of their

value, always takes for granted things allowed by those to whom it is addressed; and suits itself to particular occasions: As a strong instance of the scriptures omitting what seemed unnecessary to be mentioned, it has been observed, that even parental love is no where enjoined in scripture. (Part 1. 37.) And if we read the seventh chapter of St. Paul's first Epistle to to the Corinthians, we shall find several disswasions from marriage, but no injunction or perswasion to marry: the reason is, because the Apostle thought those whom he addressed ready enough to marry, the situation of affairs considered. We cannot imagine that he wished the inhabitants of our Globe to continue only for that generation.

In like manner, although we may not find "be ye "angry", in the literal sense of the words, we can conclude nothing more from the omission than that such a precept was unnecessary. We have heard of such a thing as Apathy; but those who affected to commend it, were Philosophers, not such as the Holy Scriptures were addressed to. Nay common *prudence* is taken for granted, in the parable of the unjust Steward, and in the famous injunction to do to others as we desire them to do to us; though a great number of men want what is called common prudence.

It may be useful also to recollect, that no quality is ever in Scripture ascribed to the *Deity*, which would be blamable in Man; our idea of God being compounded of perfections only. Hence, if we find any sort of Anger ascribed to Jehovah, or to the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, we may be allowed to affirm, that such anger is permitted to man; nay is praise-worthy in him. Perhaps the expression may here occur, "ven-"geance is mine, I will repay, saith the Lord"; Rom. xii. 19. which seems to deny to man the anger ascribed to God; but the very affirmation serves to confirm our notion, with regard to other expressions; as it implies, that if nothing is affirmed to the contrary, that which is ascribed to God, is right in man. And perhaps it may be observed, here as properly as elsewhere, that the right of inflicting punishment cannot be supposed to be

forbidden to man, in this text, but only that arbitary and discretionary infliction of evil, which "assumes the "God", and is the immediate effect of the feelings of the person offended.—But of this text we shall see more hereafter.

12. These things being premised, we may observe, that anger is not wholly sinful; and that some effects of it are such as our Creator intended, in our present condition; and that he gave us anger as a friend might give us a *sword*, (to repeat the former illustration), to enable us to repel evil by evil.—The declaration made immediately after God had created all things, must extend to the human *mind:* "And God saw every "thing that he had made, and behold it was very good." Gen. i. 31. St. Paul means the same thing when he says, generally, though with a particular reference, "Every creature of God is good, and nothing to be "refused, if it be received with thanksgiving". 1 Tim. iv. 4. And the Psalmist says, "The Lord is loving "unto every man, and his mercy is over all his works." Psalm cxlv. 9. These declarations do not mean that the works of God are incapable of *abuse:* when we say they are right, we must suppose them to be in their right *state:* but hen there *is* a right state; and that can be known only by beneficial *effects.*

13. *Jehovah* is so very frequently described as angry, in different ways and degrees, that it were vain to begin citing passages to that purpose. Of Jesus *Christ* we have already spoken under the head of *indignation:* as also of St Paul. The anger of *Moses* when, on coming down from Mount Sinai, with the Decalogue written on Tables, from immediate converse with the Spiritual Deity, he found his people in the very act of Idolatry, must have been very warm: and as such it is described. "And it came to pass as soon as he came nigh unto the "camp, that he saw the calf, and the dancing: and "Moses' anger waxed hot, and he cast the tables out "of his hands, and brake them beneath the mount." Exod. xxxii. 19. With regard to St. Paul, we may add to the passages already produced, what he says of Alexander's having done him much evil; "the Lord reward "him according to his works." 2 Tim. iv. 14. And

his manner of instructing the Ephesians; "Be ye an-"gry and sin not;" Eph. iv. 26. which clearly implies, that a man may possibly be angry and not sin. When *David* heard of the rich man's having taken the poor man's ewe-lamb, though he had exceeding many flocks and herds of his own, his "anger was greatly kindled "against the man."

That *punishment* is lawful, appears by the whole penal law of Moses; Deut, ch. xxv. as also by the declaration in the book of Genesis belonging to no set of men exclusively; "Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man "shall his blood be shed." Gen. ix. 6. And by the Epistle to the Romans ch. xiii. That punishment may sometimes be inflicted by a *private* individual, will appear hereafter.

Even the restrictions and *limitations* imposed upon anger in the Scriptures serve to shew, that it is not totally and essentially sinful. In the passage before quoted it is rather fierceness and *cruelty* than anger which is blamed. Gen. xlix. 7. The wise man advises to *defer* anger. Prov. xix. 11. The Christian is not to be angry "without a *cause.*" Matt. v. 22. He must not be *easily* "provoked." 1 Cor. xiii. 5. He must be "*slow* to wrath." James i. 19. A Christian Bishop must not be "*soon* angry." Titus i. 7. Every one must let his anger sink with the *Sun.* Eph. iv. 26. This is very different from a total condemnation and prohibition of the sentiment of anger.

That species of anger which is called *zeal,* and is nearly allied to indignation, is commended in scripture. We have already mentioned that of *Moses* in a most trying situation. Exod. xxxii. 19. *Phineas* must have performed that act for which he is so much commended, with great warmth and energy. Numb. xxv. 7, 8, &c. The Psalmist has such acute feelings that he pines away. Psalm lxix. 9. St. Paul, though he confesses that the zeal of the Jews was defective with regard to knowledge, plainly commends zeal in general, by his manner of recording its existence. Rom. x. 2. He also mentions zeal as a good effect of reproof and consequent repentance, 2 Cor. vii. 11. in the Corinthians; and he

tells the Galatians, generally, "it is good to be zealously affected always in a good thing." Gal. iv. 18.

14. And as we have compared God's giving us anger, and indeed other malevolent sentiments, to a friend's giving a man a *sword*, and as a sword can only promote good by inflicting evil, and only continues to operate whilst evil continues; it may not be superfluous to produce a few passages in which the sword is spoken of as a *good*.

The sword in general is called the "Sword of the "Lord," Jer. xlvii. 6. and the ungodly are said to be a sword of the Almighty, Psalm xvii. 13. compare Joel ii. 25. an instrument to inflict evil, for the sake of good.—Job says, "Be ye afraid of the sword; for "wrath bringeth the punishments of the sword, that ye "may know there is a judgment". Job xix. 29.

Our Saviour, at the last supper, tells his Apostles, that if any of them has no Sword, he must "sell his "garment and buy one." Luke xxii. 36. And St. Paul tells the Roman Christians that they must be good subjects; for one reason, because the Magistrate "beareth not the sword in vain". Rom. xiii. 4. He also tells the converts at Ephesus, that in order to prepare themselves for the duties which they would have to fulfil, they must arm themselves with the word of God as with a *sword*; and he calls it "the Sword of the "Spirit." Eph. vi. 17.—Heb. iv. 12. Whether we understand this use of the word of God perfectly or imperfectly, it must be analogous to the use of the sword. See Rev. i. 16. These passages tend to give credit to any instrument, which by means of evil, produces good upon the whole. Nothing can be urged against anger, which may not be urged against the sword.

15. This may suffice as to the good effects of anger, considered generally; especially as more expressions of scripture which might be introduced here, will occur under different heads.

There are some effects of anger which are good to

the *individual* in whom that passion operates..—It excites and enable him to *repel evil*;—but I know not that we need expect here a *precept* of scripture: men are so ready to take fire on the mere appearance of injury, that those who wrote as occasion required, would always deem an injunction to be angry quite superfluous, or tending to counteract those exhortations, which they found it necessary to give for the due regulation of anger. Nay, even in a systematical writer of morals it would excite some degree of surprize to find this rule, ' when you are injured and oppressed fail not to be angry ': Yet it is not the less true, that a human being would be maimed, as it were, and imperfect, if void of all kinds and degrees of anger.

That the scriptures do not mean to hinder men from repelling evil by means of the sentiment of anger, may be inferred from their allowing the individual to punish. Indeed public punishment is generally sued for by the individual; but in some cases he is allowed in scripture to punish with his own hand. " If a thief be found " breaking up, and be smitten that he die, there shall " no blood be shed for him". Exod. xxii. 2. Is it here more reasonable to suppose the master of the house, or his friends, to be excited and enabled to attack and destroy the housebreaker, by the impulse of anger, or to fight from the perfectly cold deductions of reason?

In the Law of Moses there is a person called the *avenger*, or the " avenger of blood"; no magistrate, seemingly; probably some kinsman of the injured, best situated, and best qualified for avenging; of this person it is said, " The avenger of blood himself shall " slay the murderer: when he meeteth him, he shall " slay him". Numb. xxxv. 19. What seems still more deliberate is, that though the avenger could not seize upon the guilty whilst he was in a city of refuge, yet the elders could take him from such city, and then their business was, not to deliver him up to the Magistrate, but to the avenger. Deut. xix. 12.—Numb. xxxv. 12. Those courts of justice which excuse a man when he does things through violence of passion, such as killing an adulterer, and resenting a sudden insult, though they

would punish him for doing the same things in cool blood, take for granted the general sense of mankind in favour of passion, when excited in a virtuous breast.

The *Deity* is described in Scripture as angry at the oppressor; is the person oppressed to be conceived as blamable if he be angry also? "Ye shall not afflict "any widow or fatherless child. If thou afflict them "in any wise, and they cry at all unto me, I will surely "hear their cry, and my wrath shall wax hot". and so forth. Exod. xxii. 22. &c. See also Zech. vii. 8. —14. God is also described as angry at his adversaries, or enemies. "According to their deeds, accordingly he will repay, fury to his adversaries, recompense to his enemies". Isaiah lix. 18.

16. The Deity then will hear the *cries* of the oppressed: are not these cries the language of passion? if so, a few passages of Scripture where they are mentioned must be to our purpose. Elihu, in the book of Job, speaks of "the multitude of oppressions, that made "the oppressed to cry". Job xxxv. 9. Of mighty and wicked men he says, that "they cause the cry of "the poor to come unto" God; and that God "hear-"eth the cry of the afflicted". Job xxxiv. 28. Isaiah foretells that the Egyptians "shall cry unto the Lord "because of the oppressors." Isaiah xix. 20. And St. James tells the rich, that the cries of injured labourers enter "into the ears of the Lord of Sabaoth". James v. 4.—Here is nothing like disapprobation of these cries, nor therefore of the passion which gave them utterance. The wise man speaks of "the *tears* of such "as were oppressed"; Eccles. iv. 1. and sense of injury promotes tears as well as cries. Such expressions, whether articulate or not, imply passion without power; and if they are approved, we may conclude, that, had there been power, it might have lawfully been exerted when set in motion by that passion.

Violent contests by bodily strength, are always supported by anger: yet when they are mentioned in the Law of Moses, no particular blame is thrown upon them; only it is settled how any damages arising from

them shall be compensated. Exod. xxi. 18. Perhaps each contender is supposed to think himself in the right, and to act as on the defensive; and therefore no difference is made between the parties.

17. We have observed, in speaking of the good effects of anger, or resentment, as beneficial to the individual who is moved by it, that it enables him to maintain that *authority*, which is necessary for the public good. The scriptures express much the same. Authority over *Children* is necessary for the purpose of *Education*. "He that spareth his rod hateth his son". "Chasten thy son while there is hope, and let not thy "soul spare for his crying. "The rod and reproof "give wisdom". Prov. xiii. 34.—xix. 18.—xxix. 15. I need not repeat the improbability of this discipline being kept up without some feelings of anger. To the same purpose the Apostle to the Hebrews. "Whom "the Lord loveth he chasteneth, and scourgeth every "son whom he receiveth." Heb. xii. 6.—We may add the saying addressed to St. John, "as many as "I love, I rebuke and chasten". Rev. iii. 19.

Authority over *Servants* could scarcely be maintained without some emotion of resentment: the Law of Moses annexes a punishment to excess in the exercise of herile authority; but that of itself shews the lawfulness of correction inflicted by the Master, when not carried to excess. "If a man smite the eye of his servant, or "the eye of his maid, that it perish; he shall let him "go free for his eye's sake". Exod. xxi. 26. 27. and so of a tooth. But had he corrected him more moderately, no blame would have been supposed. A real fault in a servant has the nature of an injury, being contrary to agreements, express or tacit.

Our Lord says, "that servant which knew his Lord's "will, and prepared not himself, neither did according "to his will, shall be beaten with many stripes. But "he that knew not, and did commit things worthy of "stripes, shall be beaten with few stripes". Luke xii. 47. 48. Here the lawfulness of correction, (which, as before, cannot be supposed to be executed without some angry emotions), is clearly taken for granted, as

a thing out of all question; which it seems also to be in those scriptures where masters are exhorted to make a mild and gentle use of the power that is discretionary. And Solomon says, "A servant will not be corrected by "words: for though he understand he will not an-"swer". Prov. xxix. 19.

Authority over *Subjects* is, in scripture, connected with wrath. "The King's wrath is as the roaring of a "Lion". Prov. xix. 12. The Magistrate is "the "Minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath upon "him that doeth evil. Wherefore ye must needs be "subject, not only for wrath, but also for conscience "sake." Rom. xiii. 4. 5.

Even over *religious* Societies authority cannot be maintained without some sharpness and vehemence. St. Paul tells the Corinthians that one reason why he did not visit them, was, his desire to spare them, to forbear that severity which their conduct would have demanded. And the warmth with which he introduces this reason, may be worthy of remark. "I call God for a record "upon my soul, that to spare you, I came not as yet "unto Corinth".—And he adds afterwards, in conclu-sion, "if I come again I will not spare". 2 Cor. i. 23. and xiii. 2.

18. We have said, that one good effect of anger is to guarding *Benevolence* from excess or perversion. This reminds us of some scriptural expressions; besides those already mentioned, relative to parental fondness. One passage is strong against the idolatrous prophet; the anger excited by his pernicious influence must not be softened by unreasonable compassion. "Thou shalt "not consent unto him, nor hearken unto him; nei-"ther shall thine eye pity him, neither shalt thou "spare, neither shalt thou conceal him; but thou shalt "surely kill him." Deut. xiii. 8. 9. There are ma-ny other expressions of like import. I will only pro-duce one more. "Go ye after him through the city, and "smite: let not your eye spare, neither have ye pity." Ezek. ix. v. see Deut. xix. 21. The injunction of our Saviour, "Give not that which is holy unto the

22. The good of anger to the *Object* of it consists chiefly in its preventing him from running into wrong conduct; this it frequently does by punishment, but of that we have already spoken; what we have now most immediately in view is, the threatened displeasure of good men, when any propensity to offend appears in those, over whom they have any influence. This threatened displeasure co-operates with the *conscience* of those who are in danger of offending; and makes an impression merely by looks and gestures.

What is said, of this sort, relative to the *Deity*, is easily applicable to men; as indeed it is borrowed from things human. "I will set mine eyes upon them for "evil, and not for good". Amos ix. 4. thus saith the Lord; and these words, with other expressions Lev. xvii. 10.—Jer. xliv. 11. about God's setting his face against wickedness, are perfectly analogous to that of which we are speaking; and shew, that the sacred writers recognized the force of it. And with regard to the difference between good and bad men, as to sentiments of submission which they excite; that passage of the Psalmist is apposite; and applies equally to God and Man; "there is mercy with thee; therefore shalt thou be feared." Psalm cxxx. 4.

Jehovah says of the house of Eli, "I will judge his "house for ever for the iniquity which he knoweth: "because his Sons made themselves vile, and (accord-"ing to the marginal reading) he frowned not on "them". 1 Sam. iii. 13. Had this venerable old man frowned on his sons when they seemed likely to make themselves vile, he would have preserved his house from eternal degradation.—In the text we read, "and he "restrained them not". Restraint would have been the effect of threatened displeasure. What Solomon says is to our purpose: "The north wind driveth away "rain: so doth an angry countenance a backbiting "tongue". Prov. xxv. 23. Job says, "mine enemy "sharpeneth his eyes upon me:" Job xvi. 9. he who could feel that, must be sensible to the menacing countenance of a worthy and friendly man.

When masters are exhorted *(f)* to moderate

threatening their servants; and parents to abstain from provoking their childen to wrath, Eph. vi. 4. 9. the thing against which they are cautioned is an excess. And in giving this caution the Apostle takes for granted that in moderation that would be right and useful, which he blames when in the extreme. Some magisterial threats, some parental frowns would have been *required* by the Apostle, had he observed a negligence or supineness in those to whom he addressed himself: what he did observe was furious and arrogant imperiousness to servants, and peevish severity to children; both void of that mild, gentle, benevolent spirit, which it becomes the Christian to manifest in every relation of human Life.

23. We now come to the *hurtful effects* of Resentment; but as there can be no doubt of their being described in scripture, we need not enlarge upon them, as we have been obliged to do on the beneficial effects. In *general*, hurtful effects of every passion are to be considered as the work of *man:* according to what is said in the Book of Ecclesiastes, "God hath made man "upright; but they have sought out many inventions". Eccles. vii. 29. That these bad effects are considered as *avoidable*, appears from our being ordered to put them off; and that the sorts of anger which we are to put off are abuses actually prevailing, appears from the circumstances mentioned in describing anger: for these we might refer to passages already quoted; as where avenging and bearing a grudge are forbidden; Lev. xix. 18. or where we are ordered to cease from wrath, lest we should be moved to do evil; Psalm xxxvii. 8. but we will endeavour to avoid repetition. Nevertheless we may take Solomon's description of such anger as he blamed: "Wrath is cruel, and anger is outrageous". Prov. xxvii. 4.—"Anger resteth in the bosom of fools". Eccles. vii. 9. St. Paul is afraid lest he should find amongst his Corinthian disciples, "debates, envyings, "wraths, strifes, backbitings, whisperings, swellings, "tumults". 2 Cor. xii. 20. He reckons amongst the works of the flesh, variance, wrath, strife, and murders. Gal. v. 20, 21. He commands his converts to put away,

and to put off, all, all bitterness, wrath, anger, clamour, though he says "the wrath of *God* cometh on the "children of disobedience", Eph. iv. 31.—Col. iii. 6, 8. which shews that wrath is not essentially evil. When the faults are specified which Christian converts are expected to put away, these faults are always meant, which they actually had (taken collectively) before conversion, either as Jews or heathens; the way therefore to get a right idea of any particular fault mentioned, is not to take the word expressing it in its strict literal or verbal sense; but according to the kind and degree of it prevailing in fact. The Jews had been carnal, both in their religion and morals; John iii. 6.—1 Cor. iii. 3.—Gal. v. 13, 17, 24. the Heathens had been desperately vicious. Rom. i. 24, to the end. Col. iii. 7.

24. Some evil effects of anger, when abused, fall upon the *object* of the passion: but texts need not be produced to prove that the scriptures recognize these, because every text, in which the abuse of anger is forbidden, or discouraged, implies their existence. When anger is called cruel or outrageous, it must be supposed to inflict evil on its object; and so when it is said to produce strifes, tumults and murders. "Surely Op-"pression maketh a wise man mad". Eccles. vii. 7. says Solomon. And this applies to the evils of anger as they affect the *world* at large. When anger is blamed in scripture, there is in reality, an evil pointed out, and a cause of that evil assigned; but such cause and effect are only mentioned popularly, not linked together systematically, in a scientifical manner. What that friendly harmony is, which we have said anger interrupts, the Psalmist could not but feel, when he says, "It is "not an open enemy that hath done me this dishonour, "for then I could have borne it;"—"but it was even "thou, my companion, my guide and mine own fami-"liar friend. We took sweet counsel together, and "walked in the house of God as friends". Psalm lv. 12, 14, 15.

And the scripture by calling philanthrophy love of our *neighbour*, acknowledges the power of *intercourse* in generating kind affections. *Social commerce*, for

purposes of justice, or goodness, is also spoken of in such a manner as to shew the mischief of disturbing it. St. Paul tells us we are members one of another, Eph. iv. 25. and St. Peter enjoins our being all subject one to another: 1 Pet. v. 5. How anger may disturb this mutual dependance is not unfrequently intimated. "A "wrathful man stirreth up strife". Prov. xv. 18. and xvii. 19. "Strife causeth trangression". "The "wrath of man worketh not the righteousness of "God". *Contentions* are called "debates", and discouraged, or forbidden: those at law are spoken of by St. Paul; and those at war by St. James. "There is "utterly a fault among you, because ye go to Law one "with another. Why do ye not rather take wrong? "Why do ye not suffer yourselves to be defrauded"? 1 Cor. vi. 7.—"From whence come wars and fightings "amongst you? come they not hence, even of your "lusts that war in your members"? James iv. 1.

The continual *growth* of Resentment is described in the book of Proverbs; "The beginning of strife is as "when one letteth out water". Prov. xvii. 14. To which might be added, what has before occurred, about bearing a grudge, and anger resting in the bosom of fools. The means also by which the flame of discord is hindered from dying away, are particularly mentioned. "Where no wood is there the fire goeth out; "so where there is no tale-bearer the strife ceaseth. "As coals are to burning coals, and wood to fire; so is "a contentious man to kindle strife". Prov. xxvi. "20, 21. And when we consider, that the causes of anger and strife here mentioned are also the effects of them, we cannot be at a loss to conceive, that they may continually multiply. If they produce that which engenders the same, there can be no limit to their increase. Nay should the bad consequences arising from vicious anger be once stopped, yet the angry man is but too apt to begin all again, by fresh excesses. "A man "of great wrath shall suffer punishment: for if thou "deliver him, yet thou must do it again". Prov. xix. 19.

The *ordinary* ill offices arising from faulty anger are

included in those things which we are commanded to put away; amongst which evil-speaking, with malice, and blasphemy, (meaning detraction) are particularly mentioned. As to the bad effects of vicious resentment on the *angry*, it will be sufficient if we found only the name of "bitterness"; "the heart knoweth his "own bitterness", Prov. xiv. 10.—Gal. v. (compare verse 20 with 22.) but can never know it otherwise than as misery: and therefore this feeling is opposed to the sentiment of "joy."

Nor can hardness of heart be a more pleasing feel. And when anger is vicious, and so makes men do wrong things, deserving vengeance and detestation, then may we say of the angry man, that he fleeth "when no man pursueth"; Prov. xxviii. 1. that he is afraid where no fear is: Psalm liii. 6. much more when he sees revenge actually at hand, ready to strike a deadly blow.

25. Having taken notice of the effects of resentment, we may recollect what was said about the *regulation* of it: comparing it with the expressions of scripture. If we want to have only one rule to follow, it should be this; let anger always act under the direction of *benevolence*. When our Lord says, "I say unto you "love your enemies", Matt. v. 44. his meaning must be the same. And what St. Paul calls *Charity* is not popularly distinguished from what we now call benevolence: when he tells us that this virtue "suffereth long, "and is kind",—"is not easily provoked",—"beareth "all things"—"endureth all things", 1 Cor. ch. xiii. it is the same thing as saying, that enlarged and enlightened benevolence should be our guide with regard to what we ought to fear, and what provocation we ought to indulge.

As to the question whether we should, if it were in our power, *annihilate* anger, nothing more need be produced than what appeared in considering its good effects; every instance of its good effects, in any particular situation of things, is an argument against destroying all its powers, whilst that situation continues. And

what was lately observed may be of use here, that when the Christian converts were commanded to put away anger and wrath, with their evil consequences, a comparison was really instituted, between what they had been before conversion, and what was expected of them in their new character. And therefore, that what was really ordered to be put off was *that* vice to which they had actually been habituated; they were so to regulate every passion that it should not stand in the way of any duty. *(g)* There was no more occasion to caution men against annihilating the passion of anger, than to caution them against leaving the race of mankind to die away, and vanish from the earth.

We gave an idea of a man's giving the *rein* to his resentment, as far as it would assist him in doing his Duty, and in maintaining order, without suffering it to hurry him beyond the bounds which his reason prescribed; and this idea is sufficiently supported by the sacred writers, ascribing such conduct to the Deity; which they never would have done, if they had thought it essentially vicious. Nor must it be said, that the Deity could restrain what might overpower human weakness; if we conceive the Deity to have human passions, we must be uniform, and ascribe to him also human government of those passions: we must not confound figurative language with plain; we must not make the same agent, in the same train of thought, to be in some respects man, and in others God. If any one is afraid to depend upon this argument, he may recollect what is said concerning God's *repenting* that he had made man, Gen. vi. 6. And that he had made Saul king. 1 Sam. xv. 35.—Or he may consider that Christ, who is our pattern, and St. Paul who was inspired, have left us instances of Indignation and Resentment. How cautious every man should be, lest his passions hurry him into sin, has been attentively laid down, Part i. 40. where it was observed, that it would be imprudent in ordinary men to give scope to their warmer passions. See also Part v. 22.

That anger is not *invincible* appears sufficiently from our being commanded to put it away; and from the

general declaration, that God will not suffer men to be tempted above that they are able, but will with the temptation make a way to escape, that they may be able to bear it: 1 Cor. x. 13. this declaration includes trials of every kind, bodily and spiritual.

26. We may come then to those practical *Rules* which seemed likely to suggest right methods of conducting ourselves in cases of provocation to anger, when without them we might have been unthinkingly carried into vicious conduct.

The first was, to furnish ourselves with good *principles* and resolutions. The two great pillars of Virtue, under the Christian œconomy are *Faith* and *Love:* the former well adapted to make us endure all things, the latter to make us conciliate the kind affections of our brethren, and interpret their actions with mildness and candor. St. Paul intimates to the Colossians, that the way to be presented to God "unblameable and unreproveable in his sight," is to "continue in the faith grounded and settled". Col. i. 22, 23. He prays ardently for the Ephesians, that they may be rooted and "grounded in love". Eph. iii. 17. And when we are possessed of these principles in some degree, we must carefully look forward to the dangers which we may have to encounter; we must provide forces sufficient to oppose any host that may come to attack us: we must compute exactly what fortifications we may have occasion to construct, Luke xiv. 28—32. lest we should expose ourselves to the sarcastic taunt, "this man began to build, and was not able to finish".

27. *Suspending* the indulgence of our resentment is perfectly agreeable to those parts of scripture, where we are commanded to be slow to anger; not to be easily provoked. The wise man says, "the discretion of a "man deferreth his anger". Prov. xix. 11. "Go not "forth hastily to strive, lest thou know not what to do "in the end thereof". "He that hath no rule over his "own spirit is like a city that is broken down, and "without walls".

28. In order to avoid being guided by *prejudice*,

we should learn to discern genuine *worth*. St. Paul prays that the Philippians "may approve things that "are excellent". Phil. i. 10. And what St. John says, with regard to some popular notions tending to exclude solid virtue, should be often applied. "Little children "let no man deceive you; he that doeth righteous- "ness is righteous". That man is most to be esteemed, whose conduct will bear to be most strictly examined by the eternal rules of virtue. This would apply to that indulgence of resentment on principles of false honour. When we are dazzled by a false glare of good, we shall be the more ready to palliate and overlook specious evil; as well as to undervalue humble, unpretending merit. The scriptures speak of those wicked hypocrites, who "for a shew make long prayers, "though they devour widows' houses"; Luke xx. 47. and of some, who desiring "to make a fair shew in "the flesh", obstruct that religion which is seated in the heart. At the same time holy writ warns us against rash judgment. All false notions of merit have a great influence upon the most moral sort of Resentment, Indignation; and all tend to hurry us into treating men in such ways as will occasion vexation and remorse.

29. We are countenanced by Scripture in recommending the *doing of good* even before our sentiments are thoroughly rectified. "If thou meet thine enemy's "ox or his ass going astray, thou shalt surely bring it "back again". And so of giving assistance when the beast of burden of the man that hateth us is seen lying under his burden. Exod. xxiii. 4, 5. Solomon says, "If thine enemy be hungry, give him bread to eat: "and if he be thirsty, give him water to drink": Prov. xxv. 21, which precept is cited and adopted by St. Paul, Rom. xii. 20. and will hereafter be considered more particularly.

30. We were to be aware of treating every little variance as settled *enmity*; because the best friends have sometimes misunderstandings, which prove to be only transitory. To this may be be referred the directions already cited, to be "slow to wrath"; not to let the sun go down upon our wrath. Here also we may

introduce that excellent remark, " A soft answer turn-
" eth away wrath ; but grievous words stir up anger". Prov. xv. 1.—And as first appearances cause danger, when if they were born patiently, all would end well, we may add, " Better is the end of a thing than the " beginning thereof; and the patient in spirit is better " than the proud in spirit. Be not hasty in thy spirit " to be angry". Eccles. vii. 8, 9. St Paul's advice to the Colossians can no where be introduced amiss on our present subject ; " forbearing one another and for-
" giving one another, if any man have a quarrel (or complaint, *querela*,) " against any: even as Christ for-
" gave you, so also do ye."

31. We were to be cautious lest when we indulge our displeasure towards others, our dissatisfaction should really be with *ourselves*. To this is applicable whatever is said in scripture concerning *reproof* as causing resentment. " Reprove not a scorner, lest he hate thee". Prov. ix. 8. And to the same purpose we are directed by our Lord not to give " that which is holy unto the " dogs", lest they turn again and rend us. Matt. vii. 6. St. Paul has the same thought when he asks the Galatians, " am I therefore become your enemy because " I tell you the truth" ? Gal. iv. 16. Reproof and friendly advice are things in themselves so precious, and so deserving of approbation and gratitude, that when men resent them, they must be influenced by some inward vexation and anger at themselves ; either because they have such faults as are pointed out to them ; or because they are supposed to have them ; or perhaps because they are at the same time unwilling to part from them, and ashamed to retain them.

32. The last rule recommended was, that we should not be rash in *adopting* the resentments of our *friends :* though it was confessed, that a lively interest in the common concerns of our friends, if on good principles, and under due regulation, is praiseworthy. It is not inconsistent with our idea of Jehovah, that he should declare, " I will be an enemy unto thine ene-
" mies"; Exod. xxiii. 32. nor with our veneration for St. Paul, that he should ask, " who is offended and I burn

" not?" 2 Cor. xi. 29.—Neither do we hesitate when we find Moses avenging an Israelite that was oppressed, and smiting his oppressors. Acts vii. 24. In these cases we feel security about the rectitude of the sympathy which was indulged; but in ordinary cases, by rashly entering into quarrels, we make ourselves accessaries to vice and injury; as well as involve ourselves imprudently in unnecessary dangers and difficulties. Such was Solomon's idea when he said, " A violent " man enticeth his neighbour, and leadeth him into the " way that is not good"; Prov. xvi. 29.—" He that " passeth by, and meddleth (or is enraged) with strife " belonging not to him, is like one that taketh a dog by " the ears". Prov. xxvi. 17. Moreover, the rashness here meant incurs that blame which is annexed to sowing discord": Prov. vi. 14, 19. for nothing spreads discord more than mens taking up, lightly and indiscriminately, the quarrels of their friends.

Such are the *rules* which were laid down for our practice. As they are supported by scripture, and as our comparisons of Scripture with the remarks arising from observation, have now run out into considerable length, it may be as well to *abridge* the remainder; especially as many of the passages which we have quoted, apply to more points than one; and therefore, a continuation of our plan might occasion repetitions, which would become tedious.

33. The *hindrances* to observing good practical rules may be reduced to some way of over-valuing and therefore sparing *ourselves:* to obviate which we should request the free advice of our friends: " only by pride " cometh contention: but with the well advised is " wisdom". " He that is of a proud heart stirreth up " strife". " Faithful are the wounds of a friend: but " the kisses of an enemy are deceitful". Prov. xiii. 10. and xxviii. 25.—xxvii. 6. That in order to avoid the influence of self-deceit we should *examine ourselves*, is the direction of St. Paul. " Examine yourselves whe- " ther ye be in the faith, prove your own selves". 2 Cor. xiii. 5. And it was to answer the same purpose

that the Psalmist prayed to his God to examine him. "Examine me O Lord, and prove me: try out my "reins and my heart". Psalm xxvi. 2. "Try me, "O God, and seek the ground of my heart: prove me, "and examine my thoughts". Psalm cxxxix: 23.

Nor need we want scriptural caution against *hypocrisy* in the expression of anger. "The words of his "mouth were softer than butter, having war in his "heart: his words were smoother than oil, and yet be "they very swords". Psalm lv. 22. This caution is not only against being deceived by the smooth anger of others, but against deceiving ourselves: for a hypocrite will sometimes say,, 'I did not give the man an angry word', when he provoked the person he addressed, as as much as he could; and when his affected gentleness aggravated the provocation. See Jer. xvii. 9.

34. In order to illustrate what we laid down, we supposed some *Objections* to be urged against it. One, that the directions were so *indefinite* as to be liable to much *evasion*. Our answer to this belonged as much to scripture as to the Law of Nature. Honesty and fairness of heart and mind are as necessary for the performance of revealed duties as any others: the seed sown in the good ground corresponds to those, who "in an *honest* and good *heart*, having heard the word, "keep it, and bring forth fruit with patience". Luke viii. 15. If Duties are enjoined in ever so plain a manner, there will always be room for the "testimony of "our conscience, that in simplicity and godly sincerity, "not with fleshly wisdom", 2 Cor. i. 12. we have performed them.

35. Another objection was, that forgiving injuries is *impracticable*, because if we were known to act on such a principle, our rights, in person and property, would be continually invaded. Our first answer to this was, that punishment is not always wrong; the truth of which has been abundantly proved from Scripture. We next balanced *motives*, to forbear injuries and to repeat them, on the different suppositions of punishment and forgiveness; and we found the balance to preponderate in favour of forgiveness:—but this rea-

soning wants no confirmation from scripture; because it is a defence of the Christian doctrines of loving enemies and pardoning offenders; and would be as proper in a commentary on the New Testament, as in a system of morality. We may nevertheless mention a few passages by the way.

We have said that the fear of man is an unsteady principle of action; this brings to mind that passage where religious fear is compared with the fear of man: "fear not them which kill the body, but are not able "to kill the soul: but rather fear him which is able to "destroy both body and soul in Hell". A passage of much the same import with ours, if taken in one light; for ours describes the fear of God as permanent, and as a solid ground of good conduct; but the fear of Man as fragile and not to be depended upon, though it sometimes may be used as a motive.

36. Mutual natural *benevolence*, which we said would return if not prevented, seems implied in such precepts as the following; "love as brethren".—"Be "kindly affectioned one to another with brotherly "love". 1 Pet. iii. 8. Rom. xii. 10. "A friend loveth "at all times". Prov. xvii. 17. or uniform love is the mark of a friendly disposition.

The *gratitude* and affection arising from being forgiven is expressed in St. Luke's account of two debtors, intended to convey a general sentiment. "which of "them will love him most?"—"I suppose that he to "whom he forgave most".—"Thou hast rightly "judged". Luke vii. 42, 43.

The *prudence* of connexions with the placable man is thus supported: "Make no friendship with an angry man: and "with a furious man thou shalt not go", Prov. xxii. 24.

That a merciful being may even *intimidate*, appears from a passage already produced; "There is mercy "with thee; therefore shalt thou be feared". See also Rom. ii. 4.

How discord naturally *grows* and spreads, has been

already shewn; and what was adduced shews the reasonableness of the sacred precept. "Say not, I will do "so to him as he hath done to me: I will render to a "man according to his work". Prov, xxiv. 29.

The propriety of pardoning a man of a *warm but generous* temper has appeared; both under the rule for suspending punishment, and under that for endeavouring to get just notions of merit, and of mens true character.

The distinction between *public* and *private* punishment is very clear in the holy scriptures. The design of a city of refuge was to prevent the avenger from inflicting private punishment before public could be procured: "that the man-slayer die not, until he stand "before the congregation in judgment". Numb. xxxv. 12. In one case it has appeared that the private avenger is made, as it were, the executioner under public authority. Deut. xix. 12. And St. Paul, though he justifies Rulers or Magistrates as ministers of God, when they act as avengers to execute wrath on those that do evil, Rom. xiii. 4, 5. yet says to private individuals, "avenge not yourselves". Rom. xii. 19.

37. I concluded my remarks taken from fact with a kind of *recapitulation*; but that would of course consist chiefly of the substance of what had gone before it. Some few additional ideas might occur.

Seeming injuries which we are inclined to punish, may be no injuries. Let us not deserve to have it said of us, "Behold he findeth occasions against me; he "counteth me for his enemy". Job. xxxiii. 10. let us rather take the advice of Solomon, "Strive not with a "man without cause, if he have done thee no harm". Prov. iii. 30. And suppose harm done, yet if not meant, let us accept the same kind of Apology which St. Paul offered; "I wist not, Brethren, that he was the High "Priest. For it is written, "Thou shalt not speak "evil of the ruler of thy people". Acts xxiii. 5. He who will cite authorities against himself, merits our indulgence.

If we are convinced that we suffer, yet if there is room for doubt whether we suffer wrongfully let us remember the Housholder who hired labourers into his vineyard; "Friend, I do thee no wrong". Matt. xx. 13. This plea was in all reason sufficient to secure peace; though we are too apt to imagine, that we are injured if we receive less from free bounty than other men: and to look upon that as an injury, which is only a deprivation of a benefit that we had been long accustomed to enjoy.

Should a man have injured us beyond dispute, and should he shew strong marks of sincere contrition; let us remember the Servant-Debtor: let us by all means avoid that cutting reproach of the Lord, to whom the debt was owing; "O thou wicked servant, I forgave "thee all that debt, because thou desirest me; shouldest "not thou also have had compassion on thy fellow-"servant, even as I had pity on thee?" Matt. xviii. 32, 33. Let this excellent parable make us cautious of over-rating any injury offered to us, and earnest, when we think it necessary to punish, in chusing the punishment most likely to do good. And after all our caution, let us be aware, that the best punishment we can chuse may not answer the good purpose intended; such is the "hardness and impenitent heart" Rom. ii. 5. of some men:—nay, that a punishment strictly just, may be *cruel*, according to the passage of the Parable now quoted, and therefore unbecoming when inflicted by frail and fallible beings. And not only cruelty may prompt us to punish, but, what seems less obvious, *cowardice*; that the merciful may be brave, cannot be doubted by those who contemplate our blessed Lord and his first Martyr St. Stephen in their dying moments. And let us not forget, that we are not only bound to regard ourselves, but the *general good* of the world: "if ye bite and devour one another", says St. Paul, "take heed that ye be not consumed one of another". Gal. v. 15. "A wrathful man stirreth up strife"; and we have seen, that "the beginning of strife is as when one letteth out water", Prov. xv. 18, and xvii. 14.

Let the examples which we meet with in holy writ,

convince us, that any disgrace which attaches to submission and condescension in the injured, is only in the eyes of the low and vulgar; that it is only a temporary stain, soon evaporates, and leaves pure and genuine brightness behind it, for ever.

Lastly. If notwithstanding all that has been said, offenders should presume to *claim* that indulgence which we have been studying the means of providing for them, the Parable of the Labourers in the Vineyard may again be called to our aid: there the just and generous Housholder insists upon being the judge of his own beneficence; by whatever rules he may be guided in the sight of God, and before his own conscience. If then we are, at any time, in the situation of those who have reason to desire forgiveness, let not our *eye* be evil; let us not take wrong and confused views of the case before us; Matt. vi. 22, 23. and xx. 15. lest we begin dissentions which we can never justify, and which will never have an end; and so involve ourselves in perplexity and guilt, which even death itself may be unable to expiate.

END OF PART VI.

Malevolent Sentiments.

PART VII.

RESENTMENT.

FOUR PASSAGES OF SCRIPTURE.

1. WE have now made some remarks on the passion of anger, or resentment, gathered from facts and from the nature of man; we have also compared those remarks with various expressions dispersed through the sacred writings; but still something remains. There are passages of scripture so *peculiar to revelation*, that they have nothing analogous to them in natural Law, as hitherto laid down; these require a *separate* consideration. We will begin with Matt. v. 21, 22.

2. The first enquiry which it is natural to make, is, what particular men are signified by "*them of old* "*time*"? I suppose those persons to be meant, from whom the Scribes and Pharisees of our Saviour's time had received their *Traditions:* these might be called men "of old time", because Traditions are by some Jews traced up as high as to the time of the delivery of the Law on Mount Sinai. Some traditions seem to have been innocent, or useful; but others were hurtful and blamable. Evasions of the Law, or unjustifiable and burthensome additions, or licentious restrictions. The design of our Saviour's *Sermon on the Mount* seems to

have been, to correct the wrong traditional notions of the Jews: or of the Scribes and Pharisees, as priding themselves on distinguished skill in Tradition: an additional purpose, might be, to take the opportunity of restoring the purity of the Mosaic Law; and also of introducing some Christian morality. The first instance in which our Saviour says that the righteousness of Christians must exceed that of the Scribes and Phraisies, is contained in the words now under consideration. In general we should understand, that the notion which our Lord corrects, is not in the Law of Moses, but some abuse or *perversion* of that Law. It is indeed certain, that the Law of Moses does *say*, "Thou shalt not kill"; but in the reference made by Christ we are to understand the commandment, not as meant by Moses, or as comprehending all steps leading to murder, all dispositions of a murderous sort; with all the guilt attending them; but as interpreted by Tradition, as excluding every thing but the crime of actual murder, and the sentence or condemnation of the Jewish Judgment. This is the meaning of the Text taken altogether. The difference between this doctrine being taught *by* them of old time, and *to* them, does not seem to be material; because whatever traditional doctrines were taught to the Jews of any one generation, were taught by them to the next.

Take the words "Thou shalt not kill", in their literal sense, and suppose nothing forbidden but what is expressed, and men are permitted to hire assassins, to let loose wild beasts, to wound, to maim; and if nothing was to be dreaded but the Jewish Judgment, then any one who could confound evidence, or suborn witnesses, was free from guilt. Our Lord's doctrine is so directly opposed to such folly as this, that we may be confident it is implied; especially if we compare the other notions corrected with that before us. The morality of the Gospel is more perfect than that of the Law of Moses; but we can in no degree conceive that such a Lawgiver, and such a religious teacher as Moses, should have intended the strict and literal sense of "Thou shalt not "kill" for its whole meaning. It must have been meant for a brief prohibition of all *personal* injury.

And we might add, of all *inclination* to personal injury, unless we rather chose to consider the tenth commandment as intended to regulate sentiment and inclination of every kind; as well as that which immediately tends to infringe the Laws of Property. (For Traditions, see my Lectures in Divinity, Book iv. on Article vi. Sect. iii.)

3. Our Saviour then forbade not only murder, but all *approaches* to it; and to every approach he annexed a *punishment* proportioned to its guilt. Earthly tribunals might do what they were able; but to prevent sins of secrecy, some sanction was wanted, which might reach the Heart. This I take to be the general meaning of the passage: the particular offences and punishments which our Lord specifies, are expressed in terms peculiar to those to whom he spoke; but seem rather to be of the nature of intimations, and comparisons, or *allusions*, than literal delineations of facts. Our Lord often spoke obscurely, sometimes almost ænigmatically; leaving room for after thought; for recollection and consideration: and no doubt for the wisest reasons. Nevertheless it may be proper to take such information relative to the particulars as antiquity affords.

Our Lord's first declaration is this; "But I say unto "you, whoever is angry with his brother without a cause, shall be in danger of the judgment:" That he did not mean literally an earthly tribunal, appears sufficiently from hence, that no earthly tribunal can take cognizance of the offence: an earthly tribunal might condemn a man for mischievous *acts* caused by anger, but not for being angry without a cause. The meaning therefore is, that not only actual murder is punishable, but such a disposition as leads men to it, or to any violence approaching to murder. And though the mere disposition cannot incur *human* punishment, yet there shall be a judgment at the last day, as much to be dreaded as any judgment of the Jews, which will be perfectly able to take cognizance of the guilt of needless anger.

We are told, *(a)* that what is here called the *Judgment* was amongst the Jews a Court of twenty three

Judges, who could inflict punishments; some sorts of capital punishments, but not the most painful.

To denounce such punishment as Christ denounced belongs to the office of a religious teacher; and had Moses been rightly explained, he would have come much nearer to it than he was understood to come by the Scribes and Pharisees.

We should here notice the expression of St. John; as connecting actual murder with the sentiments which lead to it; and as placing the punishment in a future world. "Whosoever hateth his brother is a murderer; "and ye know that no murderer hath eternal Life "abiding in him". 1 John iii. 15.

4. Our Saviour proceeds;—"whosoever shall say "to his Brother, Raca, shall be in danger of the Coun- "cil". The Council, or Sanhedrim, was the highest Court of Judicature amongst the Jews; could inflict capital punishments, the most painful and ignominious. *(b)* —*Raca* means vain, empty, insignificant, despicable: he who calls any one Raca, would make him an object of *contempt:* certainly a very likely thing to begin enmity; and enmity is apt to occasion violence.

Brother means Israelite, as opposed to stranger: under Christ these coincide; though a Christian may be opposed to a Heathen, as a Brother to an alien: the meaning then of this part of the text seems to be, 'you 'esteem your *Council* a most solemn Court of Judica- 'ture; and would be very unwilling to come under its 'condemnation; but I give you assurance, that though 'you may avoid actual murder, yet if you treat your 'brother in such an insolent and contemptuous manner 'as must naturally tend to provoke him to anger, and 'drive him to desperate measures, a punishment will 'await you, at least as much to be dreaded as any which 'even the Sanhedrim could inflict'.

5. The last declaration is this; "Whosoever shall "say, Thou fool, shall be in danger of hell fire". Here both the punishment and the offence require some explanation. There was a pleasant Valley near Jerusa-

lem, which, in very ancient times, belonged to the son of Hinnom: Jos. xv. 8. it afterwards acquiredthe name of *Gehenna:* becauseit was a pleasant scene, it was chosen for the purpose of sacrificing; sacrifices were there offered to *Moloch*, the Idol of the Ammonites, and to other Idols: these rites were of the most savage and barbarous nature: human sacrifices, sacrifices of children; whose cries and shrieks were so piercing, that drums or tabors were beat to drown the dreadful noise; whence the word *Tophet*, which signifies a drum or tabor, came to be used, with relation to this scene Any heathen sacrifices would have made the place an abomination to the Jews, but such as these made it particularly odious and detestable. And therefore constant fires were kept in it, in later ages, *(c)* and every thing was thrown into them which could hinder men from feeling any degree of idolatrous veneration. Thus a Gehenna of fire, meant properly the Valley of Hinnom with fires in it: but the combination of ideas connected with it, made it to be conceived as *resembling* the fire of Hell. And it may be doubted whether our Translation of the Bible would not have been as useful and intelligible as it now is, if, instead of "shall be in danger "of hell fire" we had read, 'shall be in danger of a 'Gehenna of fire'; for the metaphor, or comparison, would then have been evident. There was no such legal punishment amongst the Jews as burning in the Gehenna of fire, or in the Valley of Hinnom; which is another proof that our Saviour meant to denounce invisible punishments; but if any person had been desirous to fix on that punishment which would excite the greatest dread and horror in the mind of a Jew, he could not have imagined any thing more likely to answer his purpose than burning in the Valley of Hinnom. Our Lord therefore shewed that he knew what was in man, when he intimated punishment analogous to this.

The word *Fool* seems in Scripture to mean, a man without principles, of Virtue or Religion. "The fool "hath said in his heart their is no God". Psalm xiv. 1. "It is abomination to fools to depart from evil". Prov. xiii. 19. A fool is one abandoned and flagitious;

9. In the preceding instance we had no need to dwell on the meaning and force of the Law of Moses; but to do so in the present instance will not be useless. There are *three* passages of the Law, to which our Lord might refer: let us set them fairly before us. "If men "strive, and hurt a woman with child, so that her fruit "depart from her, and yet no mischief follow; he shall "be surely punished, according as the woman's hus- "band will lay upon him; and he shall pay as the judges "determine. And if any mischief follow, then thou shalt "give life for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for "hand, foot for foot, burning for burning, wound for "wound, stripe for stripe". Exod. xxi. 22, 25. Here though two or more persons are mentioned as striving, or fighting, yet one is distinguished as a culprit, to be tried and punished. We cannot but suppose that the purpose of the trial must be, to determine the evil which the pregnant woman suffered, and the degree of malice, or culpable negligence, which occasioned her sufferings. If "no mischief follow", means probably, if no *farther* evil attends the attack than is necessarily implied in the nature of the case: then the Judges, with the Husband, are to impose a fine, at their discretion. But if, besides being so terrified as to bring forth prematurely, the woman receives any particular personal hurt, the man who attacked her might be condemned to suffer the same. And, as we must understand the man to be convicted of a malicious intention, or of a total subjection to his furious passion, this punishment cannot be considered as unreasonably severe. The man who strikes a pregnant woman, must be brutally savage; cruel, and cowardly; he injures two human beings at once, and those incapable of making any defence, or resistance.

10. Let us take next the case concerning the false witness. "If a false witness rise up against any man "to testify against him that which is wrong"; "Then "shall ye do unto him as he had thought to have done "unto his brother". "And thine eye shall not pity; "but life shall go for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, "hand for hand, foot for foot". Deut. xix. see from ver. 16 to the end. Here again the crime punished by

retaliation is of no ordinary heinousness. What murder can imply more determined villainy than one by false accusation? how abandoned must that man be, who can pursue a design of taking away the life of an innocent person, in spite of compunction and remorse, through all the forms of judicial evidence!—And what is true of murder is applicable to maiming, in any way, by means of false testimony. Can it be called any cruelty to deprive a man, in a course of justice, and on virtuous principles, intended for the public safety, of any bodily power, of which he had deprived, or endeavoured to deprive, another, in a manner the most iniquitous? violating not only personal rights, but all obligations ro justice, humanity, and veracity? acting with a most persevering barbarity, in spite of the most affecting solemnities, the sanction of oaths, and, most probably, the calmness of solitude?

11. We may now look at the third passage, to which Christ might refer in the words before us. "If "a man cause a blemish in his neighbour; as he hath "done, so shall it be done to him; Breach for breach, "eye for eye, tooth for tooth: as he hath caused a "blemish in a man, so shall it be done to him again". Lev. xxiv. 19, 20. There being only three passages of this sort in the Mosaic Law, and the two former relating to crimes uncommonly flagitious, I feel a prejudice that this third must do the same. Yet the idea of causing a blemish in a man does not immediately excite the same horror with that of striking and wounding a pregnant woman; or with that of deliberately killing or maiming by the hands of a public executioner. It must, however, be considered, that any one accused of causing a blemish must undergo a trial; and that the judges must determine how far the attack was malicious. If we put the case that your neighbour did, from a motive purely malevolent, destroy the natural use of any part of your body; of any of your limbs, or organs of sensation, so as to disfigure you, and leave a mark of deformity for life, there could not surely be any ground of just complaint, were he to lose the same faculty, as a punishment. Your bodily powers are as valuable to you as

his are to him; and by such a law, an offender might be brought to imagine, when he attacked you in any part, that he was in effect attacking himself; which might make him do as he would be done by, better than many arguments.

Had the case admitted of restitution, it is probable that he must have restored manifold; partly for compensation to you, and partly as criminal punishment. According to the sentence pronounced by David; "As "the Lord liveth, the man that hath done this thing "shall surely die: and he shall restore the lamb four-"ford, because he did this thing, and because he had "no pity". If, in the case of causing a blemish, the punishment of retaliation was suitable to the worst possible sorts of attack, that is sufficient to justify the Law of Moses, in that particular. In the Law of England, a civilized and Christian Country, malicious maiming or disfiguring is punished with death. (Blackstone, Book iv. Chap. 15.)

12. In the book of Genesis it is declared to Noah, "Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed". Gen: ix. 6. Which may either be meant as a foundation of criminal Law, or as a rule of God's providence. Whatever be its true meaning, it relates to all mankind. But the Law of Moses also makes murder a capital crime. "He that killeth any man "shall surely be put to death". Our Lord, however, in the passage which we are considering, does not refer to these declarations: he does not suppose murder to be committed.

13. *Retaliation* has this good quality, that it suits our feelings of equity; it suits, if I may so express myself, the symmetry of our imaginations concerning retribution: and whatever, in penal laws, is the cause of their being submitted to, peaceably and quietly, as fair and equitable, by the convict, and by spectators in general, is an excellence. Not that I would be understood to be recommending the Law of retaliation as a general Law for all ages, countries, cases: several things are against such a recommendation: the topics would

not suit a religious discourse; the law might suit one age or country and not another; in any age it might require many modifications from the discretion of Judges: I am inclined to think it had such modifications under the ancient Jews: Nay, I am of opinion, that it never could properly be called a general law, even under the Mosaic Government. The remarks which I have made, are intended only as introductory to a view of our Saviour's reference to retaliation in his Sermon on the Mount.

14. We have lately said, that the particular *errors* which our Lord obviated, in his Sermon on the Mount, when not expressed, are to be collected from the nature of the case, and from what he opposed to them. According to this, we should first consider to what errors the Jews were *liable*, in applying the Laws of retaliation, from the nature of the case.

They might err in supposing, that retaliation could be applied to *all* crimes: Whereas it seems to me, that it could never be applied rightly to any crimes but those *three* which have been specified. It is expressly provided, that if a master beats out a tooth of his servant, no retaliation shall take place; there shall *not* be tooth for tooth; the only penalty shall be the manumission of the slave, or servant. Exod. xxi. 27. Interpretation of penal statutes is strict at all times; but I would submit to the attentive reader of the Mosaic Law, or of any other law, whether a particular punishment being annexed expressly to a single crime does not imply, that the same punishment is *not* to be annexed to any other crime? Suppose it were ordered, in any code of criminal laws, that a person should be burnt at the stake for a particular species of murder, would not that Law, of itself, ordain, that no person should be burnt at the stake for any other species of murder? If, indeed, a certain punishment is expressly annexed to more particular crimes than one, all those crimes must incur that punishment but no others.

Again, the Jews might err in supposing, that, because three crimes had the punishment of retaliation annexed,

those three might *always* be punished by retaliation; but I apprehend this is not according to the true meaning of penal laws. The punishment specified is always the greatest punishment; and therefore for the worst cases; but it would be iniquity to inflict the greatest punishment on all acts coming under the same criminal denomination.

The Jews might also pervert the law by holding themselves under a necessity of punishing by retaliation: such an opinion would be erroneous; because a power of acting may be given when there is no *obligation* to act: and a penal law is intended to give a power of punishing, but not to impose an obligation to punish. I do not say that every judge can pass what sentence he thinks proper on the guilty, or acquit them at pleasure; but human affairs and the variety of circumstances which may attend a crime, do require, that a power of remitting punishment should be lodged somewhere; and there can be no obligation to punish, which shall make this power of remission entirely void.

15. So far we have spoken of the ways in which those in authority might err with respect to the Law of retaliation; but our Lord might also have regard to errors and perversions of *private individuals.*

It is an error into which private men might fall, to conceive, that a penal law is intended as a ground for their conduct in private life. And religious veneration for any law might increase this error, and tend to confirm men in it. We should think it absurd, if, because our Law annexes the punishment of suspension to forgery, any merchant was to strangle his agent when he believed him guilty of that crime; to what purpose serve courts of judicature, we should say, and laws of evidence, if private men are to be judges, accusers, witnesses, and executioners? Yet there is some appearance as if the Jews had, in their private capacity, inflicted something of the nature of retaliation.

Jews in private life would abuse the Law still more if they made it general; and applied it to *all* crimes.

They might also, from an injudicious veneration for their Law, determine, not only that they were permitted to retaliate, but that it was their *Duty* so to do; as was observed of persons in magisterial capacities.

Allied to which is the observation, that they might let such a notion influence those duties which are called Duties of imperfect obligation: their beneficence, charity, forgiveness: Duties which are indefinite, or indeterminate, because the circumstances attending them are too numerous and complicated to be regulated by written Laws.

16. Our conception of the errors hitherto mentioned arises from the Nature of the case: we were also to see what Jewish errors were implied in the precepts given by our Lord in order to correct them. And if we read the whole passage before us with any degree of attention, we must perceive, that the precepts of our Saviour do not either condemn or defend the penal Laws of Moses; do not relate to any public punishment, inflicted by any civil authority; but relate wholly to *private* virtue of individuals, and only to virtue of the *indefinite*, or indeterminate sort; to duties, which are called duties of imperfect obligation. The errors therefore, which he was aiming to correct, could not be any in the Law of Moses, nor the errors of any other Law; but some errors in *interpretation*, or in *conduct*. Possibly these errors might be, in some particulars, errors of those in authority, but they seem chiefly to have been the errors of private men. Magistrates might extend too far the punishments of retaliation, or make them too general; they might use them too constantly, or remit them too seldom; but our Lord had probably more immediately in his view, the unreasonable and cruel adherence of private men to laws in themselves partial, and the ordinary hardness of heart, which was but too prevalent amongst the Jewish people, and which might be one powerful cause of their perverting the Mosaic Law.

17. Our Saviour's directions then, which have some appearance of opposing the Law of Moses, being intended to make his disciples practise the indefinite

Duties of patience, and forbearance, it may be proper to observe, of indefinite duties in general, that at the time when they are performed, they are of a *discretionary* nature; that each man must judge, from his own circumstances, of the degree and manner in which he ought to perform them; though afterwards, he is accountable for the use which he makes of his discretion, and is as liable to be called into judgment for the right performance of these duties as of any others. But in the idea of discretion it is implied, that a thing is sometimes to be done, and sometimes not to be done; and and therefore discretionary virtues, by their very nature, are to be practised *occasionally*: on some occasions to be exercised, on others not, according to the best judgment which the agent can form, and as he will answer for his conduct at an heavenly tribunal: were the case otherwise, the duties would not be indefinite. Still there is a very strong obligation on every man, whilst he is deliberating about the practice of any indefinite duty, to convince himself, that he has an honest and serious desire to do his duty in the sight of God: and to perform what appears to him to be such, as faithfully and exactly, as if his part were marked out with all possible precision, and the neglect of it were attended with immediate punishment. He must determine, that nothing shall hinder him from performing the act under consideration but an honest persuasion that it would, on that occasion, do harm; and that his abstaining from it would be productive of the greatest good.

18. We seem now prepared to consider the *particular directions* which our Saviour gives, in opposition to the prevailing abuses of the Laws enjoining retaliation.

The disciple of Christ, when he is attacked, is to *yield* to evil: *(e)* instead of indulging his impetuosity to resist, he is to give way: so much *in general:* if he receives a *blow* on one cheek, he is to offer the other; if he is sued at law for one part of his *raiment*, he is to offer another: if he is *pressed* to guide or assist one who is upon a journey, for a certain distance, he is to offer to enlarge that distance. In our Lord's manner of

proposing these concessions we hazard little in saying, that there is intended to be much force and asperity; something of eloquent and indignant reproof, to lower pride, rouse the insensibility of the self-sufficient; to make an impression upon hardness of heart: if we take for granted that the same language would have been used to the humble, the gentle, merciful, teachable, or to the weakly indulgent, we shall be extremely rash. It should be moreover considered, whether what is enjoined in each concession is not to be regarded as a *condition* of peace; so that a man might say, on being insulted: 'this blow is hard to bear; but the peace and 'mutual kindness of men is above every thing: rather 'than be the author of discord, or rather than not check 'its devouring flames, I will submit to suffer much 'evil: if I myself am burnt or hurt in endeavouring to 'extinguish them, I will bear the misfortune; nay I 'will rejoice in it, when I behold my brethren in peace 'and safety'.

But, in strictness, it does not appear to me, that the *greatness* of the personal evil born by the insulted, is precisely the thing in view, nor therefore that, as many suppose, our Lord selects examples of injuries particularly *small*. Personal injuries, as such, had been treated before; the matter now in sight seems to have been the moral dangers arising from *sudden provocation;* and examples are selected with a view to that. A *blow* is always allowed an intolerable insult; nothing provokes rage more infallibly: resentment of a blow has occasioned many sanguinary contests, and destroyed many lives.

Law-suits also produce very great rancour; and no one can tell the impression which the first appearance of a law-suit makes upon the mind but he who has felt it. *Oppression* too makes men exceedingly indignant; whether it come from powerful individuals, or from civil authority: there is no violence, which it does not suggest, no revenge which it does not present to the imagination. On the whole we may ask, at what do the irascible more readily take fire than at these three

kinds of provocation? If we compared the effect of a considerable *loss*, free from affront or insult, with the effect of these, we might adopt the words of the Poet, "Who steals my purse steals trash; 'tis something, "nothing"; and we should perceive, that though a mere loss may stun, amaze, mortify, dispirit, yet it does not exasperate like a contumelious aggression.

19. The *excellence* of our Saviour's moral doctrine can scarcely stand in need of proof from argument, to any one who enters attentively into the case supposed. A man has an insult offered him, of a provoking nature; he is strongly tempted to return insult for insult; that is, in fact, under the idea of doing himself justice, to injure his injurer: if he indulges his passion, mischief breaks out, it glows, it rages, it destroys; destruction spreads far and wide: to prevent all this, he is directed to abstain from injury, to forbear even justice, or the dangers of seizing it for himself; and an opportunity is offered him of doing an act of generosity; an act which may save many from hurt or ruin; an act, which in the very nature of it, shews greatness of mind, patient fortitude, and enlarged views of the means of promoting human happiness. Struck with the transcendent worth of the advice, elevated with lofty views of its beneficial consequences, he obeys it with firmness; the injurer is stopped in his career; for to persist he must want every worthy feeling of the human heart. The cheek turned voluntarily to receive the second blow has all the power of a shield, to resist the fiery attacks of the insulter: it disarms his wrath; it shews a magnanimity, which must end in superiority and conquest; it shews a benevolence, which makes all rancour and insolence melt away: it attracts rather the embraces of friendship than the outrages of enmity; it excites admiration and esteem.

20. Should this account of the excellence of our Lord's directions want any confirmation, we might take notice, that though the insults here specified may come from bad *motives*, yet there is a possibility of something of the same sort coming from good ones, or from apparent virtue. A blow may proceed from honest indigna-

tion, a suit at law from perswasion of right; compelling assistance in a journey, from a great earnestness to dispatch some business, to perform some duty, to do some service, without delay, which appears to be of the utmost importance: Now if a good man obeys our Lord's injunctions in such cases, all that follows is good: and a man seldom knows, in any cases, that the motives of the aggressor are not innocent, or laudable; or, at least, agreeable to his own notions of duty. To cut off long trains of evil, and that, radically and completely, must surely be desirable to every man of worth.

21. And what is the difficulty? if you allege the *danger* of encouraging insults, you bring forward an objection already answered, and one which has not more weight here than it had before. Part v. 27. Punishment is lawful when it appears to be necessary; as has been abundantly proved; but if you think it absolutely necessary to punish, you do it to very great advantage after having tried the experiment of yielding; I mean, supposing your wishes really are to do as much good as possible: your own temper is better regulated after yielding, than in the moment of provocation; your judgment is clearer, you are more likely to reform the offender, and you have more reason to expect the favourable suffrages of impartial spectators.

Besides what has been said in favour of punishing when it seems clearly to be the greatest good, we may propose for consideration the following question; When Christ says that his disciples must yield to a blow, or to oppression, is it to be understood that they are to do it *repeatedly*, or only at the time when the first insult is offered? We are to forgive an indefinite number of times; Matt. xviii. 22. or there is no stated number of times beyond which forgiveness is wholly wrong, or needless: but it may be doubted whether forgiveness properly belongs to the passage now before us. We are now concerned with right conduct at the time of an *attack*; forgiveness has a retrospective view. It is possible to forgive an offender when you look back upon his injuries, and yet to repel force by force on any particular occasion. Perhaps each man must judge for him-

self how often yielding to evil will answer its proper ends. That man who does not in the *first* instance *try* to overcome evil by some yielding to it, has no pretension to be honoured with the title of a good Christian.

22. In fact, it is probable, the difficulty before mentioned, has the greatest weight in hindering men from yielding to evil; I mean the dread of the imputation of *cowardice*. On this difficulty a good deal has been already said; but with relation to the passage before us it may be added, that he who voluntarily exposes himself to a second insult after receiving a first, cannot do it from cowardice; it is not required of him by the agressor; he has nothing to fear from him if he does not do it, and something if he does. If our Lord had commanded his disciples, on receiving a blow, to run away from the striker, obedience to his commands might then have been construed into cowardice; but surely not, when the Christian is to bear one blow firmly, keep his station, and offer, for the sake of public peace. to bear another. Many a man will return blows at random in the moment of provocation, even through fear; but no man through fear will present his cheek to the smiter unnecessarily.

And the Christian is the less to be suspected of cowardice, when he yields to evil in this manner, as his yielding properly will have the effect of courage upon his adversary; it is plain enough, that the person who receives the stroke, may, in this case, be as brave as he who gave it. And if bravery is known to exist, it will be expected to appear at the proper time, and will therefore have its proper effects. In a popular tumult the peasant attacks with fury the steady veteran; the veteran bears his intemperate and ill-directed rage, and firmly maintains his station; is he therefore a coward? What man returns every blow of drunkenness, or of childish anger? no brave man; and why should more notice be taken of the paroxyms of passion, which occasion the blow when it proceeds from vice? In short, to associate the conduct of the true Christian with cowardice, when he is insulted, can only be the dictate of fashionable prejudice, prevailing in some particular time

and place; it cannot be the effect of solid and perpetual fitness and reason.

23. If, after all, a man is so perverse as not to enter into the excellence of our Saviour's doctrine, but to think it somewhat strange and uncouth, I would offer to such a one a few *additional* considerations.

The rule of yielding to evil, especially on the first provocation, is only *one amongst a number*. A man acts at one time from one rule, and afterwards from another. And on many occasions he finds rules, which were good separately, to interfere, and impede each others operations:—all that he can do, when this happens, is to combine and oppose them, in such a manner as to produce the greatest aggregate of good. In doing this he may find that no one of his Rules is to be carried to its full length. *(f)*

Moreover, though the Head of the Christian Church has a right to command submission to evil, no member has a right to *claim* it when he himself is the offender. (Part v. 13. Part vi. 37.) It would indeed be absurd if a man might strike you on the right cheek, and then say, if you are a true Christian turn to me the other also; his doing this would take away all the suppositions on which, to all appearance, the rule was given; would destroy all the foundations on which the precept was probably built.

24. Although our Saviour expressed himself briefly, what he said might be drawn out to a considerable length, if all those suppositions and limitations which he left to common sense, were to be expressed. A short *paraphrase* of his words might answer our present purpose, without being too tedious. 'In this world my 'disciples must, like other men, or at first more than 'other men, be liable to insults and provocations; their 'first movement will be, to repel them with force and 'passion; but I exhort and enjoin them to try, in the 'first place, some concession and submission; but let 'not their submission be mean and cowardly; let it be 'noble, generous, and brave; such as no man would

'make in order to save himself from danger; such as 'must appear to proceed from philanthropy and a 'love of peace:—nor do I enjoin this submission as 'an evil, or as an encouragement to evil; but as the 'best remedy for evil. If unhappily men should 'prove so savage as to prevent its succeeding, other 'remedies may be tried; but I prescribe this with-'out mention of such supposed failure; as otherwise 'men would not be aware how much more frequently 'and effectually evil would be checked by a great 'and magnanimous yielding to it, than by a petulant 'and impatient resistance.'

25. The doctrine of the passage before us would be accepted more readily, and more agreeably to its real meaning, if the relative nature of *justice and mercy* were clearly seen. They are so related, that when one of them is spoken of the other is implied: but justice is followed in the ordinary course of things, mercy in excepted cases; hence when justice is recommended singly, it is because some danger appears of hurtful remissness or indulgence; when mercy is recommended singly, there appears a danger of carrying justice to an extreme of rigour and severity; and of applying it to cases for which it was not intended. This, well considered, would have hindered the Jews from misapplying the Laws of retaliation; it might also tend to prevent misapplication of our Saviour's doctrine, which is opposed to their unreasonable strictness.

26. As the passage before us has been urged by some Christians against national *war* in general, and has been owned by a celebrated Prelate to occasion a great difficulty, *(g)* a word should be said on the Duty of *Nations* towards each other. It does not appear to me to differ from the Duty of individuals. Concessions, manifesting a serious regard to peace, adopted in such a manner as to shew courage, magnanimity, firmness, as well as enlarged humanity, are as right in nations as in private men. In both they are indefinite duties, and therefore to be guided by discretion. They are indeed generally pretended to; and the pretension

to them gives birth to embassies and memorials; it implies also their rectitude. If a well-meaning sovereign seems sometimes to neglect them, it is because War is virtually begun by his enemy before it is openly declared.

27. There is a minute difference between St. Matthew and St. Luke in one particular. St. Matthew supposes the garment to be taken from the owner by process at Law; St. Luke by violence. Consistently with which, St. Matthew speaks of the under garment as taken by Law; *(h)* and the upper one as offered by the sufferer: St. Luke of the upper garment as taken by force, and the under one as offered to the invader. This difference between the Historians confirms our idea of the indefinite nature of the Duty in question. A *violent* stripping might be a great provocation, especially if we suppose it very unseasonable; as in cold, rain, or at a season of shew and parade; and there seems a possibility that it might sometimes be owing to a good motive: such as cloathing the naked, discouraging luxury, restoring to the right owner, suiting different shapes or sizes, as the young Persian prince did; not to mention necessity.

28. Before we conclude our remarks, it may be proper to take some notice of the verse that follows what has been already adduced. "Give to him that "asketh thee; and from him that would borrow of "thee, turn not thou away". This precept seems to be connected with the foregoing; both because the stile of injunction is continued, and because immediately after it our Lord passes on to a new error of the Jewish Traditions. Yet it does not appear to relate to abuses of the Laws of retaliation. It is, however, a continuation of advice, or command, to *yield*, and to what may in some sense be called evil: for importunate supplications to give and to lend, when the petitioner seems to have no claim or title to our assistance, are attacks which we are strongly tempted to repel; and not without anger. The three first instances might be supposed to satisfy what had been quoted about eye for eye and tooth for tooth; and it might appear natural to proceed

to another instance of yielding to evil, similar in many respects to the former. Most men are provoked, or discomposed, by petitions for money; but even good men feel impatient under interruptions of their beneficent plans, and fretful when they are obliged to refuse: they also are in a degree provoked by appearances of impudence and idleness. Still it is their duty to yield; or to try the expedient of yielding, as far as their judgment and discretion will allow. This is a very different thing from repelling the petitioner unexamined, with rudeness and indignation.

The observations made on the foregoing instances of yielding may be applied to this: that it is discretionary, no one denies; because if it were taken as definite, the institution of property would be wholly frustrated; all that one man possessed would be transferred to others, and that without any regard to their merits or their wants. Which confirms what has before been advanced on the indefinite nature of the preceding. But though the duties of giving and lending are discretionary and occasional, yet every man should have a sincere and earnest *desire* to perform them, which nothing should be able to restrain but the fear of preventing the greatest good.

Here again the expression of our Lord is short and spirited, and calculated to strike the rich and avaricious *(i)* Scribes and Pharisees; but probably not such as he would have used to the charitable, or benevolent; or to the extravagant.

When a man yields to the importunities of a petitioner for money, he may be supposed to do it on a kind of *condition*, that what he gives shall be applied to proper purposes; to the relief of real distresses: and therefore in case of continued abuse of his bounty, he may not be under obligation to repeat his donations.

The *excellence* of this instance of yielding might be dwelt upon; the petitioner, who at first irritates us by appearing in a suspicious form, may really apply to us from very good *motives*, and we should suspend our resistance were it only on that account: but if we are

finally obliged to refuse, still we shall refuse upon better ground, and with more satisfaction, after we have yielded as far as we are able, than on the first attack; and our yielding, being attended with an examination into each case, will at the same time encourage real indigence, and discourage that which is fictitious: it will be the best remedy against that impudent intrusion, the appearance of which, is apt to make us impatient.

As giving to those who beg, is not so much out of the way of our customaty notions as yielding to insults, it would be needless to examine here any difficulties, or objections; it may suffice to repeat, that no petitioner must be allowed to *claim* our assistance, as a matter of strict justice. And I may conclude my observations on this verse by a short paraphrase, the chief purpose of which is, to mark out limitations, and some variety of cases. These our Lord seems to have left to common sense; they were not in the stile of his admonitions, and would have greatly weakened their spirit and force.

'When men professing to be in want, apply to you 'for pecuniary assistance, and beseech you, either that 'you would make them an absolute gift, or entrust them 'with the use of your property for a time, though their 'application may discompose you at first, by carrying 'an appearance of dissolute and impertinent intrusion, 'not without suspicion of imposture; yet do not suffer 'your irritation to influence you so far as to make you 'treat them with contemptuous neglect, or contumelious 'arrogance; but in candor and benevolence make some 'concessions to them; yield some attention to their 'professions; seriously endeavour to relieve them; 'and if circumstances will not permit such an indul-'gence, in the particular case, consider it as a mortifica-'tion and a disappointment. Do not allow yourselves 'to repel unheard any persons pleading distress, as if 'they were so unconnected with you that they could 'have no claim to your attention; or so vicious as to 'merit punishment rather than relief; but endeavour 'to give every distressed person his proper place and 'rank in your beneficent calculations, so as wholly to 'exclude no one, without a conscientious conviction,

'that your funds ought preferably to be allowed to 'other objects of charity.'

How enlarged snd rational, as well as benevolent, must have been the sentiments of our Saviour, so to reform the errors of the Jews! so to instruct the whole race of mankind! Was "this the carpenter's son?" "Truly this man was the Son of God". See Matt. xiii. 55. Mark xv. 39.

29. Let us now take the passage immediately following the words last explained. Matt. v. 43, 44. "Ye "have heard that it hath been said, Thou shalt love "thy neighhour, and hate tbine enemy: But I say "unto you, Love your enemies, bless them that curse "you, do good to them that hate you, and pray for "them which despitefully use you, and persecute "you".

30. That the Law of Moses ordered men to love their neighbours, Lev. xix. 18. is not doubted; but where is it said, that a man ought to hate his enemy? I do not find such an injunction. The precept, consisting of two parts, to which our Lord refers, seems only to have been *collected* by the Scribes from different parts of the Mosaic Scriptures, partly moral, partly historical. The poetical writings might also supply such passages as this; "I hate them right sore; even "as though they were mine enemies". Psalm cxxxix. 22. (Part i. 18.) In the two preceding cases we did find the *words* referred to, in the Law itself, though perverted in their interpretation, or application; "Thou "shalt not kill"—"eye for eye, tooth for tooth";—but here, the error of Tradition could not be expressed in scriptural terms; we may, however, form a very probable conjecture from what parts of Scripture it had been derived: from those, which commanded the Israelites to take possession of a Region pointed out to them by Jehovah himself, and to possess it in such a manner as should in effect secure them from becoming Idolaters: we may add also, from those Scriptures, which provide for a continuance of divine worship free from Idolatry. The expressions made use of in order to answer these

purposes, might possibly, when the circumstances came to be neglected, in which they had been used originally, give occasion to hatred of idolaters as a Duty, and so to hatred of other enemies. We have already seen some of these expressions when we spoke of Resentment as a check upon the excesses and perversions of benevolence. (Part vi. 18.)

The first six verses of the seventh chapter of Deuteronomy are here to be noticed: "When the Lord thy "God shall bring thee into the Land whither thou "goest to possess it, and hath cast out many nations "before thee", "thou shalt smite them and utterly "destroy them: thou shalt make no covenant with "them; nor shew mercy unto them: Neither shalt "thou make marriages with them".—For they will "turn away thy Son from following me, that they may "serve other Gods"—"Ye shall destroy their altars "and break down their images"—"For thou art an "holy people unto the Lord thy God"—"a special "people".

This seemingly severe measure of divine providence has been *justified* by many able advocates: but it seems sufficiently justified by the reflexion, that the plan of separating a people from the rest of mankind for the purpose of maintaining spiritual worship somewhere on the earth, and of preparing the world for the universal religion of Christ, is clearly beneficial to mankind; and that such special or peculiar people must have a region to inhabit: that the reasons of driving out the inhabitants are openly declared; and that no conduct was enjoined towards them but such as was necessary to answer the kind and gracious purposes of Heaven. Had the Israelites been tempted to intermarry with the idolaters, or to make agreements or compromises with them, so that they should have continued to inhabit the region, and to be idolaters, there was not the least probability of the plan succeeding: and the same is true had the Israelites been induced to to let them continue idolaters in the country merely from compassion. At the same time it appears to me, from this and other passages of Scripture, *(k)* that the destruction of these

Idolaters was only to take place on the supposition of their warlike resistance, and on their refusing to cede the territory allotted to the Israelites, whose right and title to possess it appeared from an astonishing series of miracles: Nay it seems, that the force to be used was also on supposition of the seven nations continuing to be Idolaters; for from the manner in which the grounds of the invasion are expressed, I should not scruple to infer, that any of the inhabitants might have been admitted as *proselytes* to the religion of Moses, and thereby have continued in their own country. But however this might be, there can be no doubt that the hostile treatment of the seven nations was a *public* and national measure, intended to answer a particular *end*, and a good end; and that it was a *single* measure, not an instance of a general plan: and therefore, that it could not, with any shew of reason, be made a constant rule of conduct for private individuals.

Nevertheless it must be acknowledged, that even down to our Saviour's time a notion did prevail amongst the Jews, that they were not to keep up the same intercourse with heathens which they did with one another. St. Peter says, to Cornelius and his friends, Acts x. 28. "Ye know that it is an unlawful thing for a man that "is a Jew to keep company, or come unto one of ano-"ther Nation". And Peter is afterwards thus accused; "Thou wentest into men uncircumcised, and didst eat "with them". Acts xi. 3. Gal. ii. 12. And, no doubt, much caution and reserve must have been requisite, in all ages, to prevent the Jews from relapsing into Idolatry, to which their propensity was but too great. They are sharply reprimanded for it, especially by the Prophets: their intercourse with Heathens is termed whoredom and fornication. But reserve in associating with any man is a very different thing from hating him as an enemy. Indeed an enemy as such, is not, in strictness, the object of pure hatred, but how he may hated, and how a compound sentiment towards an enemy may be called by the name of hatred, has before been shewn. (Part i. 18. Part v. 12.) The idea of hating an enemy might possibly in part arise from its seeming to be implied in the precept to love a neighbour: if we are to love our

neighbour, it may have been said, we are to feel the opposite sentiment towards the opposite character; but a Christian is secure from such a fallacious inference, because he is commanded to love both his neighbour and his enemy. Indeed the word neighbour means the same sometimes as the word man, or as human being; because in fact the human being to whom wet perform Duties, is ordinarily our neigh bour, or lives near us; and language arises from actual circumstances.

There are several natural expressions in scripture of mens sentiments respecting their enemies; describing uneasiness under persecution, triumph on victory, and others; but these cannot reasonably be the ground of an injunction to hate an enemy, generally. Amongst the the Jews the word *enemy* seems to have had *two senses;* it sometimes seems to denote a stranger, at other times an enemy who is also a neighbour, according to our ordinary use of the word. The Latin word *Hostis*, which usually signifies an enemy, once signified a stranger. *(l)* The Ægyptians had grievously oppressed the Israelites; yet the Law of Moses says, "Thou shalt not abhor an "Ægyptian". Deut. xxiii. 7. It also says, at the same time, "Thou shalt not abhor an Edomite". Yet the Psalmist tells us, that Edom had said of Jerusalem, "Down with it, down with it, even to the ground". Psalm cxxxvii. 7. And for abstaining from ill offices to an enemy, in the common sense of the word, we may refer to what has been before cited concerning attention to his Ox or his Ass; as also concerning revenge; "Thou shalt not avenge, nor bear any grudge against "the children of thy people". Lev. xix. 18. Moreover, whatever Solomon advises must be considered as in the spirit of the old Law; and we have already produced his precept, "If thine enemy be hungry, give him "him bread to eat; and if he be thirsty give him water "to drink". Prov. xxv. 21. To which might be added, "Rejoice not when thine enemy falleth, and let not "thine heart be glad when he stumbleth". Surely these things are far from the injunction, 'Thou shalt 'hate thine enemy'. Neither need we scruple to allege our Saviour's authority in the case of the good

S maritan; because it was intended to make Jews feel, that it must be right for a *Jew* to assist a Samaritan in distress. Indeed, were the declarations of the old Scriptures less explicit than they are, the nature of the thing would be sufficient to prove, that Moses could never mean to enjoin hatred to enemies: conduct towards enemies is a part of our moral duty; which must continue invariably the same in all ages: whatever therefore Moses might *permit* for a time, on account of the hardness of men's hearts, he could not *enjoin* at one time, what would be wrong at another.

It is at all times an unwarrantable liberty in interpreters to separate a direction from all its circumstances, and make it a general moral precept: and in the present instance there is something blamable in the Jews, and incorrect, in taking a maxim collected from what was supposed to be the general tenor of the Mosaic law, and *joining* it with another, clearly expressed. Were any man to read the twofold direction, "Thou "shalt love thy neighbour and hate thine enemy", for the first time, he would naturally suppose that both parts, the love and the hatred, were grounded on the same authority; and as that is not the case, whatever makes them appear to be so, is a misrepresentation and deception: one which, as in the former instances, is to be imputed to the Scribes and Pharisees; and to the encouragers of traditional interpretation.

31. Having then seen what our Saviour meant to set aside and supersede, we may consider, in the next place, what he intended to inculcate. "I say unto "you, love your enemies". As Christians, we are only concerned to see the true meaning of this precept; its authority we cannot doubt; or its reasonableness; nevertheless we may for the sake of those who hesitate concerning the truth of our holy religion, fix our thoughts for a while on the rational ground of a Duty, which has sometimes been deemed extravagant. We have already recommended, from principles of Natural Law, putting Resentment under the guidance of benevolence; and have examined the agreement of scripture with this direction: (Part v. 21. Part vi. 25, 26.)

We have also balanced the motives for and against forgiveness; but have not said any thing directly pointed at the *love of enemies*, either as to its meaning, or our obligation to encourage it. The meaning of love towards enemies seems to be, not that we are to love them *because* they are enemies, but *notwithstanding* they shew themselves disposed to commit injuries against us.

The principle of benevolence is to be constant and universal: it is that through which we were brought into being; it is that without which we cannot exist to any good end; injuries may make us feel resentment; and resentment may, on some occasions, rightly prompt us to punish; but nothing must ever destroy our benevolence: we must always desire the happiness of every sensible being; we must aim and intend to make even punishment an instrument of happiness; we must never do an act, the ultimate tendency and design of which, is to promote evil, or misery. Nothing can be more clearly our Duty than this; and yet if we observe this, we must love our enemies; to distinguish between love and benevolence, or charity, though not difficult, is by no means necessary in popular language, such as that of the Holy Scriptures. No passion can be meant to promote evil on the whole. Whether a man accustoms himself to act from moral or religious motives, he must endeavour to maintain a perpetual, never ceasing benevolence. No one is incapable of comprehending, that to it the happiness of man is chiefly owing, that without it we should be hurried by our unkind passions into evil and misery, ever spreading, ever increasing, ever more and more embittered. Every one can see, that if we bite and devour one another, we must, in the end, be consumed one of another. Gal. v. 15.

And if a man accustoms himself to aim at pleasing the Supreme Being by his conduct, he must constantly endeavour to execute the benevolent designs of Heaven, and be the instrument of communicating happiness to his brethren, who are, equally with himself, children of his heavenly Father, subjects of the universal Lord. If in practice any one should find this most reasonable

Duty difficult, he might receive some assistance from considering, that the injurious man cannot but be an object of *pity*; as one who is taking the most direct way to lower, and finally to ruin, himself, in the estimation of every good man, of every man of worth and fidelity; and of that God on whom all things depend, and whose judgement must determine whether he is to be happy or miserable for ever and ever. When we view a man as an object of our pity, we are softened; our desire is, rather to relieve than to hurt him: we are approaching, in the strict sense of the word, to love him. Moreover, when a Duty seems at first sight too arduous and sublime, or too refined and delicate, for common men, we may do some good by taking it as a thing to be *aimed* at, as something which we may begin to attempt, though without much prospect of soon arriving to perfection. He who should attempt to feel kindness or compassion for his enemies, with this desire of gradual and progressive improvement, would soon find himself more advanced than he had seen reason to expect. Nay, at the very outset he would be in a moral situation far removed from that of the man who was endeavouring to hate his enemy, in opposition to the returning kindness, and relenting tenderness of human nature.

32. What has now been said may put us into a method of studying the excellence of our Saviour's general doctrine, "Love your enemies". For this seems to be a general precept, and those which follow, seem to be particulars comprehended under it. The first particular direction is, that if our enemy shew his malevolence by *curses* or execrations, we may shew our benevolence with the greatest propriety by returning *blessing*, or benediction. In the strictest sense, blessing and cursing mean calling upon superior beings, capable of influencing human happiness, to pour down good or evil on the persons whom we bless or curse. Should our enemy in this way endeavour to bring evil upon our heads, by the intervention of superior beings, our part and duty is, to invoke the same beings to shower down good upon him: and no direction can be more reasonable: for this is a kind of attack which requires no de-

fence; the only person who can be hurt by an imprecation is he who utters it; and if we wish to save him from the evil which he is bringing upon himself, the most natural method is, to apply to the source from which the evil springs.

Sometimes blessing and cursing mean no more than gentle and harsh speaking; but our reasoning will extend to this sense; for to return "railing for railing" can do no good; it cannot punish or amend; it can hurt only the person who is guilty of it; whereas mild and gentle language, if returned with proper dignity and prudence, may prevent much evil: the soft answer which turneth away wrath, may avert its long and complicated train of mischiefs.

33. If our enemy *hate* us, our part is, to do him *good*. In any case our enemy may be conceived to hate us; in the case last mentioned, he is supposed to exert his hatred in a particular manner; but in the present case no effect of his hatred is specified: we are led by such a supposition to view the passion as only in the *mind* of our enemy: yet he would exert it if he could; this thought directs our attention to such enemies as want power to hurt us; that is, to our *inferiors*. We can easily imagine a train of mischief in the mind of our enemy, which may always be ready to explode; and which may burst forth occasionally; but the occasions on which an inferior can hurt us, being extraordinary, the more just conception is, to view his malevolence as being only mental. Now it frequently happens that, without bad intention, we have excited resentment in the minds of our inferiors; we have overlooked them, we have preferred others to them; if we are invested with authority, perhaps we have punished them; but it is quite enough if we have taken some advantage from them, however justly, which they have been accustomed to enjoy. In such cases, if we find that a man is nourishing hostile imaginations against us, it seems as if we ought not to confine ourselves to satisfying our own consciences, we should go farther, and indulge the weakness of others, so as to endeavour to satisfy them also. Yet perhaps we cannot lay open all

our motives of action; it may be inconsistent with prudence, or with fidelity. Here the excellency of our Saviour's direction begins to appear; what need hinder us from doing *good* to our enemy? and what reasonings or explanations can have such an effect on his mind as an open, disinterested act of kindness? It says to him, in a language to which he will not turn a deaf ear, 'I 'am concerned that I have offended you; it was not 'ever my intention to incur your displeasure, or occa-'sion your ill-will; I may have erred, or appearances 'may have been unfortunately against me; but I am 'earnestly desirous to convince you, that whatever 'have been my errors, in whatever light my conduct 'may have appeared, I always meant well to you; and 'shall always be glad to prove to you my friendly dis-'position, whenever I can do it consistently with my 'duties towards other men'. (See Part v. Art. 24. 4th Rule. And Part vi. 29.)

34. In the third and last place, our Saviour tells us, that if our enemy should use us despitefully and *persecute* us, our duty is,—to *pray* for him:—to offer that species of prayer to the Deity on his behalf, which is called *Intercession*. Here the passion of our enemy is supposed to be accompanied with *power* in him whom it impels.

The word *despiteful* has been shewn (Part vi. 6.) to denote, in our translation of the Bible, a lofty kind of resentment, mixed with pride and insolence. Persecution also, of itself, implies superiority and influence: for how can any persons persecute us but such as are more powerful than ourselves? to such the last mentioned duty, of doing them good, is inapplicable; the inclination which prompts them to persecute us, would prevent our services from gaining acceptance, and the superiority by which they are enabled to oppress us, would make our petty benefits to be of no significance; still our benevolence is to remain; and we are to exercise it in the best and most effectual manner we are able: How can we better prove that our love is without dissimulation than by interceding for our persecutors with Him, who is their judge, and might be our aven-

ger? with him who has the hearts of all men in his "rule and governance," and who can dispose and turn them as seemeth best to his godly wisdom. This is the only way in which we can exercise our benevolence in such a case, and therefore in this way we are commanded to exercise it. We must, indeed, take care, that our conduct be conformable to our Intercession; and therefore if, contrary to probability, an occasion present itself, in which we are capable of hurting him who in most things is our superior, we must be consistent, and faithfully act the part of those who have prayed for his welfare in simplicity and sincerity of heart. On such an occasion our superior changes his relative station, and we must endeavour to do him *good*.

35. Whosoever considers these two verses of our Saviour's Sermon on the Mount in the light in which they have now been represented, as containing a general precept, and giving directions for our conduct in a few of the most important particulars comprehended under it; if he allows that they all are founded on the best and most rational principles, must, at the same time that he acknowledges the supreme excellence of the Christian Religion, admit, that an enemy, though immediately an object of resentment, is by no means an improper one of benevolence and Love.

36. Another passage of Scripture to be considered separately from those which confirm the conclusions of reason and experience, is the concluding part of the twelfth chapter of the Epistle to the Romans. We may begin with the sixteenth verse, as our Church begins from that verse in the Epistle for the third Sunday after the Epiphany; but our attention will be fixed chiefly on the twentieth verse:—"if thine enemy hunger, feed "him; if he thirst, give him drink: for in so doing "thou shalt heap coals of fire on his head". Here the practical direction is deemed clear in its meaning, but the reason assigned for relieving an enemy has occasioned some difference of opinion.

37. Many have understood by heaping coals of fire on the head of an enemy, increasing his punishment;

but others have found difficulty in admitting this sense. They seem shocked at the idea of any man's doing good with an intention or expectation that the good shall operate as an evil upon the object of his beneficence. They allege, that such motive is contrary to the *scope* of the Apostle's exhortation; that it must embitter the *mind* of him who acts from it; and they think, that the Apostle may have had the idea of a *crucible*, in which metals are melted down, by means of coals heaped on all sides and on the top. *(m)* A thought seeming to receive strength from what immediately follows, about overcoming evil with good: or softening and melting the hard hearts of the malevolent.

To me it seems, that the benevolent spirit of these interpreters has contributed more towards the reception of this meaning than their critical acuteness; though in other instances they shew great sagacity and judgment. I must confess, that the increase of punishment appears to me the most natural, and the best supported sense of the metaphorical expression, heaping coals of fire; nor do I discern any force in the objections made to that sense, which can reasonably hinder its being adopted.

38. Let us state the case regularly. Solomon writes, about a thousand years before the birth of Christ, in the following manner; if thine enemy be "hungry, give him bread to eat, and if he be thirsty, "give him water to drink: For thou shalt heap coals of "fire upon his head, and the Lord shall reward thee". Prov. xxv. 21, 22. That the expression "coals of fire" and others similar to it, are generally used for punishment, is allowed by all: that it is used so in this passage of the Book of Proverbs, is sufficiently clear from the word *reward* being opposed to heaping coals of fire. Now though we saw no reason why Solomon should propose such an inducement to an act of kindness, we must think that he had some good reason; at least one which must have been good in his time, and in his religion; and this must make us extremely cautious how we put any forced construction upon his words, in order to avoid any notion seeming to us dangerous. The Jews were vindictive; which might be partly owing to the

causes already assigned, Art. 30. and partly to the slow progress of civilization: revenge is always a vice of barbarism. Solomon acts a discreet part with respect to their vindictive spirit; he does not attempt to extinguish it all at once; he does not absolutely deny the rectitude of punishment; but he cautions the Jews not to let it prevent acts of common humanity; and exhorts them to avoid being themselves the avengers of their own wrongs. It must be more safe, he intimates, to let such a very dangerous office devolve upon that perfect Being, who alone judgeth righteous judgment; according to what they had been taught long before Solomon's time by their Lawgiver Moses himself. Vengeance is mine—or, "To me belongeth vengeance and recompense".

This advice must be seasonable, whether any of the people really thought retribution indispensible, or whether they sheltered a desire of revenge under that principle. We may conceive Solomon to have been acquainted with their notions, and to have endeavoured to turn their enmity into a channel where it could do no harm. 'Suppose that justice' we may conceive him to say, 'according to your notion of it, must be 'satisfied, yet Jehovah is able to satisfy it, and will 'surely omit nothing that ought to be done; do not 'therefore use your enemy cruelly; do not suffer him 'to perish for want of bread and water. You may 'supply him with the necessaries of life, and punish 'him afterwards, if that seems absolutely necessary: 'should he abuse your bounty, he enhances his crime, 'and there is no doubt, or none that needs perplex you, 'that Jehovah will increase his punishment'. Can any thing be better imagined, or more wisely urged, than such a direction as this? It is highly probable that we do not see the allusion in the metaphor of burning coals, or coals of fire, exactly in the same light in which Solomon saw it; that must depend, like other allusions, on minute facts and familiar customs; but we seem to have, on the whole, sufficient reason to conclude, that Solomon did really mean increasing punishment, when he used such a metaphorical expression.

Those who favour the allusion to a crucible, should shew what progress the arts had made in the time of Solomon: perhaps that might not be difficult, as far as concerns the present question, because gold and silver are mentioned as used in very early times; though they could not be useful till they were melted. Nevertheless it may not be wholly improper to observe, generally, that to prove any thing concerning the time of St. Paul would not be sufficient; it would fall short of what is here required. On the whole we may submit it to the candid, which comparison the wise man was most likely to have in his mind, when he spoke of coals of fire; that to punishment, or that to melting and softening the heart; the one so in use as to be generally understood, the other so unusual, that we have not a single instance of it in the Old Testament. In language all depends upon custom; and not less in figurative language than in plain. Indeed did we find coals coals of fire used figuratively, as often for softening the heart as for punishment, the mention of *reward* as its opposite would still determine the sense here; reward being directly opposed to punishment, and in no way to the melting of the affections. And whatever is the right comparison in the Book of Proverbs, is also the right one in the quotation from that book by St. Paul. The interpreters of St. Paul, who favour the comparison of the crucible, are, I think, though they may not be aware of it, apt to treat his expressions now before us, as originally his, not as quoted; and they are apt to neglect the word "*reward*".

They may say, that in strictness, they are not interpreting the words of Solomon, but those of St Paul, or at most those of Solomon as adopted by St. Paul; but surely the Apostle would not quote words of the wise man which signify punishment, and use them as meaning quite a different thing; softening the heart or affections: He must quote them as well known to his Jewish converts, and as what must be received for Scripture even by the Gentiles. Therefore it is more reasonable to suppose, that St. Paul meant to convey some such idea as this; 'You must treat your enemies with com-'mon humanity; for even the Jews, notwithstanding

'the hardness of their hearts, were under obligation to 'do this; shall it not much more be done by the disci- 'ples of the mild and forgiving Jesus'? and supposing St. Paul to have quoted the Book of Proverbs only for the sake of this argument, and to have thought that Christians might as well be humane and merciful for mercy's sake, without any idea of the ungrateful being *punished*; though he might possibly have stopped short when he had delivered Solomon's precept concerning the relieving of an enemy, yet it would have been very unnatural for him to have made a partial quotation by omitting the *motive* alleged, even if he had thought it peculiar to the old Law: nor would such omission have answered any purpose, as the passage was well known, and as he was quoting the Jewish Scriptures. Did those who differ from us take this ground, and shew that St. Paul meant only to quote the words, as part of the Old Law, and to improve upon them, they would have at least a good foundation, whatever they might be able to build upon it.

39. Let us then, in order to avoid any difficulty arising from the difference between the old and new Law, take the words *as St. Paul's* originally, and see whether, on that supposition, there is any thing material to be objected to the sense which we conceive to have been Solomon's; that is, to coals of fire meaning punishment, either on account of the *Interpretation*, or of the *consequences* which would follow from adopting it.

In considering whether we *interpret* the words of St. Paul in a fair and reasonable manner, it should be kept in mind, that every argument has to effect something in the mind of him to whom it is addressed; it has to clear up some obscurity, to obviate some difficulty; and nothing would serve better to shew that a certain sense of words was not the right one, than to prove, that according to that sense the word could answer no purpose: nor, on the contrary, would any thing better justify a sense than shewing the purpose which it would or might answer. Now the great support of revenge in the minds of men who profess to observe their Duty,

is the notion, that injuries *ought* to be punished; and that it is a vicious negligence, or want of resolution, not to punish them; that it is a failure in duty to our injured friends, or to the public. To this notion, or principle, the reason urged for omitting to punish whilst your enemy is in great distress, is a full answer. It is as much as to say, 'supposing there was this necessity for retribution which you affirm, yet your behaving with common humanity does not prevent its taking place: 'the Deity is the best able to punish justly, as he 'knows the whole of each case, and has no prejudices 'or partialities, and is no respecter of persons.—You 'may think it fortunate to have this declared from authority, as it may save your attempting a task for 'which you are not perfectly qualified. Relieving your 'enemy in extreme distress does not prevent your punishing him afterwards, if your conscience dictates 'that punishment is necessary; it only prevents your 'greedily seizing a bad opportunity of avenging your-'self, when punishment would be most ungenerous, 'cruel, cowardly, and disgraceful. You may safely 'pass by such an occasion, and commit your cause "to "him that judgeth righteously". 'There is no circumstance which can more clearly mark out the difference between malevolent revenge and public-spirited punishment, than your treatment of an enemy 'who is in want of the necessaries of life'.

And indeed it appears somewhat strange, that one text of scripture should occasion difficulties, when another of like import occasions none. "Vengeance is 'mine, I will repay saith the Lord". This means the same as that which we are considering; and they are joined together by "*Therefore*". What though the words of that taken from the book of Proverbs sound as if man was the punisher, the judge, and the executioner, in heaping the coals of fire, no one who thinks for a moment, can suppose that he is so in reality: the Deity must heap the coals of fire, though in consequence of human actions. Both texts mean, 'Be not rash, be 'not cruel, be not afraid that vice and injury will escape 'with impunity; do you act humanely to your necessitous brother, whether he happens to be friend or 'enemy; God will do the rest'.

We have already hinted, that a man, who loved to gratify his resentment more than to promote justice, might make the propriety of punishing a *pretence* for indulging rancour; and a person might deceive himself, and imagine he was aiming at what was right, whilst he was really following a faulty propensity; but the declaration that God will do himself justice is as much against these abuses, as against a sincere belief of that propriety of avenging one's self, to which they pretend. Indeed, whatever destroys a principle, must of course destroy all pretences and imaginations which are built upon it.

Should not the motive of heaping coals of fire be admitted, according to our sense, in any other way, they might as an argument *ad hominem;* or as an argument addressed to a particular man, drawn from his own principles or concessions. It would be orderly and legitimate reasoning to say to any man; 'your desire is to 'punish such a person because he has injured you; *on* '*your own principles* I recommend it to you to do him 'good; this will be the way, if he continues in the cha-'racter which you are aiming to punish, to have him 'more severely punished than you can punish him': in an argument of this sort we are not supposed to *approve* of every thing; our end or design is, only to bring a particular man to right conduct, or right opinion, in a particular instance. Nor does the Holy Scripture disdain the use of such an argument. The Lord who leaves the *Talents* to be improved by his servants, grounds the blame and punishment of the slothful one on concessions made by him, though not recognized as just and true. "Out of thine own mouth will I judge "thee, thou wicked servant. Thou knewest that I "was an austere man" and so forth, Luke xix. 22. compare Matt. xxv. 26. why didst thou not act accordingly? Here the severity is not supposed to be justly imputed to the Lord; but the slothful servant had deserved all the consequences which would have followed from its being real; and the Lord argues upon that supposition, though not approved. In our present question, the result of this method of arguing would be; 'do 'good, be humane; if you cannot be so upon princi-'ples perfectly kind, be so upon your own'. And

many men may be prevailed upon to do their duty by such imperfect reasoning, who are deaf to solid and rational argumentation.

Nor will our Interpretation be invalidated by the opinion that it contradicts the *scope* of the Apostle's exhortation, as it inculcates revenge rather than forgiveness; to me it does not appear to do this. The whole of the passage before us consists of arguments and motives for treating an enemy with kindness; if the sense ascribed to any part was really inconsistent with this end, it could not be admitted: but according to what has now been observed, the argument or inducement of heaping coals of fire, in the sense of punishing, is of great use in removing a difficulty, which really prevails to a great extent, and which is often used as a pretext for unkind and unmerciful behaviour. I mean the idea, that we ought to do justice, to shew our abhorrence of injury, to resent all affronts offered to our friends.

Whatever argument tends to remove a difficulty standing in the way of any duty, must be considered as affording an inducement to the performance of that duty.

40. And as we attain to our sense by fair interpretation, we need not be deterred, from establishing it by any *consequences* which seem to attend it. It has been apprehended, that if we allow coals of fire to mean punishment, men may do good actions with malicious intentions, or expectations: this sounds like something very bad; but let a man come to *action*, and all danger must vanish. If a man sees his enemy in distress, only let him give relief, the rest is safe enough. Perhaps a man who is desirous to do his duty, may begin to give relief before he is perfectly reconciled, in heart and affection; but his beneficence will soon generate benevolence, he that acts kindly will soon be kind. (Part v. 24. Part vi. 29.) But suppose this not to be the effect, for a man may relieve an enemy in necessity without ceasing to consider him as an enemy, yet in the *act* of relieving necessity, I am much inclined to say, that I defy a man to have the principle, or to act from the

motive, of increasing the punishment which is to be inflicted by the *Deity*. It seems to me a thing impossible. At least a man must want common sense to do good from such a principle. He must entertain the absurd and impious imagination, that the Deity will act under his direction, and execute any sentence which he thinks fit to pronounce. Can any man of common sense run into the extreme folly of supposing that God will punish because a revengeful man intends or expects that He will?

We may say, generally, that God will punish an ungrateful man; but when we come to the cases of particular men, we cannot say what will be the divine judgment. And so a benefactor may have the general belief of God's punishing ingratitude, without the least persuasion that a particular man will be punished for ingratitude to *him*: or without the least thought about the matter; though if the thought of punishment *due* to the man's ingratitude does occur, he cannot do better than commit himself to God, recollecting either this expression of Solomon and St. Paul, or any other to the same effect; "Vengeance is mine"—"the Lord re-"ward him according to his work".—"God is a righ-"teous judge".

Suppose you were thus advised, in any case, 'Use your enemy handsomely; then if he behaves ill, the 'world will take your part, and the indignation of all 'men will be against him';—or, 'you will bring the 'indignation of all spectators upon your adversary by 'kind behaviour;' would your adviser understand that he was exhorting you to do good with a malicious intention?—Still, if our reasoning failed to convince any one, that doing kind actions with a malicious intention is not to be feared in practice, we might maintain, that relieving an enemy in distress, must do *good*; must be useful and beneficial, even though it could be attended with some hope that our enemy might be punished: and the main end of a rule of conduct is to do good.

One evil consequence before mentioned of admitting the sense of the Apostle to be, relieve your enemy, for

ting the expression of Solomon in such a place, shewed what idea he had of its meaning: but this surmise seems too weak to bear much stress to be laid upon it; especially as there is some connexion between the two verses according to our sense of the coals of fire. Overcoming evil with good is connected with relieving an enemy in distress, though it may not be with Solomon's motive; and that seems sufficient to account for the Apostle's transition from one precept to the other; indeed better than we can account for most transitions in the same chapter. Giving a starving enemy bread and water may prove, eventually, an instance of overcoming evil with good; but the general description of that Duty raises our conceptions much above such an instance. We might at the same time perceive a connexion and an immense disparity between the things expressed in these two verses, were we to suppose the Apostle to speak more fully; in some such manner as this; 'When your enemy is in your power, thro' some particular distress, be not meanly impatient to take advantage of his necessities: afford him some supply: I say not now, take him to your bosom, put on him a wedding garment, kill for him the fatted calf; I only now say, give him bread to eat and water to drink. I hope by this good you may overcome his evil disposition, but should not that prove to be the case, leave him to God; ingratitude will be punished as it shall deserve. Only avenge not *yourself*. But whatever may be the event of your forbearance to your distressed enemy, think not that you are to rise no higher in overcoming evil with good than such an instance. It is a species of virtue most comprehensive and most sublime; there is an endless variety of evils to be overcome; there is also an endless variety of beneficent expedients; by which they may be surmounted. To invent and apply these with success must demand the most consummate wisdom of improved philosophy, the most perfect goodness of genuine Christianity'.

Such is the connexion between relieving the necessities of an enemy, and overcoming evil with good; such is the disparity between the instance mentioned by St. Paul, and the whole duty.

As men have become civilized and polished, those of generous dispositions, though they have held it a duty of honour to revenge, have always considered it as ignominious meanness to use an enemy harshly whilst he was under any calamity of nature or fortune. And national enemies have suspended hostilities whilst a ship was in extreme danger, from famine or the elements, though they would renew their attacks after the distress was removed. These things shew the excellence of the Apostle's advice: how desirable were it that men of improved and polished manners should be equally ready to adopt all other methods of overcoming evil with good!

But with regard to the argument derived from the connexion of the two verses, we may add, what has been just hinted before, that it supposes the moral precepts of the Apostle in the Chapter before us to be more connected than we know them to be: interpreters do not seem to have a right to found an argument on connexion between two verses, unless they saw clearly connection between others. I doubt not but St. Paul had a series of thoughts linked together, even when he had no design of writing systematically; but as he does not labour to shew how one precept suggested or brought on another, it must be very difficult for us, at this time, to ascertain the connecting links; they were incidents and circumstances present to his mind, but unknown to us: the nearer we could approach to the knowledge of the particular state of Christians when he wrote, the more likely we should be to see the train of his ideas. One great event which must dwell upon the minds of all who were zealous for the cause of Christianity, was the *persecution*, to which Jews, and probably Christians, were subject, though it had in a good measure abated. Nothing is more likely to afford us a key to the connexion of St. Paul's moral precepts. Let us try the experiment: although we have already ventured upon some little illustrations of some expressions in the portion of scripture before us, we could not perhaps better conclude our remarks than by attempting a sort of connecting *paraphrase* of the whole.

42. 'The foundation of all true virtue is *humility*. 'It is necessary in forming your *opinions*, as well as in 'your practice: if you are wise in your own conceits, 'you will be governed by prejudice and passion; no- 'thing more will be wanted to make you revengeful: 'but the Christian doctrine is, recompense to no man 'evil for evil; at all times such return is to be avoided, 'but particularly in such a situation as yours: you are 'surrounded by neighbours who are watching the effects 'of the new religion; some inclined to join you, others 'to persecute; do not injure the Christian cause, by 'any intemperate conduct, or by disreputable appear- 'ances of any kind. However you may be slandered, 'however injured by uncharitable constructions of your 'mysteries, or sacraments, however censured for de- 'spising deities, or disturbing families, be patient; use 'your utmost endeavours to live at peace with all around 'you: provoke not others; be not yourselves easily 'provoked. Perhaps some who have lately been your 'persecutors, are now in your power; abuse not that 'power! I beseech you by all that is good; and with 'all possible affection I entreat you, not to be so rash as 'to take upon yourselves the dangerous task of aveng- 'ing your own wrongs. Remember the Sermon of 'your Lord upon the Mount; remember the example 'which he has set you; be not hasty to resist evil; 'give it some scope; yield to it, in some degree. Nor 'murmur in your hearts as if Christianity deprived you 'of some right or privilege; in the Law of Moses it is 'said, "Vengeance is mine, I will repay, saith the 'Lord". With which I may connect the precept of 'the wisest of Princes, that if even an enemy is in want 'of the necessaries of life, he must be supported: are 'you afraid of neglecting the claims of *justice* if you let 'slip any opportunity of making a man to suffer as you 'think he deserves? neglect not the obligations of hu- 'manity on such a pretext; God will punish all men ac- 'cording to the measure of their several offences. 'Perhaps the metaphor of heaping coals of fire alarms 'or perplexes you; but remember, the practical direc- 'tion is plain and clear; that contains no trope or 'figure: secure obedience to that, whatever becomes

'of the rhetorical ornament. Nay, the righteousness 'of the Christian must *exceed* that of the old Law: a 'Jew ought to leave vengeance to God; a *Jew* ought 'to relieve his enemy in necessity; but a Christian ought 'to rise higher, and seize *every* opportunity of over-'coming evil with good. Evil, in various shapes, may 'attack his good principles, and try to hurry them into 'confusion and disorder; but he must thoroughly com-'prehend and feel the dignity and excellence of virtue; 'and the contemptible meanness of vice; he must learn 'to maintain for that which is good its due superiority: 'not by oppression or contumely, but by that ingenu-'ous benignity, which must make men ashamed of being 'his enemies; by that generous kindness, which must 'soften the heart of the vindictive; by that wisdom, 'which shews at first view, that revenge is folly; by 'that steady uprightness, which proves, that what is 'wrong cannot be stable and permanent: by that pru-'dence, which will bring the general indignation of 'mankind to protect and secure whatever is truly valu-'able to human nature'.

43. Such are parts of Scripture relating to Anger or Resentment, which require a separate attention, and seem incapable of being referred to any remarks taken from mere reason and experience. We may add to them those expressions which declare, on divine authority, that our duly moderating our resentment, or our forgiving our brethren, will affect the operations of the *Divine Mercy* towards ourselves.

The general meaning of these expressions seems to be, that though it has pleased the Judge of all the earth to publish a plan or system of remission of sins, founded on the merits of the Christian Sacrifice, yet no man must hope, or petition, to be included in that plan, who does not, on his part, forgive those, by whom he has been injured or offended.

Nothing can be more reasonable than this; the Author of the book of Ecclesiasticus feels the absurdity and presumption of asking that of God which we refuse to one another; and the parable of the *Servant-debtor* sets such

presumption in a very strong light, by shewing, that the offences of men against each other, are trifling in comparison of their offences against the Deity. "One man "bereth hatred against another", says the Son of Sirach, not nicely perhaps discriminating the malevolent sentiments, but using words in a popular manner, "One "man beareth hatred against another, and doth he seek "pardon of the Lord? He sheweth no mercy to a "man who is like himself; and doth he ask forgive- "ness of his own sins"? Eccles. xxviii. 3. 4.

St Matthew indeed does express himself as if, according to the literal sense of his words, every one who forgave others must be forgiven: "If ye forgive men "their trespasses, your heavenly Father will also for- "give you"; Matt. vi. 14. but this can only mean, that if we Christians forgive each other, we shall be adopted or admitted into the Christian scheme or system of remission of sins; we shall not be *incapable* of forgiveness: still the *Justice* of God is to be satified; still the *conditions* remain to be fulfilled; the conditions of repentance and sincere endeavours of amendment. Otherwise, any careless, easy-tempered, indolent man, who did not concern himself whether injuries were punished or not, would have full licence to commit every sin incident to human nature. These conditions, are so plain, that though they are sometimes expressed, they are sometimes only implied, according to the course of a sentence. When St. Luke speaks of the Duty of forgiveness, he *expresses* the condition of repentance, but it is equally necessary when it is only *implied*. "If "thy brother trespass against thee; rebuke him; and "if he *repent*, forgive him; And if he trespass against "thee seven times in a day, and seven times in a day "turn again to thee, saying, I repent; thou shalt for- "give him". Luke xvii. 3. 4. It cannot then be doubted, that we must repent ere we can expect forgiveness from our heavenly Father.

The right idea of forgiveness in man, as promoting forgiveness in God, is, that it is an indispensible condition; that no one must entertain the least hopes of having the general declarations of mercy applied to him-

self, till he has taken the *previous step* of forgiving his brethren. The manner in which St. Mark expresses himself, agrees well with the idea of a previous or preliminary step. "When ye stand, praying, forgive, *if* "ye have aught against any: *that* your Father also "which is in heaven may forgive you your trespasses. "But if ye do *not* forgive, neither will your Father "which is heaven forgive your trespasses". Mark xi. 25. 26. To which agrees the direction to leave a gift before the Altar, not offered, until reconciliation with men shall have been completed. Matt. v. 24.

And the artless expression of St. Matthew (vi. 14.) should be considered as the result of the *Lord's Prayer*; as an inference or deduction from it; which is signified by the illative "*For.*" Now the Prayer does not intreat our heavenly Father to forgive us all our sins, past and future, if ever so wilful, if ever so little repented of, only on condition of our never inflicting punishment; no man has ever understood it in that sense; but it supposes us to be heartily sorry for our sins; the remembrance of them to be grievous unto us; the burden of them intolerable: it supposes us earnestly desirous to rid ourselves of this burden, and ignorant of the manner of doing it. I am willing, each man is supposed to say, to shew all lenity to others, but how can I presume upon that, to think that God will forgive me the manifold sins which I have committed against his divine Majesty? In such a difficulty, it must be a great consolation and encouragement to be allowed to intreat the Almighty to shew that mercy to us, which we have shewn, and do constantly shew, to others. But it is by no means reasonable to infer from thence, that God will forgive us all manner of offences because we do our duty in a single point: or because we neglect to inflict punishment, merely through indolence or cowardice, or dissipation. Moreover, it is of the nature of every prayer, that in order to its success we do our parts: You pray to God for your daily bread; suppose God to grant your petition, yet will you have daily bread without any exertions of your own?

On the whole then, our forgiveness of those who

injure us, must be *previous* to our praying for forgiveness from heaven; but nevertheless, it is a matter of very great importance, that when we have taken this previous measure, we may offer it as a plea at the throne of the Divine mercy; and may found hopes upon it that we shall be admitted to the inestimable privileges of Christian Covenant.

44. As to the *practical* part of this subject, what has been said of *yielding* may easily be applied to forgiving. Forgiveness is a Duty, but a duty of the *indeterminate* sort: the different degrees in which it is to be practised, on different occasions, must depend upon circumstances. So far, indeed, forgiveness must always be perfect and entire, that we must always act from pure and unmixed *benevolence;* whether that prompt us to indulge, or to deter. When we are afraid of being overpowered by injury, we cannot have a better direction how to proceed, than that which we find in the New Testament. "If thy Brother shall "trespass against thee, go, and tell him his fault be- "tween thee and him alone. If he shall hear thee, "thou hast gained thy Brother. But if he will not hear "thee, then take with thee one or two more, that in "the mouth of two or three witnesses every word may "be established. And if he shall neglect to hear them, "tell it unto the Church; but if he neglect to hear the "Church, let him be unto thee as an heathen man and "a publican". *(n)* On which words I will only observe, at present, that they are by no means intended to supersede Christian Charity, and brotherly affection; and that where circumstances seem materially to have changed, our duty is, to use a parity of reasoning, and apply the same principles, as nearly as possible, to new situations.

45. We may now draw to a conclusion of our reflections on this extensive subject of Resentment; and we cannot finish them more properly than by asking ourselves what *improvements* appear to have been made in the regulation of Resentment by the Christian Religion. The improvements which it has occasioned in morality in general might afford scope for much discussion; *(o)*

but at present suffice it to remark, that man is certainly made *capable* of improving himself in virtue by reason and experience; but that in *fact* the most important duties have been very much undervalued; and are so still, except by some Christians. And that it is the nature of Christianity greatly to improve that *Disposition* upon which improvement in morals chiefly depends.

With regard to Resentment in particular; though we may not see the whole benefit which our Religion has produced, yet it may be pleasing and useful to take notice of some few advantages.

First.—Whatever sayings against revenge, or commendations of forgiveness, some heathens may have occasionly thrown out, there is no such *agreement* amongst them as to make an impression on the public mind, nor any such *authority* vested in any of them as to guide the generality of men independently of private judgment. The ordinary classes of men must, in a great measure, act after the opinions of others; and the Christian in ordinary life is relieved from all doubt as to the Duty in question:—if he complies with that which is prescribed in the Gospel, his benevolent affections will be clogged by no perplexities, or opposite authorities. And those who are qualified to examine the grounds of their actions, will by the light of the Gospel be enabled to see the worth and excellence of that which is enjoined. Whereas, in any kind of life, to separate truth from falshood in the writings of Philosophers, requires that men should be wiser than Philosopers themselves.

Secondly.—Were it allowed that any heathen Philosopher, or Orator, merits approbation, and does good, by recommending clemency and mildness; yet can it be said of any such person, that he has given the mild and placable class of virtues their due *rank* and value? has any moralist ever made them his *principal* object? yet Christians now know them to be of the highest importance, as preventing long trains of mischief: as sub-

stituting in their place schemes of beneficence, as generating and nourishing kind affcetions, as giving the mind a taste for virtuous sentiments and moral enjoyments.

Thirdly.—Although Jesus Christ taught what was excellent, and at the same time delivered what was revealed from Heaven, yet the ideas of following the authority of a teacher, and of being instructed by Revelation are distinct from each other. Now there is an *opposition* between Resentment and Benevolence, which seems to occasion uncommon difficulty; no human authority seems likely to surmount it. A very wise and good man might possibly temper them together, so as to gain the proper uses of both; but without *Revelation* it should seem as if most men would follow the impulse of either, as circumstances happened to give it strength and influence; the result of which would be, a motley incoherent conduct: denoting one character in prosperity and good health; and a very different one under affliction, oppression, or adversity. Nay, when the well-informed Christian acknowledges those principles which Revelation inculcates; when he makes Resentment to be only an instrument of correction in the hand of benevolence, yet there is still required great knowledge of mankind, as well as a considerable share of discretion, to make his acting after those principles produce its proper effects: his conduct, though founded on those principles, might want the guidance and encouragement, or support of Revelation.

Fourthly.—The practice of Virtue depends not only upon a right conception of its nature, but on the *motives* by which a man is actuated. Suppose Philosophy perfectly enlightened as to the nature of the Duty before us, yet it certainly could never propose such powerful motives as Christianity affords. The case or parable of the *Servant-Debtor*, Matt. xviii. 23. seems as if it must be irresistible, to every one who allowed it to operate freely upon his mind.

The idea that we are bought with a *price*, 1 Cor. vi. 20. must, if fully admitted, have a great tendency to

mortify all self-importance; by which revenge is in a great degree supported. Our Lord says, John xv. 12, 13. "This is my commandment, That ye love one another, "as I have loved you. Greater love hath no man than "this, that a man lay down his Life for his Friends". To which we may add the exhortation of St. Paul; Eph. iv. 32. "Let all bitterness and wrath, and anger, "and clamour, and evil-speaking be put away from "you, with all malice: And be ye kind to one another, "tender hearted, forgiving one another, even as God "for Christ's sake hath forgiven you"—No motive could be offered to the human mind more powerful than this last, and it is wholly Christian. It is equally calculated to silence the cavils of the captious sceptic, to work conviction on the mind of the man of thought and reflection, and to rouse the affections of the man of sensibility. Moreover, Christian motives make the unchangeable Deity the primary object of our attention, even when that Duty is directed to variable man. Nothing can tend more to our being steadfast and immoveable in our duty, in spite of human folly and ingratitude. And if you say, that this is the nature of all religious motives, we need only observe in reply, that Christianity has greatly improved religion, that it has greatly strengthened our hopes of future happiness, by bringing life and immortality to light, and that, inasmuch as it has made such improvements, it has added to our motives for practising the Duty of forgiveness considered as a religious Duty.

Fifthly.—Nor ought we to omit, that Christianity has afforded us *examples* of forgiveness, such as were never known in the world before its publication. This should not be omitted, because example excites our sympathy, sets in motion our powerful principle of Imitation; and, what is particularly useful in a duty accounted difficult and extravagant, it makes that appear *practicable*, or even familiar, which had seemed beyond the powers of ordinary men. The conduct of our Saviour (and we might add St. Stephen, and other Christian martyrs) towards his enemies, even whilst he was under sufferings the most dreadful, and injuries the

most exasperating, affords a lesson of forgiveness, more forcible and efficacious than can be conveyed by words.

With regard to the Texts of Scripture on which we have particularly dwelt, they are not by any means to be overlooked whilst we are speaking of improvements. The first guards against all vicious indulgence of the passion of anger in our *actions*, by laying restraints upon it, whilst it is only influencing our *words* and our thoughts. The second prepares us for sudden *provocations*, which are always dangerous to virtue, and teaches, what was in morals unknown before, that the best method to abate the violence of an attack is to *yield* to it. The third plainly insists, that a man by being our enemy does not cease to be an object of our benevolence; at the same time that it suggests some specific modes of conduct, in a few of the most distinguished cases of enmity. And the last shews us how we should treat an enemy when our power over him is the greatest; when he is reduced to want, or even necessity. Adding a recommendation of that most exalted and amiable of all employments, overcoming evil with good.

With gratitude therefore ought we to form our hearts and minds to love, and rightly comprehend, the precepts of that divine teacher, who has taught the important duty of forgiveness in expressions easy to be understood; has illustrated it by a case the equity of which cannot be denied; has enforced and familiarized it by his own example; and has provided for its being continually suggested to the thoughts, by involving it in that prayer, which, we see from the expressions contained in it, ought not for a day to be omitted.

46. And now we have considered all the malevolent sentiments of the human mind, under the classes of Hatred, Envy, Malice, and Resentment. The length to which we have been carried, can only be excused by the candor of those, who will allow, that this is a part of our constitution which has not hitherto been sufficiently noticed; though it is continually active, and though its influence is very great upon the happiness of Mankind.

Should any such rude beginnings as these induce men of real abilities to carry on, correct, improve the train of reflections here laid open, the result could not but prove extremely beneficial to human life, and greatly ameliorate this our earthly state of probation.

END OF PART VII.

FINIS.

MALEVOLENT SENTIMENTS.

NOTES ON PART I.

ARTICLE 3.

(a) IN 1774 I preached two Sermons before the University of Cambridge on the malevolent passions, or sentiments, and afterwards I printed them. They were taken from my moral Lectures, and therefore did not contain scriptural proofs, or illustrations; a defect which was strongly urged in their disfavour. I therefore in 1779, began to offer *these* discourses to the same Audience, and proceeded in preparing and delivering them till I was elected Norrisian Professor of Divinity, in 1780. But I had not then finished the subject of Hatred. The other discourses have been written since. Those few persons who have the *two* discourses, must expect to find these only an enlargement of them; with scripture instances, and disquisitions upon them.

(b) Art. 7.] In Philanthropy we love all men, of all ranks; but it is as *men;* as our *semblables.* Superiority and inferiority in every respect, vanish, when the object of our attention is Mankind.

(c) End of Art. 9.] Should any one wish to see Hatred, or odious qualities, more particularly described, he may consult Theophrastus, who seems to have drawn his characters more with a view to such qualities than to any others.

(d) Art. 12.] In Art. 7. there was a reference to Smith's Theory of moral Sentiments, Part 2. Sect. 3. Chap. 1. p. 211. octavo. He is not there speaking of

Hatred, but all we want is his judgement that the imagination can make persons of things. He is speaking of Gratitude and Resentment; which are excited, he says, " by inanimated as well animated objects. We " are angry for a moment at the stone that hurts us. " A child beats it, a dog barks at it, a choleric man is " apt to curse it". " A man grows fond of a snuff-box, " a pen-knife, of a staff which he has long made use " of, and conceives something like real love and affec- " tion for them". Afterwards this author mentions *persons* as the most proper objects of resentment and gratitude.—When we are said to hate certain animals, as toads, spiders, &c. perhaps something of the same sort takes place. Imagination is very much concerned in the business: I know not whether it may not give them a likeness to something shocking; to some instruments of pain; some powers of hurting; something like grotesque personal deformity: some characters; some tendency or disposition to do disagreeable things. Possibly the Stomach has some share in the feeling. Certainly any disquisition, which taught us to conquer hatred or disgust of this sort, would be useful. Might not, in common aversions, our senses correct our imagination? Suppose a man who disliked a spider, were to view it patiently on all sides, and to examine the fabric of its web, especially during its formation; were to touch the animal gently, nay to speak kind words to it, would not his disgust abate? A horse that boggles, seems to do something of this sort: so does a human being, when possessed of courage enough gradually to discover, that the frightful spectre which has alarmed him is nothing more than a harmless cow.

(e) End of Art. 24.] When men speak of those things which do good by means of immediate evil, they are apt to forget, that there are things, which though immediately good, produce subsequent evils: sweets may be as much evils on the whole as bitters; luxury as a sword. It is weakness to neglect this; for if a thing produces both good and evil consequences, what does it signify which sort come first? Yet we are apt to speak of immediate good as good upon the whole;

and of immediate evil as evil upon the whole.

(f) End of Art. 25.] *Odious* sometimes signifies that which excites hatred; but sometimes it denotes bad qualities of a certain sort; of that sort indeed, which, as we are made, do excite hatred; but which might be classed and have a common name, though we had no such sentiment. Nay, might be blamed and avoided.

(g) Art. 27.] Sterne says, in his Sentimental Journey, "When the heart flies out before the under-"standing, it saves the judgment a world of pains."—Chap. Remise Door.

(h) Art. 28.] The word *Beauty* includes not only certain conformations of person, but the colors and shapes of inanimate beings; of vegetables; plants, trees, flowers,; the appearances of nature which we call prospects: the forms and colors of various animals: also features and attitudes, considered as expressive of virtues and graces of the mind. Whether it includes graceful motion, is scarcely worth contending. It is, I believe, generally understood to include gracefulness, which, in my idea, implies motion. Not but attitudes are called graceful; yet many attitudes imply motion: every motion is a succession of attitudes; and when a figure is imitated in an attitude which makes one of such succession, that figure seems to be in motion. This applies to figures of persons dancing, or of animals skipping, running, &c.—The horses of the Sun every one conceives to be in motion. So of Mercury, &c.

(i) Art. 37.] "Whatsoever is my situation let "me feel the movements which arise out of it, and "which belong to me as a man: if I govern them as a "good one, I will trust the issues to thy justice; for "thou hast made us, and not we ourselves". Sterne's Sentimental Journey, chap. Conquest.

We may not kill. Deut. v. 17.

We may kill. Numb. xxxj. 17. Deut. xiii. 9. 1 Sam. xv. 33. Rev. vi. 8. Rom. xiii. 4.

We may not swear. Matt. v. 34.

We may swear. Deut. vi. 13. Psalm lxiii. 12.

We may not drink wine. Prov. xxiii. 31. Joel i. 5.

We may drink wine. 1 Tim. v. 23. Matt. xi. 19.

(k) End of Art. 37.] What St. Paul says of anger might be extended to all malevolent sentiments. Eph. iv. 26. He says, "Be ye angry, and sin not". That is, "though ye be angry, sin not": (Butler Ser. 8.)—which implies that a man may be angry and "not sin".—In the same sense it might be said; 'Hate, and sin not'.—'Envy, and sin not'.

(l) End of Art. 38.] There is a very good French book which does the thing here proposed, entitled, "*Essai sur les moyens de plaire*". It is said to be written by Moncrief. Mr. Mainwaring has published a good Sermon on 1 Pet. iii. 8. in which some of the observations agree with those of this Essai.

(m) Art. 45.] La passion voit tout eternel. Diderot; Pere de Famille, Act. 2. Sc. 6.

NOTES ON PART II.

(a) End of Art. 3.] MISANTHROPY is here described chiefly with a view to the more improved and higher classes of men: but it prevails much in ordinary life, tho the description of it there being more familiar, might be less decorous for a grave discourse. The most Misanthropy which I have seen is in London; but I have known one farmer's wife take such an aversion to another as not to visit her for years, though they lived at a convenient distance. The object of this aversion

was a very worthy person; benevolent, candid, and very clear of qualities naturally and accidentally odious. Good sort of people in lower life are not in general ashamed to give out that they dislike all strangers; they rather boast of it as a part of their virtue. In the instance abovementioned the kind care which the person disliked took of her neighbour in sickness, at last effected a thorough victory over all prejudices.

(b) Near beginning of Art. 10.] I have heard that General Guise used to say, No honest man ever eats butter.

(c) *Art.* 10.] See my Sermon for Addenbrooke's Hospital; bottom of p. 7. Quarto.

(d) *Art.* 10.]

" This is in thee a Nature but affected;
" A poor unmanly melancholy, sprung
" From change of fortune".

Timon of Athens, Act 4, Sc. 3.

And afterwards,

——— Thou'dst a Courtier be
Wert thou not beggar.

Marmontel, in his Tale called the Misanthrope, says, " c'est un caractere factice, un personnage qu'on prend par humeur, et qu'on garde par habitude."

(e) *End of Art.* 19.] The Misanthrope is sometimes made a character in Comedy; but I do not recollect an instance of an explanation between *two* misanthropes: though I think it might have dramatic effect.

NOTES ON PART III.

(*a*) *Beginning of Art.* 5.]. See Bishop Joseph Butler's Sermons: Sermon 1st. Note.—And Plautus has this expression;

Quoniam æmulari not licet, nunc invides.

Miles glor. 3. 2. 26.

Aristotle makes Envy and Emulation subjects of two separate chapters. Rhet. Lib. ii. Cap. 12, 13. Expressing them by φθονος and ζηλος.

(*b*) *Art.* 8.] I once asked a very illiterate man at Cambridge why two particular women were always scolding and quarrelling; so as to disturb the neighbourhood. His answer was, "They envys one ano-" ther; they sells the same things". I felt an inclination to extend the remark, or make it general; as all who are pursuing the same advantages by the same means, may be considered as selling the same things". —This confirms the adage quoted by Aristotle, Και κεραμευς κεραμει. Rhet. Lib. ii. Cap. 12.

(*c*) *End of Article* 9.] In the Greek Testament we have φθονος and ζηλος, as in Aristotle; but not used with the same philosophical precision and discrimination. Φθονος seems the proper moral term for Envy, but ζηλος sometimes approaches so near it in meaning in in the New Testament, that there is a difficulty in distinguishing between them. Ζηλος is originally only *fervour*, from Ζεω: it by degrees has come to mean envy and emulation; from the warmth of contention observable amongst rivals, or parties opposed to each other. Since fervour may have place in a good cause or a bad one ζηλος is sometimes commended in scripture, as Rom x. ii.—2 Cor. vii. 11. and sometimes blamed, as Gal

v. 20, 21. where ζηλος is translated " emulations," and φθονοι " envyings," merely to change the English word; not with a view of following the distinction of Aristotle, who makes φθονος to mean that sentiment which prompts a man to hinder others from gaining the object in view; and ζηλος that which prompts a man to gain the object for himself.—As ζηλος may be laudable and φθονος not, the former is more likely than the latter to be used for the most favourable species of our sentiment.—It must depend then on circumstances and connection in what sense ζηλος is at any time to be taken: it is the only word used for any species of envy in the Acts of the Apostles; and it seems always to be used when any reference is made to rival sects. St. James (iii. 14 and 16.) gives it πικρος for an epithet, and connects it with εριθεια; and St. Paul reckons it among the works of the flesh; probably there is no instance in which the term is taken favourably when fervour means that of competitors, or contending parties; because in fact fervour in such cases does commonly run into faulty excess; and the senses of words are taken from realities. " Charity envieth not ", ου ζηλοι̃: a benevolent spirit does not run into such contentions as we see in the world.—So James iv. 2. φονευετε και ζηλουτε: ye contend even to taking away life, and yet ye do not obtain what ye contend for. Acts vii. 9. ζηλωσαντες is used for the motive of selling *Joseph*, which must have been envy, or jealousy. The Jews deliver up Christ δια φθονον, Matt. xxvii. 18. On the whole then Aristotle is right in making his ethical and theoretical distinction between φθονος and ζηλος, and yet it was natural for the sacred writers, in their popular language, to follow the actual state of things. Not but Rivalship in Virtue seems to be recommended 2 Cor. ix. 2. and Heb. x. 24. And Rom. xi. 14. both παραζηλοω in Greek and emulation in English are used in a way of commendation.

In French *Envie* signifies both envy and a longing, or desire: when we long for any thing, another possesses it, and our desire is accompanied with envy towards the possessor. *Zèle* is used for envy, much as ζηλος in the New Testament. " la méchanceté du

" zèle"—the next words are, " les *envieux* se trahissent " eux-mêmes". (Genlis.)

(*x*) *Art.* 12.]
Invidia Siculi non invenere Tyranni
Majus tormentum. Hor. Ep. 2. 2.

(*d*) *Art.* 14.] See Byron's Narrative, 8vo. second edition, 1768.

Miss Ray, the Mistress of the Earl of Sandwich, was shot by her lover, a person in Holy Orders, who, immediately after shooting her shot himself. The fact is recorded in a book called *Love and Madness;* but I have not, now, any account of the particulars at hand.

" Jelousie is Hell". Percy's Relics, vol. 1. p. 297. Patient Countess, line 2d.

See also the beginning of Mrs. Montolieus fable, or &c.—but above all, Shakspeare's Othello.

(*e*) *Art.* 16.] Mr. Wilberforce says, p. 355. that " emulation is forbidden: for besides that this passion " almost insensibly degenerates into envy, and that it " derives its origin chiefly from pride and a desire of " self-exaltation, how can we easily love our neigh- " bour as ourselves, if we consider him at the same " time as our rival, and are intent upon surpassing him " in the pursuit of whatever is the subject of our com- " petion"?

Mr. Cowper the Poet, who seems to have been in the same way of thinking with Mr. Wilberforce, blames emulation in one place, and commends it in another: I am sorry that want of room, where I made the remark, prevented my noting the particular places.

It appears, I think, that Mr. Wilberforce was acquainted, with the distinction between Envy and emulation. I would ask then, (though I hereafter acknowledge the imperfection of Emulation,) cannot we fulfill the command to love our neighbour as ourselves if we

try to make ourselves as good as our neighbours? When I try to make myself as excellent as any one, it is because I love or esteem him; his kind of excellence suits my taste; my ideas of real merit. Nay, if I endeavour to make myself as *rich* as any friend, it does not seem necesssary that such endeavour should abate my friendship. A friend of mine, who in one part of his life was witness to many academical competitions, writes thus; "So far as my Cambridge experience "goes, I will venture to answer Mr. W.'s question *thus;* "that I think, the rivalships, as there carried on in my "days, (I imply nothing for or against *other* days, but "merely confine myself to what I best know), did not "on the *whole*, retard men in approaching to that love "which is called loving our neighbour as ourselves, "but *advanced* them in the approach. I can speak the "most strongly of my *own* feelings in those rivalships. "Those rivalships did, I think, increase my benevo-"lence:—at least my *general* benevolence; and either "increased, or did not much diminish my benevolence "to my Rivals themselves. Quære, however, whe-"ther this would have been so if I had been oftener "disappointed in my competitions. I really think, that "the Rivalships which I witnessed in others, appeared "to me to be carried on in a very honourable way; "and that on my *present* reflection, I may believe them "to have *improved* the moral feelings of the compe-"titors. This must be understood with exceptions." So far my friend: I wish to remark, that in one principal Competition, into which I examined with diligence, 'tho' probably not without a degree of prejudice, this person had *not* the preference which he merited; according to the best judgement I was able to form at the time.

P. S. As I see no reason to the contrary, I am inclined to add, that the friend here spoken of is my Brother: Richard Hey, author of several works which have been valued. On Liberty, Gaming, &c.—Happiness and Rights: and that his sentiments (above expressed) were such in 1798, at the end of thirty years from the time of which he speaks.

(*f*) *Art.* 17.] Le plus heureux est chargé des avances: son bonheur lui impose le devoir d'être doux, d' être patient. Un cœur abreuvé d' amertume, exige les égards, les ménagements les plus délicats.

I much approve of this, but I forget where I met with it.

Le mérite commence par éveiller l' envie, mais il peut toujours la désarmer par la modération et la modestie. Genlis: Libraire, p. 184. 12°.

You cannot envy your neighbour's wisdom, if he gives you good counsel; nor his riches, if he supplies you in your wants; nor his greatness, if he employs it to your protection. Swift, quoted by Johnson, in his Dictionary, under *Envy*.

(*g*) *Art.* 21.] Où la vertue regne, il n'ya point de Rival.

Rosiere. Mémoire, near end.

Near the beginning of this Memoire Mons. Target, by whom it is drawn, speaks of the tender friendship of the Rivals for the Rose: " la tendre amitiè des rivales " &c. see Pref. to Madame de Genlis's Rosiere.—Some may say, here is a verbal contradiction; but the meaning seems to be, that such very friendly Rivals may be considered as no rivals at all, in the usual sense of the word; though they be competitors.

NOTES ON PART IV.

(*a*) *Art.* 3.] For instances of this proper sense of Malice see my printed Sermons on Malevolent Sentiments, p. 45. Bishop Hurd uses the expression to "malign and envy". Sermons vol. i. p. 224. We have in Horace, laudare malignè. Ep: ad Aug. 209. On which see Dacier's Note.

Gil Blas says, Book 7. Chap. 2, speaking of the Archbishop of Grenada's Officers, "mais j'eus la malice "de ne pas contenter leur curiosité, pour me venger de "leur mépris" ——In the Book of Ecclesiasticus, "xviii. 31. the verb "malign" is used in our sense. Bishop Law expresses the sentiments of envy and malice (as malice is felt by the object) when he says,, "what eagerness to excell some, what dread of falling below others!" Theory of Rel. p. 12. 4th edit.—— The Song has both sentiments; Malice and Envy.

I laugh not at another's losse,
I grudge not at another's gaine;

Percy's Reliques. Vol. i. p. 295.

(*b*) *Art.* 3.] Though common men may not easily be driven to use malice in what we call the proper sense, yet I have observed that those to whom the word has become familiar, in that sense, find very frequent occasions to use it. Nay they use a *verb*; and want as often to speak of one man's *malicing* another, as of one man's envying another.

(*c*) *Art.* 4.] *Cruelty* to brutes, &c. seems to be using them in a tyrannical insulting manner, allied to malice, and that rather without attention to what they

suffer, than in order to make them suffer. Curiosity at the same time is gratified; and the fine animated attitudes and gestures of tormented animals, besides being picturesque, raise an interest, and excite various emotions in the mind.—This is by no means intended to justify cruelty to brutes, but only to account for it in those who do not think.

The pleasure of *games* of skill and activity, so generally felt by mankind, consists very considerably in triumph over an adversary.

(*d*) *Art.* 5.] Some men say, partly perhaps in the way of pleasantry, that they cannot bear to be *shewn* things; meaning collections of pictures, statues, literary curiosities, fine houses, prospects, &c.—probably those who say this, feel something of insult, or malice, mixing itself with the explanations which are given them. It does not seem impossible, that a *Cicerone*, if narrow-minded, may feel a degree of triumph in what he knows familiarly, and his pupil for the hour is unacquainted with, though acknowledged to be worthy of general notice or admiration.

(*e*) *Art.* 6.] See my Lectures in Divinity, Book iii. Chap. ix. Sect. 1. Note (*a*)—In these Lectures it was frequently found necessary to observe, that the language of Scripture is popular. There is no such word as *Sacrament* in Scripture; nor as *Trinity*.

(*f*) *Art.* 7.] It must not appear strange if in some of the instances quoted, different sentiments should run into one another. How natural it is for them all to mix and unite has been shewn repeatedly.

(*g*) *Art.* 8.] For common life see Fielding's Amelia, B. 2. Ch. 1. " turned their heads aside, unable to " support their secret triumph ".

With regard to *Captives*, it seems almost unaccountable, that small tribes of Savages should so often be conquerors and conquered by turns, and yet continue to

destroy captives; when it must be strikingly evident, that a mutual forbearance of such cruelty must be for the common good.—Perhaps they act only from the passion of the moment: untaught to look forward, disdaining to think of consequences, their views extend no farther than to satiating their revenge, and triumphing over their adversaries and Rivals.. As far as they act from any principle, it is from a contempt and detestation of the character of coward: which they think he must deserve and incur, who first spares an enemy with the view of being afterwards spared himself.

(*h*) *Art.* 20. Edward son of Edward III, commonly called the Black Prince: at the Battle of Crecy. 1346.

NOTES ON PART V.

(*a*) *Art.* 4.] Bishop Joseph Butler has an excellent Sermon on Resentment. How much I am indebted to it I really do not know; as many years have passed since I read it, till within these few days (1799). He seems to divide *Anger* into sudden and deliberate, then to use the term, sometimes for the genus, and sometimes for either species. Should this minute remark be admitted, the inaccuracy, such as it is, may be accounted for by what is here (in the text) observed. Bishop Butler was one of the most accurate of writers, as well as one of the best of men.

(*b*) *Art.* 4.] *Ressentiment* in French seems to correspond to this ancient sense of our Resentment.

Courroux, in Girard's Synonymes, implies some loftiness mixed with anger; it is a sentiment such as arises in the mind of a person of high rank, and pride,

towards an offending inferior. *Rancune* seems to answer to our bearing malice; (Part iv. Art. 3.); whereas *rancour* with us is used for enmity of the most malevolent and bitter sort.

(*c*) *Art.* 6.] See Butler's Sermons on Resentment, Vol i. 12mo. p. 205.

(*d*) *Art.* 7.] See my printed Sermons on Malevolent Sentiments, p. 52.

(*e*) *Art.* 12.] Horace mixes the ideas of Hatred and Resentment in this line,

Dum pænas *odio* per vim festinat *inulto*.
Epist. Lib. i. Ep. 2. v. 61.

(*f*) *Art.* 13.] There is an appearance as if some men deceived themselves by attending too much to their freedom of choice, and too little to the motives by which that choice is determined: perceiving such self-deceit may have driven others into the doctrine of *Necessity*. Our consciousness of a power of chusing makes us think ourselves less passive than we really are. We are impelled by our feelings to good, and that by such constant laws, that a spectator would take it for granted we should act as we do, though in every act we are sensible that we might have acted differently.—I can conceive that men would not make much opposition to the notion of the beneficial influence of the malevolent sentiments, were they to digest thoroughly what is here intimated. But it certainly wants a more full explanation, or examination. Something to the purpose might be found in my Lectures in Divinity, Book iv. Art. x. Sect. 49, and elsewhere.

(*s*) *Art.* 22.] Part I. 37.—Part III. 16.—Part IV. 9.

Madame de Genlis introduces Modern Philosophy (from Pensèes Philosophiques, &c.) pleading in favor of indulging the passions, and contemning those who would subdue them. To make this subduing the more

contemptible it is called *annihilating*; we do not desire really to annihilate passions; but the manner in which such a thing is charged upon us shews, that it was deemed *confessedly* absurd. See Mad. de Genlis on Religion, p. 153.

(*h*) *Art.* 22.] It is not easy to conceive what we should be if deprived of any one of those passions which now continually prompt us to action; yet the attempt to conceive such a thing might have its use. How would a man be if entirely devoid of Anger? When he received harm, injury, affront, would he not be perfectly still and quiet? as little stirred as a piece of marble or wax-work? When he beheld oppression, cruelty, treachery, meanness, ingratitude, would not his features be fixed, and his countenance as placid as ours is on the sight of an indifferent event, or a serene day? A blow might give him bodily *pain*, but as it would not provoke him, he might perhaps thank the striker for taking much trouble on his account. Mock such a one as much as you please, scorn, insult him; he takes no more notice than a portrait, or a statue. And must not such a person, in his turn, deal about blows and injuries with perfect insensibility? must he not make himself *odious*? and bring on continual attacks?

This is not meant as a faithful representation of what a man would be without anger; for that, as I set out with observing, is difficult to be conceived; but merely as something to set others on trying to form an idea of what I am unable to imagine so as to satisfy myself.

(*i*) *Art.* 27.] It is not here meant, that a man may fully expect such *particular* gratitude for *every* good action as he determines to be adequate; were that the case would there be any such thing as disinterested goodness? but it seems as if a benefactor might indulge *general* expectations, that a number of good actions would, in one way or other, produce a number of returns.

It may not seem material to mention, that these

thoughts on forgiveness make part of a Sermon, or set of Sermons, preached before the University of Cambridge in the year 1769. What follows relative to Examples, Part VII. was preached on St. Stephen's day; and all relating to Resentment from Part VII. 43. to the end, in 1769.

NOTES ON PART VI.

(*a*) *Art.* 6.] PERHAPS in French *Courroux* conveys much the same idea. See Note (*b*) in Part V.

(*b*) Art. 7.] In 2 Cor. vii. 11. we have the word *Revenge;* but it seems to mean one part. or mark, of *Repentance.*—Locke and Hammond conceive it to be anger aimed by the penitent at himself; and we are certainly angry with ourselves, and feel a desire to *punish* ourselves, when we look back upon sins and follies into which we have suffered ourselves to be seduced. Yet in reading the passage something gave me the idea of desiring to punish *others* as well as ourselves, if they had been instrumental in our seduction.

(*c*) *Art.* 7.] The passage here meant is 1 Tim. ii. 8. on which see Hammond's Note. In that Note he refers to his Note on Matt. xv. 19.—This also should be read; also Matt. v. 24. They all relate to the purity of the *Heart* from from Revenge, or Grudge: χωρις οργης και διαλογισμε (or διαλογισμων) might be better translated than by "wrath and doubting"; the two words should denote ideas or feelings which usually mix together in the *Heart.* Hammond was sensible of this, yet he does not seem to keep the *tenth commandment* enough in view. He might think *coveting property* the thing particularly forbidden. But the tenth commandment appears

to enjoin, though very briefly, a regulation of *all* our our *sentiments*, as being the causes of our actions.

(*d*) *Art.* 10.] In Part V. some things were said concerning the causes of *frequency* and *intenseness* in anger; but we could scarcely exemplify these from Scripture without repeating what is said in other places. How the *presence* of the object enlivens affections may appear from 1 John iv. 20. which is grounded on a principle common to all passions. *Love* of enemies has been mentioned, and will be spoken of more fully. *Sympathy* will also occur. And the scriptural use of simple terms for *compound* sentiments was fully exemplified under Hatred, Part I. Art. 18, &c. where *Enmity* was an instance.

Cruden calls *zeal* a mixed passion. In the Book of Ecclesiastes we have xi. 10. *Sorrow* in the text and *Anger* in the margin; a feeling so expressed may be compounded of anger and sorrow.

(*e*) *Art.* 19.] James iii. 3. "Behold we put "bits in the horses mouths that they may obey us; "and we turn about their whole body". This is written with a different idea from our present one. It is an instance of a small thing moving a great one; to illustrate the important effects of the small member the tongue. Neither does Job's purpose, when he describes brute animals, coincide with ours. His purpose is to magnify the *Creator*; which he can best effect by contrasting the power of God with the weakness of man. Accordingly, he sets forth those powers of the Horse, &c. which are independent of Man; such as instinct, &c.

(*f*) *Art.* 22.] Eph. vi. 9. in the text has "*for-* "*bearing* threatening": the marginal translation is, "*moderating*". I take the latter: ανιεντες has both senses. If the word "*forbearing*" be preferred, it should imply a comparison; between what is, and what ought to be: it should mean, forbear *such* threatening as is *customary*, amongst the generality; who may, as the

world now is, in these parts, be called imperious and tyrannical masters.

(*g*) *Art.* 25.] Against what is here stated it might be urged, that Solomon says, (Ecclesiastes xi. 10.) "remove sorrow" (margin "*anger*") "from thy "heart". Solomon could not compare Christianity with the state immediately preceding it; but he might see enough of the effects of ill-governed Anger, as a Jew, and as a man, to wish that a good deal of what he did see might be removed.

NOTES ON PART VII.

(*a*) *Art.* 3.] See Macknight's Harmony.

(*b*) *Art.* 4.] See Macknight's Harmony.

(*c*) *Art.* 5.] See Macknight from Kimchi.—See also Parkhurst's Greek Lexicon, under Γεεννα.

(*d*) *Art.* 5.] Some derive μωρε from *Marah*, which has the senses mentioned in this discourse. It also sometimes signifies *Apostate*.

(*e*) *Art.* 18.] Τῳ πονηρῳ to the injurious person. Hammond.

(*f*) *Art.* 23.] See my Lectures in Divinity, Book IV. Art. 37. Sect. 19.

(*g*) *Art.* 26.] See Barclay's Apology for the Quakers, Prop. 15. And Bishop Burnet on the 37th Article of the Church of England.

(*h*) *Art.* 27.] See Hammond on the passage.

(*i*) *Art.* 28.] Luke xvi. 14.—See Bishop Hurd's Discourses Vol 2. Discourse xi.

(*k*) *Art.* 30.] See Numbers xxxiii. 51—56.—See also Deut. xx. 10, &c. mentioned in Bishop Law's Theory of Religion, p. 81. Note (*n*)

See also Deut. xxix. 14, 15.

(*l*) *Art.* 30.] See Cicero de Officiis Lib. i. 12.—And Hume's Essays, Part II. Essay 1. on Commerce. Vol. I. p. 287. Octavo.

(*m*) *Art.* 37.] See Taylor on Romans; Hammond, &c.—Locke gives our sense. See Concordance under *Coals*, and *Burning*.—See also Parkhurst's Hebrew Lexicon under *Gehal.*

(*n*) *Art.* 44.] This passage is Matt. xviii. 15—17. —But I do not dwell upon it, as it is mentioned in the 33d Article of the Church of England. See my Lectures in Divinity, Sect. xi.—Also Sect. viii, of that Article.

(*o*) *Art.* 45.] See my Lectures in Divinity, Book I. Chap. xix.

I wish to be permitted to mention here, that Dr. Law, late Bishop of Carlisle, recommended it to a Student of the University of Cambridge, who was applying his mind to the subject now under consideration, to request a perusal of the Discourses which I had preached at St. Mary's Church on the Love of enemies. And was encouraging to my disquisitions on other occasions. My particular reason for desiring to mention such an anecdote is, that the same learned Prelate towards the decline of life, found our opinions more different than they had once seemed to be. See my Lectures in Divinity, Book III. Chap. VI. Sect. vi.

END OF THE NOTES.

Errata to Malevolent Sentiments.

CONTENTS.

Page.	*line.*	
xi.	21.	*dele* a.
xii.	5.	*for* ight rnles *read* right rules.
xiii.	21.	*for* objsct *read* object.
xiv.	6.	*from bottom, for* Hel *read* Hell.
		bottom line, for mention *read* mentioned

DISCOURSES.

10.	2.	*for* dermine *read* determine.
13.	9.	*from bot. for* hababitations *read* habitations.
17.	1.	*for* confirred *read* conferred.
19.	3.	*for* odions *read* odious.
21.	18.	*from bottom, for* necessarly *read* necessarily.
—	10.	*ditto, for* unfeelnig *read* unfeeling.
—	9.	*ditto, for* course *read* coarse.
23.	16.	for *pesvishness* read *peevishness.*
25.	14.	*from bottom, dele third* t *in* attachment.
30.	19.	*ditto, dele* by.
—	4.	*ditto, dele* up.
44.	30.	*for* unmeritted *read* unmerited.
45.	8.	*for* trigue *read* intrigue.
46.	29.	*for* he *read* be.
50.	7.	*for* thought *read* though.
—	15.	*for* disatisfaction *read* dissatisfaction.
59.	4.	dele (*x*)
60.	7.	dele (*w*)
64.	5.	*from bottom, for* Aristat *read* Aristot.
74.	6.	*ditto, for* their *read* there.
83.	6.	*for* the *read* his.
86.	6.	*from bottom, for* administed *read* administered
90.	25.	*for* (*l*) *read* (*k*)
102.	25.	*for* fervent *read* ferment.
123.	26.	*for* he *read* he is.
124.	16.	*for* unto *read* into.
125.	7.	*for* particulary *read* particular.
132.	10.	*for* it a *read* it is a.
135.	1.	*for* arbitary *read* arbitrary.
—	24.	*for* hen *read* then.

138. 2. *for* enable *read* enables.
146. 1. *dele* all.
148. 5. *for* will *read* would.
— 53. *for* fear *read* bear.
151. 3. *from bottom, dele* be.
153. 3. *for* oppressors *read* oppressor.
154. 15. *dele* as
156. 9. *for* character *read* characters.
157. 16. *for* desirest *read* desiredst.
160. 8. *for* Phraisies *read* Pharisees.
164 8. *from bottom, for* the from *read* from the.
172. 12. *dele* and.
182. 1. *for* allowed *read* allotted.
184. 6. *from bottom, for* may *read* may be,
185. 7. *for* wet *read* we.
— 14. *dele* the.
— 7. *from bottom, dele* him.
207. 8. *for* is heaven *read* is in heaven.
210. 2. *for* affcetions *read* affections.
211. 9. *for* to one another *read* one to another.

NOTES.

vi. 5. *for* not *read* non.
— 8. *from bottom, dele first* in.
viii. 5. *for* Ep. 2. 2. *read* Ep. 1. 2. 58.
— 11. *from bottom, for* competion *read* competition.
x. 15. *for* il n'ya *read* il n'y a.
xiv. 6. *from bottom, for* (*s*) *read* (*g*)
xiv. 8. *ditto, dele* from.

(Wakefield, Printer, Newport-Pagnel.)

thoughts on forgiveness make part of a Sermon, or set of Sermons, preached before the University of Cambridge in the year 1769. What follows relative to Examples, Part VII. was preached on St. Stephen's day; and all relating to Resentment from Part VII. 43. to the end, in 1769.

NOTES ON PART VI.

(*a*) *Art.* 6.] PERHAPS in French *Courroux* conveys much the same idea. See Note (*b*) in Part V.

(*b*) Art. 7.] In 2 Cor. vii. 11. we have the word *Revenge;* but it seems to mean one part. or mark, of *Repentance.*—Locke and Hammond conceive it to be anger aimed by the penitent at himself; and we are certainly angry with ourselves, and feel a desire to *punish* ourselves, when we look back upon sins and follies into which we have suffered ourselves to be seduced. Yet in reading the passage something gave me the idea of desiring to punish *others* as well as ourselves, if they had been instrumental in our seduction.

(*c*) *Art.* 7.] The passage here meant is 1 Tim. ii. 8. on which see Hammond's Note. In that Note he refers to his Note on Matt. xv. 19.—This also should be read; also Matt. v. 24. They all relate to the purity of the *Heart* from from Revenge, or Grudge: χωρις οργης και διαλογισμε (or διαλογισμων) might be better translated than by "wrath and doubting"; the two words should denote ideas or feelings which usually mix together in the *Heart.* Hammond was sensible of this, yet he does not seem to keep the *tenth commandment* enough in view. He might think *coveting property* the thing particularly forbidden. But the tenth commandment appears